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ABSTRACT 
 
Folk psychology has been an object of great philosophical interest for the last 50 years, but it 
remains obscure in many fundamental respects. One finds little consensus on what folk psychology 
is, how it works, and who uses it and how. My dissertation aims to resolve some of this confusion 
by addressing three major problems about folk psychology, pertaining respectively to its meaning, 
character, and domain. 
In the first chapter I discuss what I call the Meaning Problem. Despite the term “folk 
psychology” having wide currency, its meaning remains obscure. I note that the term’s usage pattern 
comprises two distinct strands that echo a proposal by Stich and Ravenscroft to separate the internal 
sense of the term “folk psychology” from its external sense. The external sense concerns an outside-
the-head body of lawlike “platitudes” that make up our collective lay understanding of human 
behavior; the internal sense concerns our in-the-head capacity for getting a cognitive grip on other 
minds. I argue that respecting this separation makes sense of the two strands of usage and provides 
a useful division of labor. 
I argue that an internal meaning for “folk psychology” worth wanting must be specific 
enough to capture the phenomenon cognitive scientists care about—what they call mindreading—
but general enough to leave room for debate on the many still-unsettled questions about that 
phenomenon. I propose that an agent A mindreads just in case its behavior systematically depends 
on changes in the psychological states of an interactor B and that dependency exists in virtue of A’s 
psychological states systematically tracking those of B. 
By focusing the rest of my dissertation on mindreading, I am free to set aside whether folk 
psychology is true or accurate. This is a problem that is properly about the external sense of “folk 
psychology”; and while the internal sense is not entirely unrelated to this problem, the issues I 
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address in chapters two through four can be pursued in isolation from it. We don’t need to know 
about the truth of the platitudes that make up external folk psychology in order to fruitfully 
investigate folk psychology in its internal, in-the-head sense—to ask how the latter works, and who 
uses it. 
In chapter two, I turn to the debate over this capacity’s character. Traditionally, this debate 
has pitted “theory theorists” against “simulationists.” Theory theorists argue that mindreading 
involves the application of a theory, perhaps tacitly held, about the behaviors and thoughts of 
others. Simulationists argue that what underwrites our social reasoning is a capacity to simulate the 
way others think and act. I suggest that slow progress on this debate can be blamed on fundamental 
misunderstandings of core concepts that produce ill-posed questions and bad ways of addressing 
legitimate questions. To illustrate this point, I discuss a specific case of much interest in the current 
literature: what mirror neurons can tell us about how mindreading works. 
Some simulationists argue that mirror neurons provide a neurological ground for 
simulationist accounts, lending them empirical support. But to assess this claim, one must first 
understand what it would take for anything to provide a neurological ground for simulationism, 
which in turn requires a clear and plausible view of what simulation itself is—and such a view is 
largely missing from the debate. I sketch a more respectable picture of simulation, on the basis of 
which I am able to rehabilitate the mirror neuron hypothesis. But even if mirror neurons do 
represent a victory for simulationism, that victory has a decidedly limited scope. The current 
evidence suggests that simulationists have the more compelling account for some mindreading 
abilities. For others, theory theorists seem to hold the stronger position. I endorse a hybrid account 
that includes elements of both theory theory and simulationism. My view is hardly the first such 
account, but it improves on previous efforts by employing the unifying, integrative idea of folk 
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psychology as a model, an idea that synthesizes and extends insights from Ronald Giere, Philip 
Johnson-Laird, and Peter Godfrey-Smith. 
In chapter three I take up the problem of establishing folk psychology’s domain. This 
problem must be divided into two components: the first is specifying the role mindreading plays in 
the cognitive lives of normally functioning adult humans. The second part of the problem is whether 
other sorts of creatures can read minds as well. There are independent reasons to insist on this 
distinction, since it provides conceptual clarity and practical boundaries, but it is especially pertinent 
to my interests, which lie with the second question. For the rest of the thesis, it is this second 
question I will call the Domain Problem: given that normally functioning adult humans are members 
of the mindreading “club,” who else belongs in that club? 
Those working on the Domain Problem can be roughly grouped into inflationist and 
deflationist camps. Inflationists argue that animals and prelinguistic infants may have a serious claim 
to be mindreaders; deflationists disagree. One robust strain of deflationism, best articulated by José 
Bermúdez, contends that creatures lacking language are incapable of mindreading. I argue that this 
language-dependency thesis is incorrect even if one requires that mindreading necessarily involves 
the ascription of propositional attitudes. While there may be some mindreading phenomena that 
necessarily involve linguistic thought, there is no good reason to think that creatures without 
language could not engage in a robust folk psychology. 
Of course, whether such creatures actually do so is another matter, and that is my focus in 
chapter four. While the Domain Problem is an empirical matter for science to settle, I argue that 
philosophers can still contribute in at least three major ways: generating novel hypotheses and 
experimental paradigms, evaluating pre-empirical principles used to guide research, and carefully 
interpreting contentious data. To illustrate this claim (and follow my own advice), I discuss some 
actual cases from the scientific literature. First, looking at primate mindreading research, I show how 
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a persistent and seemingly intractable methodological problem in mindreading research may be 
overcome by clever experimental design. 
I next criticize two pre-empirical principles one often finds being invoked in mindreading 
debates—one stems from anxiety about anthropomorphism, while the other is a descendant of 
Morgan’s Canon. Finally, drawing on work by Elliott Sober and others, I show how appeals to 
parsimony should (and should not) be used in interpreting the results of mindreading research. 
Taken individually, these cases show that philosophers can do meaningful work on the Domain 
Problem. Taken together, they provide tentative support for inflationism about mindreading in 
nonlinguistic creatures.  
I close chapter four by sketching some of my project’s implications in areas outside cognitive 
science. Our practices and attitudes concerning the treatment of animals, for instance, are shaped by 
our beliefs about how animal minds work, and the ethical justification of those practices and 
attitudes depends on the accuracy of those beliefs. A warranted move toward inflationism should 
therefore change, for the better, some of the ways we think about and interact with our fellow 
creatures. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE MEANING OF FOLK PSYCHOLOGY 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION: A WORLD OF OTHERS 
 
“…we see the hero smile at the villain and we all swiftly and effortlessly arrive at the same 
complex theoretical diagnosis: ‘Aha!’ we conclude (but perhaps not consciously), ‘he wants 
her to think he doesn't know she intends to defraud his brother!’”  
Daniel Dennett (1987, p. 48) 
 
We find ourselves in a world of others, with bodies and minds akin to, but distinct 
from, our own. To survive and to flourish, we must get along with these others, anticipate 
what they will do, guess at what they believe, understand their wants and wishes, reckon their 
motives and intentions, sympathize and empathize with their feelings, compete and cooperate 
with them, and share in their projects and pursuits.  
Imagine that you’re planning a surprise party for a friend; if you’ve ever done so, you 
won’t have to imagine. The top priority, of course, is maintaining the element of surprise. 
You have to deceive your friend, sometimes elaborately, about your intentions—or at the 
very least keep her in the dark—even as you coordinate the plans with your other friends. To 
keep the ruse intact, you have to anticipate the questions she might ask and have plausible 
responses ready, and you have to know which of her family members can be trusted with 
advance knowledge of the party (and which ones are notorious squealers). And putting the 
element of surprise aside, you naturally want the party to be fun for her, which means drawing 
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on what you know about her likes and dislikes. And yet you want the party to be fun for 
everyone, so the guest of honor’s personal preferences have to be balanced against those of the 
other partygoers. And let’s not even consider the nightmarishly complex tangle of 
friendships, alliances, hostilities, expectations, and obligations you have to hold in mind when 
deciding whom to invite: hmm, her boss has to be invited, but isn’t her boss dating that ex of hers from 
college? That was a bad breakup; then again, it was years ago, so maybe…and so forth. If you can 
imagine all this—or if you’ve lived through it—then you have a sense of the dizzying 
interpersonal logistics involved in bringing off a single surprise party. 
Yet surprise parties happen every day, and mostly they turn out fine. Navigating the 
world of others is a head-spinningly complex task, but we do it constantly, we do it with 
astonishing success, and we almost always do it without thinking very much about how we do 
it. It’s a talent learned by everyone but taught by no one: by the time we can speak, and 
without even trying, we are prodigies of the interpersonal world. By the time we are adults, 
we have added to our repertoires and refined our techniques, and we are, more or less, fit for 
the multitudinous tasks of —surprises parties included. 
Philosophers have a name for this multifaceted ability by which we steer through this 
world of others: folk psychology. Without it, we would be lost at sea—trapped in our own 
minds or in a world of mere objects and inscrutable agents, unable to make sense of or 
connect with the strange creatures that live outside our heads. Philosophy has long 
appreciated the importance of this ability, but careful and fruitful work on understanding it is a 
more recent development catalyzed by the advent of scientific psychology. Before that, it 
scarcely made sense to talk of folk psychology in the first place; after all, what the folk knew 
about mind was just about all there was to know. 
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Only when science began rigorously to sketch the workings of the mind did we come 
to a clearer view of our lay knowledge of other minds—which in turn highlighted the points 
of concord and contrast between these bodies of knowledge. A rigorously scientific view of 
the mind opened up the conceptual space required for an inquiry into its wild and 
commonsensical counterpart. Into that space stepped eager philosophers and scientists, tools 
in hand. 
Yet despite philosophy and psychology’s fervent interest in folk psychology (FP) over 
the last hundred-odd years, the most basic and pressing questions about it still confront us: 
just what is it, and how does it work? Who uses it, and when, and how? The world of others 
is our world, and navigating it comes naturally to us—but when we investigate and reflect 
upon our natural expertise, we find it hard to answer these sorts of questions, or even to 
think about them clearly. In the pages to come I will address three fundamental problems 
that arise when thinking about FP, which I call the Meaning Problem, the Character Problem, 
and the Domain Problem. 
(1) The Meaning Problem: what do we mean, and what should we mean, by the term 
folk psychology? 
(2) The Character Problem: what is the character of FP? How does it work? Is using 
FP more like applying a theory or enacting a simulation—or something else? 
(3) The Domain Problem:  what is the proper domain of FP?  In other words, how 
much of our social cognitive lives should be understood in terms of employing 
FP, and what other creatures (if any) might employ FP? 
In this first chapter, I will propose a partial answer to the Meaning Problem—enough of an 
answer to get a handle on the slippery and complicated Character Problem, which will be the 
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focus of chapter two. Of the problems listed above, the Domain Problem has received the 
least explicit attention, and contemporary discussion of it is largely confused and confusing; 
chapters three and four will work to dispel some of that confusion, showing first how not to 
solve the Domain Problem—which is really two problems, it turns out—and then showing 
how genuine progress can be made. All of these problems will likely be with us for a while; 
the best I can do here is to make some headway in the right direction. 
 
1.2 ENTER THE MEANING PROBLEM 
The Meaning Problem is the right place to begin: after all, before we can usefully 
broach questions about the character or domain of FP, we need to know what we are talking 
about when we talk about it. We can begin by simply surveying some representative glosses 
of the term from a broad sample of the contemporary literature.1 
Paul Churchland:   
Each of us understands others, as well as we do, because we share a tacit command of 
an integrated body of lore concerning the lawlike relations holding among external 
circumstances, internal states, and overt behavior. Given its nature and functions, this 
body of lore may quite aptly be called “folk psychology.” (1981, p. 69) 
Martin Davies and Tony Stone: 
It has come to be a standard assumption in philosophy and psychology that normal 
adult human beings have a rich conceptual repertoire which they deploy to explain, 
predict and describe the actions of one another and, perhaps, members of closely 
related species also. As is usual, we shall speak of this rich conceptual repertoire as 
                                                
1 Not everyone in philosophy, and not even everyone in this list of glosses, even prefers the term “FP”. Lewis 
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“folk psychology” and of its deployment as “folk-psychological practice.” (1995a, p. 
2) 
Peter Godfrey-Smith:  
I take folk psychology to be the basis—whatever it is—of our ability to describe, 
interpret, and predict each other by attributing beliefs, desires, hopes, feelings, and 
other familiar mental states. (2005, p. 1)   
Alvin Goldman:  
[“FP”] refers to the ordinary person's repertoire of mental concepts, whether or not 
this repertoire invokes a theory. (1993, p. 15) 
Robert Gordon:  
 [FP is] just the capacity for practical reasoning, supplemented by a special use of a 
childish and primitive capacity for pretend play. (1986, p. 171) 
Terry Horgan and James Woodward:  
[FP is] a sort of common-sense theory about how to explain human behavior” (1985, 
p. 197)   
David Lewis:  
Think of common-sense psychology as a term-introducing scientific theory, though 
one invented long before there was any such institution as professional science. 
Collect all the platitudes you can think of regarding the causal relations of mental 
states, sensory stimuli, and motor responses…[a]dd also all the platitudes to the effect 
that one mental state falls under another—‘toothache is a kind of pain’, and the 
like…. Include only platitudes which are common knowledge among us---everyone 
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knows them, everyone knows that everyone else knows them, and so on. (1972, p. 
256) 
Shaun Nichols:  
Most broadly, folk psychology is simply the information that lay people have about 
the mind. (2002, p. 134) 
Daniel Hutto and Matthew Ratcliffe, surveying the area: 
Almost all discussions of the topic begin by stating or presupposing that [FP] is the 
ability to attribute intentional states, principally beliefs and desires, to other people 
and perhaps also to oneself, in order to predict and explain behaviour. (2007, p. 1) 
Stephen Stich: 
…we all share a (largely) tacit theory according to which the behaviour of people of 
people and higher animals is to be explained (in part at least) by appeal to their beliefs 
and desires. It is in virtue of being embedded in this “folk psychology” that such 
terms as ‘belief’ and ‘desire’ acquire their meaning. (1982, p. 154) 
Kathleen Wilkes: 
This seems to me most patently obvious as soon as we reflect on our most mundane 
and routine social activities, let alone when we reflect on the diagnoses we make when 
the behaviour of friends or colleagues seem initially out of character or puzzling: we 
employ unthinkingly, and largely successfully, a rich, intricate, and sophisticated 
framework of [FP]. (1991, p. 18) 
Condensing these glosses into a list of short noun phrases, FP is, variously: a body of lore, a 
conceptual repertoire, the basis of an ability, a repertoire of concepts, a capacity 
(supplemented by another capacity), a sort of common-sense theory, a term-introducing 
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scientific theory, information, an ability, a largely tacit theory, a framework. Even this small 
sample seems dauntingly heterogeneous, and disturbing questions arise: is there any hope of 
reconciling, or at least lending some order, to these various ways of understanding the term 
“FP”? Can we pin down a meaning for this term that is worth wanting? There is, and we 
can—but it will take some work. 
Some of these glosses may seem too broad to be helpful; others, too restrictive. 
Horgan and Woodward’s gloss manages to be both: while ‘a sort of theory’ is hard to pin 
down in any meaningful way—it’s not clear whether “theory” is to be taken literally or only as 
a façon de parler—their gloss limits FP’s application to the behavior of humans, which seems 
prima facie implausible, since I seem to be (perhaps mistakenly) using FP when I try to make 
sense of my dog’s behavior in terms of her mental states. Furthermore, Horgan and 
Woodward restrict FP’s deployment to the task of explanation, which is both out of step with 
wider usage and intuitively strange: after all, to successfully navigate a world of other minds, 
we need to do far more than merely explain how they work. Prediction, cooperation, 
coordination, deception, empathy—all these tasks (and more) seem to fall within FP’s 
purview. So already we are establishing some desiderata for what a meaning for “FP” should 
look like: not so narrow as to preemptively screen out phenomena, circumstances, or 
applications that at least potentially belong to it; and not so permissive as to be meaningless. 
We can next note a duality running through this list of glosses that indicates two 
distinct (though not wholly disparate) strands of usage. The first strand is typified by words 
like “theory”, “lore”, and “framework”—words that suggest a system or store of information. 
The second is typified by words like “ability”, “capacity”, and perhaps “repertoire”—words 
that suggest something more dynamic, more like a craft or a skill. A theory is something to 
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learn, revise, and apply; a capacity is something to acquire, hone, and exercise. One could 
have a theory about how to ride a bicycle while lacking the capacity to do so, and one could 
possess great bike-riding ability without access to any “lore” about bicycles.  
The natural inference to make, once these two strands of usage are made clear, is that 
there are actually two different phenomena being talked about, or that there are two major 
aspects to the phenomenon we have been calling “FP”. Indeed, this is the inference made by 
Stich and Ravenscroft (1993), who propose a way of flagging and respecting this distinction 
that is enormously helpful, but which often goes ignored and unacknowledged. They argue 
that one could use the term “FP” in either an external or an internal sense. These senses don’t 
correspond to rival views, although their users might certainly disagree on a great many 
topics; instead, the senses have distinct areas of application—they are interested, as it were, in 
different things. Users of “FP” in the internal sense are free from worrying too much about 
what users of “FP” in the external sense are up to, and vice versa. It is worth revisiting and 
the way Stich and Ravenscroft treat this issue and amplifying their recommendation; if we can 
keep the two senses of “FP” straight in our thoughts and words, we can avoid talking past 
one another and getting caught in go-nowhere debates. And, more immediately, we can break 
the Meaning Problem down into smaller, and perhaps more manageable, parts. 
 
1.3 THE EXTERNAL SENSE OF “FP” 
The external sense of “FP” (hereafter “FPE”) designates something that “ain’t in the 
head”; something that “is not claimed to be an internally represented knowledge structure or body of 
information; it is not part of the mechanism that subserves [our social-cognitive] abilities” (Stich and 
Ravenscroft 1993, p. 14). It is rather a public, socially constructed thing—perhaps in the 
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shape of a collection of “platitudes,” as David Lewis’s gloss has it. Nichols and Stich (2003), 
in a more recent articulation of Stich and Ravenscroft’s basic insight, dub this sense of “FP” 
the platitude account of folk psychology. Seen through this lens, Lewis (1966, 1970, 1972) is 
arguably the locus classicus of the FPE strand of usage.
2 And although Lewis himself moved 
some distance away from his early position, which he perhaps came to regard as overly simple 
and restrictive (1994), it is worth briefly rehearsing that position. Whatever its flaws, it has 
been hugely influential in the philosophy of mind and beyond. 
Lewis asks us to imagine collecting all the publicly-agreed-upon platitudes “regarding 
the causal relations of mental states, sensory stimuli, and motor responses,” and to suppose 
that these platitudes have the form: “When someone is in so-and-so combination of mental 
states and receives sensory stimuli of so-and-so kind, he tends with so-and-so probability to 
be caused thereby to go into so-and-so mental states and produce so-and-so motor response” 
(1972, p. 256) The collection of platitudes, once properly systematized, constitutes a theory 
about human psychology. This theory introduces theoretical terms—terms for mental states 
like belief, desire, and so forth—and stakes out causal-functional roles for the purported 
referents of those terms to play. And if there are indeed entities that play the appropriate 
roles specified by the theory, then the theoretical terms refer to just those entities. There is 
such a thing as a belief, according to Lewis’s conception of FPE, if there is some entity that 
satisfies the causal-functional role staked out for belief by FPE, our systematized collection of 
platitudes (1966, 1970, 1972). 
Lewis’s account of FPE introduces a number of well-document problems, some of 
which Lewis himself points out in later work (1994). His account is further hobbled by the 
                                                
2 Although Sellars (1956) is an obvious philosophical precursor, and a number of empirical psychologists were 
on the same wavelength as far back as the 1950s, too. 
 
 
10 
 
semantic view Lewis is developing alongside it, which is plenty problematic on its own. 
Keeping the core of Lewis’s picture in mind, we can gain a more general and less 
philosophically encumbered way to understand FPE by considering FPE’s foil; that is, its 
“expert” counterpart. FPE, as a public and systematic lay theory about how people think and 
behave, is conceptually linked to scientific psychology. They share common concerns and 
subject matters, but they differ sharply in their methods and content. The information that 
makes up scientific psychology comes from scientists, who form hypotheses and perform 
experiments to test them; who build models and make predictions; who collect data and try 
to make sense of it. The information that composes FPE, by contrast, comes from non-
scientists. It is a systematization of the untutored judgments offered by lay people, to 
whatever extent these judgments can be systematized.  
To further clarify the nature of FPE, and bring to the surface the concerns and 
problems that belong properly to it, I offer a pair of analogs.  
 
1.3.1 An Analogy: Folk Meteorology, Folk Medicine, Folk Psychology 
On one hand, we have meteorology: an area of scientific inquiry aimed at understanding, 
explaining, and predicting short-term weather phenomena. Naturally there are textbooks on 
meteorology, and a good one (like Ackerman & Knox, 2012) should collect, synthesize, and 
present the best answers meteorologists currently have to questions like “How do 
atmospheric conditions affect the trajectory of a hurricane?” or “What factors shape the 
altitude of the cloud base?” or “How do temperature gradients affect wind speed?” It would 
specify the tools and methods professional meteorologists use to learn about and forecast 
weather phenomena, and it would define and properly employ the concepts actually wielded 
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by meteorologists as they go about their practice. It would contain sentences, models, graphs, 
equations, principles, and laws. Much of this information will be the object of broad and 
stable consensus within the scientific community, but where there is significant debate among 
meteorologists on a particular topic, the textbook would be expected to accurately report that 
debate. 
On the other hand, compare the quasi-scientific field of folk meteorology. No textbook 
exists for this field, but only because there’s no market for it; we can imagine one well 
enough. Such a textbook would collect, synthesize, and present the answers lay people give 
(or would give) to questions like the ones just described. It would specify the tools and 
methods, such as they are, that lay people use to learn about and predict the weather, and it 
would define and properly employ the concepts that populate lay people’s talk about weather 
phenomena. A good deal of this information will be the object of widespread agreement 
among lay people, but much will not—our imaginary textbook would need to faithfully 
reflect consensus where it exists, and accurately describe the various sides of a dispute where 
it does not. 
These two textbooks would differ extensively—the proverbial person on the street 
will have a quite different understanding of, e.g., the atmospheric factors influencing 
hurricane trajectories, than will a professional meteorologist. And where they differ, with 
respect to this topic and all other weather phenomena, we should presumably regard the 
scientific textbook is as authoritative. Of course, the folk-meteorological textbook should be 
taken as having a kind of authority, too—not with respect to weather phenomena, but with 
respect to what lay people think and say (or would say) about weather phenomena. Our folk 
textbook is the definitive compendium of the untutored, relatively unreflective belief reports 
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of people with little or no scientific training in meteorology. But to the extent that we can pin 
down folk meteorology as making certain explanatory or predictive assertions, we may judge 
those assertions in the light of our best science as being true or false. And the more out of 
step folk meteorology is with its scientific counterpart—in its method, assertions, and 
conceptual repertoire—the more we should consider it a grossly mistaken theory. 
Along similar lines, consider the difference between medical science and folk medicine, 
broadly conceived.3 They share the same basic goal: to promote human health and, relatedly, 
to prevent, diagnose, and combat disease. The former comprises the insights of physicians 
and medical scientists—anatomists, biologists, immunologists, and the like—while the latter 
comprises the collective beliefs of lay people belonging to some particular population or 
cultural group. At least in the industrialized West, medical science is generally regarded as 
authoritative (relative to its folk counterpart) on matters of theory and practice—when it 
comes to questions about, e.g. how diseases spread, or the toll taken on the body by the 
process of aging.  
A sure sign of this fact is the asymmetric flow of information between the two 
domains. To consider the recent history of Western folk medicine is to behold the continual, 
often reluctant incorporation of scientific medical knowledge into the collective 
understanding of lay people. The notion, for instance, that someone could be an 
asymptomatic carrier of an infectious disease was an established scientific notion well before 
it took hold in the larger populace—most famously illustrated by early-20th-century case of 
“Typhoid Mary” Mallon, a carrier who, because she was asymptomatic, steadfastly refused to 
                                                
3 I want to avoid entirely all issues pertaining to the cultural importance of folk-medical traditions and practices, 
as well as all questions about the genuine medical efficacy of any particular folk practice. The idea here is simply 
to sketch the fundamental differences between folk medicine and medical science regarding the acquisition and 
application of knowledge; that is, to sketch their differences qua sciences. 
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believe that she could be a source of infection (Cirillo, 2004; Leavitt, 1996). Yet it is relatively 
rare for a principle of folk medicine to make its way into the corpus of scientific medical 
knowledge.4 Of course, even in cultures and countries where medical science holds sway, 
there remains a—pardon the phrase—healthy appetite for what folk medicine has to offer; 
one need only find the right aisle in a bookstore to see abundant evidence of this appetite. 
In each case—meteorology and medicine—we have a mature scientific theory and a 
folk counterpart to that theory, and in each case we can readily imagine judging the accuracy 
and efficacy of the folk theory against its “professional” scientific counterpart. With that in 
mind, suppose that we do indeed find folk meteorology and folk medicine to be grossly 
mistaken theories: they make bad predictions, offer wild explanations, and employ sloppy and 
inaccurate conceptual vocabularies. What should we do about that, other than avoid using 
these theories to tell us whether we should wear galoshes, or how to treat a persistent 
headache? Should we try to revise the folk theories gradually, or should we aim for wholesale 
folk-scientific revolution? We might have prudential reasons to aggressively root out these 
bodies of folk belief; perhaps we think them responsible for serious and dangerous errors on 
the part of lay people. Perhaps we think it is intrinsically valuable, regardless of the practical 
consequences, for lay people’s understanding of the world to match, as closely as possible, 
the best scientific theory.  
Suppose that we have decided to pursue an educational campaign aimed at bringing 
folk meteorology or folk medicine more in line with their scientific counterparts. We would 
need to weigh the costs of such efforts against their benefits, and in light of their probability 
                                                
4 To note a culturally significant difference from the case of folk meteorology: there remains a—pardon the 
phrase—healthy appetite for what folk medicine has to offer, even in regions and among populations where 
modern medical science holds considerable sway. If you need proof, simply stroll down the aisles of any US 
bookstore, if you can still find one. 
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of success. We would need to consider the many problems that could arise along the way, 
including: 
(i) It may be that some principles of medical science or scientific meteorology are 
impossible for lay people to properly understand without some background in other 
fields—rudiments of physics, chemistry, and biology, for instance. Pursuing a 
reeducation program would thus require additional efforts that fall outside the proper 
bounds of either meteorology or medicine. 
(ii) While certain folk concepts or beliefs may only need some refinement to bring them 
in line with the best science, others—for various reasons—may prove stubbornly 
resistant to change or supercession. 
(iii) Scientific ways of talking about meteorological or medical phenomena and methods 
for investigating those phenomena may not be practicable under the circumstances 
typical of lay discussions about these matters. The brute limits of technology or 
linguistic convention may prevent lay people from talking and thinking about those 
phenomena in scientifically respectable ways. 
These are tricky issues and, going along with Stich (1998), I would call many of them political 
issues, which simply don’t admit of neat, principled means of resolution. Even if one deems it 
right and good to bring collective folk beliefs closer to the best science, one cannot derive a 
priori, nor draw from history, any one-size-fits-all solution for bringing collective folk beliefs 
closer to the best scientific theories of the day, nor a general rationale for why and when it is 
appropriate to do so.5 
                                                
5 One might reasonably think that, in many cases, it is the beliefs of policy makers—and not the folk at large—
that most urgently need to find accord with the best science. Global warming is the most obvious and dramatic 
example. Even here, though, one imagines that policy makers’ attitudes would shift if scientifically respectable 
beliefs about climate change took stronger hold among their constituents. 
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 To at last complete the analogy, simply replace “meteorology” or “medicine” with 
‘psychology’ in the above discussions; what results is a sound framework for understanding 
the philosophical and scientific debate surrounding FPE over the last 50-odd years. 
 
1.3.2 The Problems of FPE 
That debate has come to comprise the following problematic issues: 
(a) Consensus and coherence. There is disagreement over the extent to which folk-
psychological beliefs can be coherently systematized into a single “theory”. Recent 
work in experimental philosophy, for instance, seems to reveal previously 
unappreciated differences in how lay people think others will behave. It’s not clear 
how to account for these differences, nor whether a unified theory can be articulated 
in abstraction from them.6 Exactly what it takes for some Lewisian collection of 
“platitudes” to count as a genuine theory is not clear, nor how much consensus is 
required for a shared belief to count as a genuine platitude. Some argue that FPE 
employs terms, like “belief” and “desire”, that don’t refer to anything—but whether 
that would mean FPE is a false theory or a faux theory is a matter of debate.
7 
(b) Content.  To the extent that some minimally coherent folk theory of psychology exists, 
there has been great debate over what the content of that theory is—i.e., what kinds 
of predictive, explanatory, and ontological commitments it makes. Some think FPE is 
committed to the existence of, e.g., the propositional attitudes; others disagree. 
                                                
6 E.g. Feltz and Cokely (2008), Knobe (2003), Knobe & Burra (2006), Machery (2008), Roxborough & Cumby 
(2009). 
7 Paul Churchland, for instance, believes FPE employs non-referring terms, which leads him to say that it is a 
bona fide, but radically false, theory. Others agree with Churchland that FPE employs non-referring terms, but 
believe that this fact disqualifies FPE from bona fide theory status.  
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Pinning down just what ought to go into the imaginary FPE textbook has proven to 
be quite difficult.  
(c) Scientific Respectability. Assuming some agreement can be reached about the content of 
FPE, there remains the issue of its relationship to scientific psychology: whether or 
not FPE stands in need of vindication by cognitive science, and whether such 
vindication is possible. Some hold the firm conviction that FPE and cognitive science 
are fundamentally incompatible, and that there must be a reckoning; others argue that 
they are not only compatible, but in substantial agreement.8  
(d) The Stakes – What is at stake in this debate is itself a matter of much disagreement; it 
isn’t clear what it means if FPE turns out to be basically correct, or radically false, or 
simply unburdened by the need to be scientifically vindicated. One’s position here is 
likely to be especially shaped by the positions taken on (b) and (c). For instance, one 
who thinks (i) that FPE postulates the existence of the propositional attitudes, and (ii) 
that neuroscience licenses eliminativism about the propositional attitudes, will find 
FPE to be a radically false theory, which has filled our everyday vocabulary with talk 
of things that do not exist. Putting FPE in its proper place—whatever that is—would 
then resolve some very basic ontological problems. Jerry Fodor’s stance on this 
matter is put with characteristic zest: if FPE should prove to be gravely mistaken, he 
writes, it would be “the greatest intellectual catastrophe in the history of our species” 
(1987, p. xii). 
(e) The Way Forward. Informed by their positions on (a)-(d), philosophers and some 
psychologists have offered predictions and prescriptions about how things will 
                                                
8 Churchland (1989), Waskan (2003, 2006), Morton (1996), Barker (2002), and Knowles (2001, 2002) are just 
some of the attempts to investigate these questions. 
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proceed. In addition to the purely predictive question of whether FPE could be gotten 
rid of or fundamentally altered, there is the normative question of whether FPE should 
be gotten rid of or fundamentally altered. The first question is connected to issues 
about how deeply entrenched FPE is in our cognitive architecture and social practices; 
the second is more closely tied to the kinds of issues Stich (1998) calls ‘political’. For 
instance, Paul Churchland (1981) famously recommends, and tentatively predicts, the 
eventual replacement of our folk-psychological vocabulary with a more 
neuroscientifically respectable one—but relatively few have signed on to this view. 
These are the issues with which one must contend—though not all at once, necessarily—if 
one takes up the external sense of “FP”. I now turn to the internal sense of “FP”—call it 
“FPI”—in order to bring out its distinctive features and the questions that belong properly to 
it. 
 
1.4 THE INTERNAL SENSE OF “FP” 
For Stich and Ravenscroft (1993), what marks the territory of FPE is the idea that it 
“is not part of the mechanism that subserves [our social-cognitive] abilities.” By contrast, then, “FPI” 
carries the sense of something that is part of that mechanism. While “FPE” picks out 
something that “ain’t in the head,” “FPI” picks out something that is in the head. While FPE 
is inescapably public, FPI is private—not necessarily inaccessible, but literally inside the 
bounds of one’s body. While the metaphor for FPE is a textbook or collection of platitudes, 
the right metaphor for FPI is a tool or a toolbox: the means or mechanisms by which our minds 
represent and reason about the minds of others. We can now identify some fundamental 
questions that properly belong under the umbrella of FPI. 
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(a) Character. If FPI is the toolbox that allows us to make sense of the minds of others, 
what is in the toolbox, and how are the tools used?  This issue is quite broad, but the 
biggest debate in it has been the one churning unabated for the last 30 years between 
so-called ‘theory-theorists’ and ‘simulationists’. To put things very briefly, the former 
camp maintains that FPI has the basic character of a (perhaps tacit) theory, along with 
the internally stored rules for how and when to apply that theory; the latter camp 
contends that FPI is a capacity for simulation that allows us to cognize the minds of 
others by using our own mental processes as stand-ins. More recently, hybrid views, 
which encompass elements of theory-theory and simulationism, have attracted 
considerable support. The debate is far from over, however. 
(b) Modularity. As a special offshoot of the larger debate over psychological modularity, 
the extent to which our folk-psychological abilities are enacted by a well-defined 
psychological module or modules is a matter of dispute among philosophers and 
psychologists alike. Part of the issue here is deciding which social-cognitive abilities 
properly fall under the heading of FPI, and which do not. Even if consensus can be 
reached on that topic, it’s not clear whether the FPI-abilities are too heterogeneous to 
be captured by a single module or a bundle thereof.  
(c) Domain. Supposing that we have some idea of what is in the toolbox, or at least an 
idea about what the toolbox permits one to do, we can ask who exactly has a toolbox.  
Certain humans—infants, persons with severe autism—perform tasks of social 
cognition in ways that make us wonder whether they have a different version of FPI, 
or whether they have it at all. Likewise, certain animals—some primates, cetaceans, 
and corvids, for instance—perform behaviors that make us wonder whether they 
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might have some form of FPI. Regarding normally functioning adult humans, we may 
wonder, not whether we have FPI, but about the prevalence of it in our mental lives. 
Perhaps its role has been unduly exaggerated; perhaps it has been underestimated. 
These debates are sprawling and unwieldy, here branching into various sub-areas of 
experimental psychology, there eliciting weighty contributions from philosophers.  
This list is not exhaustive, certainly, but it is broad enough to capture most of the major 
disputes about FPI. And it should be clear that the concerns intrinsic to FPI are quite 
different from those intrinsic to FPE. Questions highly pertinent with respect to FPE may be 
virtually meaningless when applied to FPI. For instance, it seems sensible and important to 
ask whether FPE is true as a theory, model, or description of the mind. But it is absurd—or at 
least very premature—to ask whether FPI is true or accurate; it seems FPI is not even the kind 
of thing that admits of truth or accuracy. I can make errors when I use FPI, of course—but I 
can also do so when I use my sense of smell or my memory. Asking whether FPI is true or 
accurate in general is like asking whether olfaction or memory in general is true or accurate: not 
literal nonsense, perhaps, but not very sensible either.  
Now, once one has adopted a certain view of FPI’s character, it might well make 
sense to talk about its accuracy or truth. For instance, if one thinks that the character of FPI is 
a tacit theory-like structure9, then one faces the possibility that FPI is radically false—and, if 
that turns out to be the case, the further puzzle of how a radically false theory could serve our 
social cognition so well. But that puzzle would neither be unique nor especially deep: 
cognitive science and clear-headed philosophy of mental representation (e.g. Cummins & 
Poirier 2004) has given us every reason to the think the representational accuracy of a 
                                                
9 This is one possible version of a view known as the theory theory. Theory theory is typically contrasted with 
simulationism, which latter is, roughly, the idea that FPI is best characterized as the application of a simulative 
process. The next chapter will discuss these notions at much greater length. 
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cognitive system can be distinguished from its overall utility. There may be a “Truth 
Problem” about FPE, but there is no comparable problem when it comes to FPI. 
This point illustrates just some of the good reasons for honoring the internal-external 
distinction: by doing so we cut down on the amount of time spent chasing questions that 
don’t deserve to be chased. Moreover, we can narrow our focus to on the issues that seem 
most pressing to us without getting bogged down in debates largely irrelevant to those issues. 
It’s just that sort of focus-narrowing that’s presently in order. As mentioned above, 
this dissertation aims to address what I call the Meaning, Character, and Domain Problems of 
FP. It should now be clear that the latter two problems are not problems for FP in general. For 
one thing, talking about FP in general at all is a mistake, which one risks by not respecting the 
distinction identified by Stich and Ravenscroft. For another thing, the Character and Domain 
Problems plainly concern FPI—and as such, they can be pursued largely in isolation from the 
issues inherent to FPE. Whether FPE needs and can expect vindication by cognitive science; 
whether the mental states (perhaps) posited by FPE actually exist; whether there even is 
something unified enough to deserve the term “FPE”; these are all important and fascinating 
issues. But they simply aren’t issues relevant to the particular problems I mean to discuss. 
Nor is it relevant here to continue searching for an answer to the Meaning Problem as it 
applies to FPE—as long as we maintain a respect for the internal-external distinction, we can 
press ahead with the aspect of the Meaning Problem that corresponds specifically to FPI. 
 
1.5 FRIENDS OF THE INTERNAL-EXTERNAL DISTINCTION 
Before doing so, however, it is worth taking some time to bolster the credibility of the 
internal-external distinction, since my way of dividing the labor depends heavily upon it. The 
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distinction noted by Stich and Ravenscroft is not frequently honored in the literature. 
Nevertheless, I argue, it resonates well with the insights of other thinkers on this matter—
even thinkers who don’t explicitly acknowledge that distinction. 
One major ally is Daniel Dennett, who actually anticipates the internal-external 
distinction, in quite different terms, by insisting that we separate what he calls the “craft” of 
FP from its “ideology” (1991). Dennett describes the former as “a multifarious talent for 
having expectations about the world”—specifically the world of other intentional agents 
(1998, p. 82). This description matches up well with the idea of FPI that Stich and 
Ravenscroft—and I—recommend: an ability, a skill, a kind of toolbox in the head. Distinct 
from FP’s craft is its ideology, which Dennett describes as our public, commonsense, quasi-
scientific understanding of how the craft of FP works—a description that, again, accords well 
with the basic, Lewis-inspired idea of FPE recommended here: a theory, a body of knowledge, 
an imaginary textbook that collects and systematizes lay opinions. 
In a further point of concord with Stich and Ravenscroft, Dennett contends that 
ignoring this distinction impedes the progress of science and scientifically-guided philosophy 
of mind: “Some of the confusion”—in this case, over how to interpret the results of 
empirical research on autism in young children—“is probably due to confusing the craft of 
folk psychology—how we work the tools of the trade—with a few misleading elements of 
the ideology of folk psychology, the often benighted lore about how the craft works” (1998, p. 
82). Note, too, how this description of the ideology of FP as “lore” echoes Churchland’s 
gloss of FP as a “body of lore”; whether they know it or not, both remarks are referring to 
the external, and not the internal, sense of “FP”. 
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Another cognate of the internal-external distinction shows up in the work of Peter 
Godfrey-Smith (2004), who draws a distinction between two kinds of FP: the kind used on 
the freeway, as he puts it, and the kind used in a court of law. When I negotiate speeding 
traffic on a car-clogged freeway, I am performing lightning-fast tasks of social cognition: 
predicting what the car in front of me will do given a narrowing of the road, making 
judgments about whether the truck driver to my right can see my car from where she sits, 
sussing out what the driver tailgating me is trying to communicate. By contrast, when I am 
hearing or making arguments in a court of law, I am involved in social-cognitive practice that 
appeals, explicitly or implicitly, to general laws of behavior—lawlike relations presumed to 
hold between, e.g., beliefs, intentions, and actions. In such a situation I am brought to 
reflectively formulate and publicly express my opinions about the causal structure of human 
cognition and behavior, and to make inferences on the basis of those opinions. Neither 
Dennett’s craft-ideology division nor Godfrey-Smith’s freeway-courthouse scheme maps 
perfectly onto the internal-external distinction, of course. But each is clearly gesturing in the 
same direction—and the lack of perfect agreement is more than offset by the utility of the 
metaphors they offer. 
 
1.6 TOWARD A MEANING FOR “FPI” 
I hope to have extended and amplified the insight of Stich and Ravenscroft by 
showing how apt and useful the internal-external distinction is. It gives sense and order to the 
confusing ways philosophers and psychologists have used and glossed the term “FP”. It 
brings together views that seem to be implicitly appealing to the distinction—like Dennett’s 
and Godfrey-Smith’s—under a single conceptual heading. It lets us mark out particular 
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problems and concerns as belonging properly to one or another sense of “FP”. And, of 
immediate interest to my own project, it justifies deferring questions about FPE in order to 
delve more deeply into questions about FPI. 
But the internal-external distinction can only take us so far; it provides the sketch of 
an answer to the Meaning Problem for FPI, but nothing more. We know that FPI is 
something in the head that underwrites our ability to navigate a social environment, and we 
know it has something to do with sensitivity to the psychological states of others. The task 
now is to specify in a more robust way what we should understand by the term “FP” when it 
is used in its internal sense. I submit that any meaning for “FPI” worth wanting should satisfy 
the following desiderata:  
(i) The meaning of “FPI” should not include talk of a theory, tacit or otherwise. Perhaps FPI 
will turn out to be best understood as a theory of some kind. But we certainly can’t settle that 
question from the armchair by fixing a meaning for the term “FPI”. Under even weak 
construals of “theory”, to say that the term “FPI” picks out a theory—tacit or not—smuggles 
a hefty commitment about FPI’s character into the meaning of that term. By accepting such a 
loaded meaning, simulationists would be immediately excluded from the very debate they are 
trying to win over FPI’s character. Since they don’t take themselves to be talking about a 
theory when they use the term “FPI”, they wouldn’t be talking about the same thing theory-
theorists are; end of discussion. Now, the sprawling, data-heavy dispute between theory-
theorists and simulationists might turn out to be deflatable, but it would be profoundly strange 
to achieve that deflation by this kind of preemptive semantic fiat. And charity dictates that we 
not choose a meaning for “FPI” that eo ipso makes the assertions of simulationists come out as 
grossly false or non-referring. 
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Of course, one might object that “theory” is permissibly used in specifying the 
meaning of “FPI” provided “theory” is construed very broadly. By expanding our conception 
of what counts as a theory, this objection goes, we can call FPI a theory in a weak sense 
without thereby signing up for the problematic implication that it is a theory in the stronger, 
stricter sense used by theory-theorists. This objection is not persuasive, however—for on a 
construal of “theory” weak enough to do the job, it seems that almost any capacity or 
competence would count as the use of a theory. And in that case, it is no longer clear what 
work the term “theory” is doing. Perhaps it is apt, in some metaphorical way, to say that my 
kidneys harbor a theory of blood filtration—but if saying so means no more than “My 
kidneys are good at filtering blood,” then surely we are taking the term far beyond the limits 
of its useful application. “Theory” is thus too problematic a term to serve as part of the core 
meaning of “FPI”—it is either an ineffectual lightweight or an untenable heavyweight. This 
latter point can be made more general:  
(ii) The meaning of “FPI” should be coarse-grained enough to accommodate the Character 
Problem.  In other words, since the Character Problem appears far from settled, we have to 
leave room enough to settle it. Imagine the process of coming to understand how an internal 
combustion engine works: you have a grasp on the idea of a combustion chamber—a place 
where fuel ignition occurs in the presence of some kind of oxidizer—but remain almost 
completely in the dark about how the fuel enters that chamber.  You will need a term for 
your quarry—something like ‘the fuel delivery system’—and a definition for that term that 
picks out the job its referent does. This definition should be coarse-grained enough to allow 
for many diverse hypotheses about how that job is done. A definition that is too fine-grained 
in one way might disallow carburetor systems; a different definition might disallow fuel-
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injection systems; yet another might make room for both carburetors and fuel-injection 
systems but erroneously restrict the physical makeup of the system. The question of what 
realizes the ‘fuel delivery system’ role should be left as a matter for empirical inquiry.  
And likewise for FPI: we have some rough sense of what FPI is “for,” but the fine-
grained story of how it realizes that function is still up for grabs. We shouldn’t fix the 
meaning of “FPI” in a way that disallows live hypotheses about the character of FPI. Of 
course, this point about character-neutrality should not be taken to imply that future progress 
made on the Character Problem couldn’t be read back into the Meaning Problem. The way 
we refer to FPI, and what we take ourselves to be referring to, may well be sensitive to 
discoveries made about the character of FPI. But as a methodological point, we must begin 
with a coarse-grained functional specification of our quarry, so that we can have a well-
defined but wide-ranging debate about what kinds of finer-grained specifications do the job. 
(iii) The meaning of “FPI” should be neutral with respect to the kind of psychological states the 
FPI-user attributes to others. If a creature’s social-cognitive success depends on its attributing 
psychological states to another, should that success be enough to conclude that FPI is being 
employed? Or must the attributed psychological states be of a particular type—for instance, 
must they be propositional attitudes? It is not immediately clear how to answer such 
questions, but it seems wise to begin with a meaning for “FPI” that does not straightaway 
restrict itself to particular psychological state-types. Down the road, of course, we may 
discover that any cognitive event that qualifies as FPI-use involves the attribution of 
propositional attitudes—and, should that turn out to be the case, we may then feel more 
confident in so restricting the meaning of “FPI”. For now, though, we should be cautious. 
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(iv) The meaning of “FPI” should not imply that FPI is a psychological module—or that it 
isn’t.  Our understanding of “FPI” should not risk being made obsolete by progress in the 
ongoing debate about the general modularity of mind. The same point holds for anatomical 
modularity: our answer to the Meaning Problem should carry no implications regarding how 
our folk-psychological abilities are realized neuroanatomically, or even whether well-defined 
neuroanatomical systems can be identified as the realizers of these abilities. These are live 
empirical questions not to be scuttled by the framing of a definition. 
(v) The meaning of “FPI” should not prematurely decide the Domain Problem. If we settle 
the question of, e.g., whether non-human animals can engage in FPI merely by fixing a 
meaning for “FPI”, we have erred. Again, the idea here is to give a meaning for “FPI” that 
makes room for the very real debate over questions like this one. What counts as a creature 
with FPI is something to be discovered through experimental and theoretical work based on a 
reasonable construal of what FPI is; not something to be built into that construal from the 
start.  
More desiderata could be listed, probably, but we have enough now to consider some 
candidate answers to the Meaning Problem of FPI. To that end, I will build on a framework 
provided by J.L. Bermúdez (2009). 
 
1.7 KINDS OF MINDREADING, AND AN ANSWER TO THE MEANING 
PROBLEM 
First, a terminological note: Bermúdez uses the term “mindreading” instead of “FP”, 
and while his target is clearly FPI, it will sometimes be easier to adopt Bermúdez’s 
terminology for the discussion to follow. Bermúduez glosses two species of mindreading as 
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follows: “A creature engages in minimal mindreading when its behavior is systematically 
dependent upon changes in the psychological states of other participants in the 
interaction….” (2009, p. 147). A creature engages in substantive mindreading when its behavior is 
systematically dependent on its representations of the psychological states of other 
participants in the interaction (pp. 147-8).  
This taxonomy has features and implications worth unpacking. First, as Bermúdez 
himself says, minimal mindreading is “quasi-operational.” In principle, it could occur in a 
creature that was incapable of attributing psychological states to others, or even a creature 
with no psychological states of its own. By contrast, substantive mindreading could only 
occur in creatures with mental representations. Second, an ascription of minimal mindreading 
to a creature is merely descriptive; it is not (by itself) explanatory. Asserting that some 
creature engages in minimal mindreading merely points out a relationship of dependence 
between that creature’s behavior and the psychological states of whatever it interacts with—it 
says nothing about why that relationship obtains. By contrast, substantive mindreading 
ascriptions are explanatory: they assert that a causal relationship exists between the creature’s 
representations of others’ psychological states and that creature’s behavior, and that this 
relationship explains the covariance that ascriptions of minimal mindreading merely describe. 
Of course, ascribing substantive mindreading isn’t the only way of explaining an instance of 
covariance captured by a minimal mindreading ascription. A creature known to lack the 
ability to represent others’ psychological states might exhibit that kind of behavioral 
covariance, but we would need to find some other, non-substantive mindreading way of 
explaining that covariance. 
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Bermúdez’ framework is laudable: it draws clear taxonomic lines along crucial 
dimensions, giving us a plausible and useful way of talking about different kinds of 
mindreading. But in unpacking this taxonomy’s features and implications, one worries that it 
leaves out (or passes over) a potentially important basic phenomenon. I have in mind a third 
type of mindreading, “stronger” than minimal mindreading but “weaker” than substantive 
mindreading.  Lacking a better term, I’ll call it sub-substantive mindreading and define it thus: A 
creature engages in sub-substantive mindreading when its behavior is systematically 
dependent upon changes in the psychological states of other participants in the interaction, 
and when these dependencies hold because some of the creature’s psychological states are 
systematically dependent upon changes in the psychological states of the other participants. 
Why does sub-substantive mindreading represent a genuine third category?  First, it is 
decidedly less operational than minimal mindreading. As mentioned, one could ascribe 
minimal mindreading to creatures with no psychological states at all; sub-substantive 
mindreading ascriptions can only be made to creatures with mental states. To classify some 
creature’s behavior-type as merely minimal mindreading is to suggest that the creature’s 
psychological states play no role in behaviors of that type. To classify some creature’s 
behavior-type as sub-substantive mindreading is to assert that some of its psychological states 
do play a role in behaviors of that type. Second, sub-substantive mindreading seems to go 
beyond the merely descriptive nature of minimal mindreading—it says something about why 
the covariance asserted by minimal mindreading holds. But in discharging that explanatory 
debt, sub-substantive mindreading takes on another.  It explains the covariance described by 
a minimal mindreading ascription in terms of a relationship of systematic dependence 
between a creature’s psychological states and those of the other participants—but it leaves 
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unsolved the question of why this relationship of dependence occurs. Substantive 
mindreading goes further still, discharging sub-substantive mindreading’s explanatory debt by 
asserting that mental-state-to-mental-state dependence holds in virtue of the creature’s 
capacity to mentally represent the psychological states of the other participants. 
Even if these conceptual distinctions can be maintained, though, one might think 
carving out logical space for sub-substantive mindreading is silly, because any case where an 
ascription of sub-substantive mindreading is justified will turn out be one in which an 
ascription of substantive mindreading is justified, too.  But making an sub-substantive 
mindreading-ascription does not commit one to making an substantive mindreading-
ascription any more than making an minimal mindreading-ascription commits one to making 
an sub-substantive mindreading-ascription.  We could well imagine a creature in which 
minimal mindreading occurs and is not explained by sub-substantive mindreading: in such a 
creature, the systematic covariation asserted by minimal mindreading would hold in virtue of 
something other than a systematic dependence relation between the creature’s psychological 
states and those of its fellow participants. Likewise, we could well imagine a creature in which 
sub-substantive mindreading occurs and is not explained by substantive mindreading: in such 
a creature, the systematic covariation asserted by sub-substantive mindreading would hold in 
virtue of something other than the creature’s capacity to mentally represent the psychological 
states of its fellow participants. 
To see this point concretely, take the hypothetical case of two people inhabiting an 
apartment building, one living directly above another.  Whenever the upstairs neighbor, 
Upton, gets forlorn about his lost love, he wails and stomps on the floor, which reliably 
strikes fear into the heart of the downstairs neighbor, Downing, causing him to tremble. On 
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the other hand, whenever Upton grows hopeful of finding love again, he plays beautiful 
music on his violin, which reliably makes Downing think nostalgically of his days as a patron 
of the symphony, causing him to gaze wistfully into space.  Absent further information, the 
right way to characterize this situation is in terms of sub-substantive mindreading: some of 
Downing’s behaviors (trembling, gazing) are systematically dependent on changes in Upton’s 
psychological states (forlornness, hopefulness), and that relationship holds because some of 
Downing’s psychological states (fear, nostalgia) are systematically dependent on Upton’s 
aforementioned psychological states.  This isn’t a complete causal story, of course, but for the 
purposes of correctly capturing the sort of mindreading at work here, it will do.  In any case, 
nobody should want to say that Downing’s psychological states represent Upton’s 
psychological states in any robust sense, and so there is no reason to ascribe substantive 
mindreading. 
But so what?  Even if sub-substantive mindreading is a genuine third option, what 
difference does that make?  Potentially, a big one: sub-substantive mindreading ascriptions 
assert dependencies between the psychological states of a creature X and a creature Y, but 
they do not (all by themselves) assert that X represents Y’s psychological states.  I submit that 
carving out logical space for such ascriptions is vital if we are to accommodate 
nonrepresentationalist theories of cognition, social cognition, or particular forms of social 
cognition. Adherents of such views need a way of characterizing folk-psychological capacities 
that is more than minimal—i.e., that isn’t quasi-operational or purely descriptive—yet which is 
still open to a nonrepresentational explanation of these abilities.   
In very general terms, nonrepresentationalists need to assert the following 
conjunction: 
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(a) For some creatures X and Y, X’s psychological states are systematically sensitive to 
Y’s psychological states, and  
(b) This systematic sensitivity is not to be explained by X’s representing Y’s psychological 
states.   
If our taxonomy comprises only minimal and substantive mindreading, this assertion is 
precluded: it goes beyond minimal mindreading, but falls short of substantive mindreading. 
Some representationalists might wonder why we should bother accommodating these pesky 
nonrepresentationalists in the first place.10 Delving headlong into that feud would not be 
germane here; suffice it to say that various flavors of nonrepresentationalism are indeed alive 
and kicking in the philosophy of mind,11 and that the discussion of FPI—i.e., what it is, how it 
works, and who does it—should not preemptively exclude these positions by construing 
“FPI” in a way that disqualifies them a priori. 
This point brings us back to the Meaning Problem: of the three candidates—minimal 
mindreading, sub-substantive mindreading, and substantive mindreading—which is closest to 
a workable definition of “FPI”? For the reason just explicated, it cannot be substantive 
mindreading: if nothing weaker than substantive mindreading could belong to the meaning of 
“FPI”, then nonrepresentationalists are preemptively and unduly screened out of the picture. 
                                                
10 As a committed representationalist, I can still recognize certain attractive features of a nonrepresentational 
account. For a start, adopting such an account renders certain nagging controversies entirely moot. As an 
example, consider the debate among those who think genuine mindreading must involve representing the other 
as being in some mental state or other, over whether these representations are conceptual or nonconceptual 
(Goldman 2009). This problem is by no means easily solved, but it is quite readily dissolved by simply denying 
that mindreading involves such representations in the first place. Of course, the problem of fixing the leak in 
your boat can in some sense be dissolved by simply denying that the leak exists, but I wouldn’t recommend it in 
deep water. One might reasonably worry that the nonrepresentationalist is making a similar sort of error.  
11 On the one hand, we can note nonrepresentational strains in the “enactive” approach to social cognition 
typified by people like Alva Noë (2005), Andy Clark (1997), and Warren Frisina (2002), whose accounts owe 
much to the pioneering and oft-misunderstood work of J.J. Gibson (1979). A distinct but genealogically related 
camp builds on the territory staked out by Husserl (1954/1970), Heidegger (1953/1996), and Merleau-Ponty 
(1945/2002), constructing a neo-phenomenological approach that is highly sympathetic to 
nonrepresentationalism; this camp includes Shaun Gallagher (2001, 2006), Daniel Hutto (2004, 2007), Dan 
Zahavi (2001), and many others. 
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Substantive mindreading violates the desideratum of character-neutrality. With that in mind, 
perhaps minimal mindreading seems like the best choice. After all, we want a meaning for 
“FPI” that is neutral not only with respect to character, but with respect to psychological 
state-type, modularity, and domain. Minimal mindreading meets all those conditions 
admirably.  
Yet minimal mindreading is neutral to a fault—it is too anodyne to usefully fill out 
the meaning of “FPI”. Remember the larger project underway: what we mean to investigate is 
a capacity that is of tremendous cognitive use—something that feeds into intelligent social 
behavior. We want to understand how it is that we have such an astonishingly flexible and 
powerful ability to navigate a world of others—and mere minimal mindreading is too weak to 
bear that load. Let’s imagine a hypothetical case of minimal mindreading: a living mood ring. 
Suppose there is a slug that, when wrapped around one’s finger, changes color in synchrony 
with changes in one’s galvanic skin response, which changes are physiological signals of 
emotional shifts. The slug’s behavior systematically depends on changes in the psychological 
state of the person upon whose finger it sits, but to the extent that we can attribute any 
psychological states at all to the slug, those states do not enter the explanatory picture. The 
living mood ring engages in minimal mindreading, but not in sub-substantive mindreading 
(nor, a fortiori, in substantive mindreading). And even on a neutral construal of FPI’s domain, 
it is implausible to think that the slug is using FPI. 
With minimal mindreading and substantive mindreading ruled out, we are left with 
sub-substantive mindreading as the best remaining candidate for an answer to the Meaning 
Problem. Sub-substantive mindreading won’t work as it stands, though, since not every case 
of sub-substantive mindreading plausibly qualifies as a deployment of FPI: for instance, the 
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situation of Upton and Downing is a case of sub-substantive mindreading, but seems to fit 
our intuitive sense of FPI quite poorly. For that reason, we must add some extra content to 
the bare definition of sub-substantive mindreading in order to arrive at an acceptable answer 
to the Meaning Problem. This extra content is simply an expansion of the core idea that FPI 
involves attributing psychological states to others: whatever FPI turns out to be, it must be 
understood as trafficking in thoughts about thoughts. FPI is what allows us to make sense of the 
social world by giving our minds some purchase on the minds of others. Note that while this 
addendum moves beyond the original formulation of sub-substantive mindreading, it remains 
well short of the specifically representational point that distinguishes Bermúdez’s gloss of 
substantive mindreading. 
The core meaning of “FPI”, then is as follows: for any creature X in a social interaction, FPI 
is the psychological capacity that underwrites X’s behavior being systematically dependent upon changes in the 
psychological states of the interactor, in virtue of X’s psychological states systematically tracking the 
interactor’s. This answer to the Meaning Problem has enough substance to screen out 
phenomena that do not involve genuine metacognition—i.e., those not involving thoughts 
about thoughts—but is also general enough to satisfy our desiderata of neutrality. We cannot 
read off of this definition any conclusions about how FPI works, nor about its proper 
domain. But we can use it as a starting point to investigate those questions in more depth. I 
will turn first to the former question: the problem of FPI’s character. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE CHARACTER PROBLEM 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
I have recommended a pair of meanings for “folk psychology”, corresponding to the 
term’s internal and external senses. For the remainder of the dissertation I will focus 
exclusively on the phenomenon corresponding to the term’s internal sense—whatever it is in 
our heads that allows us to get a cognitive grip on other minds. And except when there is 
good reason not to, I will use the term mindreading to denote that phenomenon, which avoids 
a (further) surfeit of initials and subscripts. 
In fact I intend to narrow my focus even further, and doing so in good faith demands 
a brief explanation. Taking up and contributing meaningfully to what I see as the most 
pressing debates within the Character and Domain Problems of folk psychology, I have to 
accept some fundamental assumptions shared by the parties in those debates. And one such 
assumption is that “to attribute a mental state to an individual is to represent that individual 
as being in that state” (Goldman 2009, 235). So although I ended the previous chapter by 
proposing a meaning for “folk psychology” that is neutral about whether or not mindreading 
is representational, I will bound this chapter’s discussion with the assumption that 
mindreading is indeed representational—that it is, in fact, the psychological capacity to represent and 
reason about others’ mental states—and the answers I will give to the Character and Domain 
Problems depend on that assumption.12 My account is open to challenge, therefore, by 
someone who is keen to attack its representationalist foundations. However, since my 
                                                
12 In the just-discussed terminology of Bermúdez, then, my sense of “mindreading” lines up with what he calls 
substantive mindreading. 
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proffered answers aim at questions that are themselves founded on representationalist 
assumptions, the prospect of that challenge doesn’t worry me overmuch; I am no more 
vulnerable to it than are my interlocutors within the representational framework. 
Lest I am taken to be dismissive of nonrepresentationalism: I am by no means 
opposed to the program in general. On the contrary, nonrepresentationlists are exploring 
avenues that have received too little attention in the recent history of cognitive science, and 
their often-provocative conclusions (e.g. Hutto, 2008) make up an important and enlivening 
part of the debate surrounding folk psychology. And I certainly think it is possible that, 
among the processes and structures that underwrite full-fledged mindreading (the kind 
operative in normally functioning adult humans), there are mental processes that are 
nonrepresentational in character; in fact I think it is likely. My claim that mindreading is 
representational does not entail its being exclusively representational; it is simply shorthand for 
the claim that mindreading is essentially representational. 
With that disclaimer on the record, I turn to the Character Problem, which is, at its 
core, a “how” question. When mindreaders represent and reason about others’ mental states, 
how do they do so? If mindreading is enabled by a psychological mechanism or collection of 
mechanisms, then what sort of mechanism is it, and how does it work? 
There is nothing new about this question; indeed, over the last 25-30 years it has been 
a hotly pursued and widely debated topic in psychology and the philosophy of psychology. 
But the debate, I argue, has been hampered and constricted by basic conceptual confusions 
that produce fruitless, ill-posed disputes. Indeed, the very opposition between the two camps 
that constitute the traditional Character Problem debate—the theory theory camp and the 
simulationist camp—is in many respects based upon such confusion. If we can clear up some 
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of these obscurities, we might hope to make more rapid and substantial progress toward truly 
understanding how mindreading works. In this chapter I will consider one particularly 
controversial topic that falls within the boundaries of the Character Problem—the evidentiary 
status of mirror neuron activity—and use it to illustrate how fundamental misunderstandings 
can bog down our philosophical and scientific discourse.  
Recent years have seen a marked trend toward hybrid accounts of mindreading’s 
character, so called because they purport to include elements from both theory theory and 
simulationism. A partial list would include Botterill and Carruthers (1999), Nichols & Stich 
(2003), Perner and Kühberger (2006), and Goldman (2006). The popularity of such accounts 
is on the whole a heartening sign, but the hybrid position does not go far enough. It still 
accepts the basic contours of the traditional debate. In the latter part of this chapter I will lay 
out the beginnings of a new way of answering the Character Problem. In many respects my 
position is close to the hybrids, but by offering the unifying, integrative idea of mindreading 
as the exploitation of a model, it goes beyond the traditional, constricted conception to which 
most hybrid accounts are still heavily indebted. 
 
2.2 THE TRADITIONAL DEBATE 
The modern debate over the Character Problem took shape in the mid-1980s, with 
the proliferation of competing accounts that could be grouped into two broadly opposing 
camps. I begin with the earlier-established theory theory. 
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2.2.1 Theory Theory 
Mindreading is often said to be, or involve, a kind of theory. Indeed, “theory of 
mind” 13 is one of the terms thought to be roughly interchangeable with “mindreading” and 
“folk psychology.” Not every such locution, however, should be taken as expressing or 
referring to the TT position regarding the Character Problem. Speaking of mindreading as a 
“theory” is frequently understood as merely a façon de parler, and entirely innocent with respect 
to the intrinsic character of mindreading. In such cases the term “theory” is meant to denote, 
in a rather vague and loose way, a body of knowledge or a cognitive capacity.  
Of course, even when “theory” is intended as more than a mere façon de parler, the user 
of the term may be harboring an extremely broad, flabby sense of what counts as a theory. 
Such uses are guilty of the kind of “promiscuity” that concerns Simon Blackburn (1992). 
Blackburn describes the perspective from which this “promiscuous” sense originates: 
If we are good at something…then we can be thought of as making tacit (very tacit) 
use of some set of principles that could, in principle, provide a description of a 
device, or possibly a recipe for the construction of a device, that is also good at it.” 
(1992, p. 188) 
From this perspective, the fact that we can think of our “talent” for folk-psychologizing as 
the (very) tacit deployment of a set of principles that could be specified theoretically is 
enough to license the claim that mindreading is a theory.   
But if this is all that “theory” means—that there is or there could be a theoretical 
description of the practical capacities we think mindreading enables—then it is hard to see 
how there could be any coherent alternative to TT. A sense of “theory” this broad 
prematurely deflates the disagreement between theory-theorists and their opponents. Plainly 
                                                
13 This phrase is sometimes—but only sometimes—capitalized, for reasons that remain a bit obscure to me. 
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we need a stricter and weightier sense of what a theory can be, which, when applied to 
mindreading, amounts to taking a particular sort of stand on the Character Problem. How, 
then, does a more robust sense of “theory” figure into TT? In other words, why do theory-
theorists think it is appropriate to call mindreading a theory (or the use of a theory)?  
Premack and Woodruff (1978), who coined the term “theory of mind,” initially gloss 
this term as “mean[ing] that the individual imputes mental states to himself and to others” (p. 
515). This seems too loose to be helpful—the idea that mindreading involves the attribution 
of mental states is part of our starting point, after all—but they continue that mindreading is 
“properly viewed as a theory, first, because such states are not directly observable, and 
second, because the system can be used to make predictions, specifically about the behavior 
of other organisms” (p. 515). 
Stich and Nichols (1992) construe “theory” as “an internally represented ‘knowledge 
structure’—typically a body of rules or principles or propositions—which serves to guide the 
execution” of the folk-psychological capacities. And although this construal of “theory” is 
still rather permissive, it is robust enough to bring the TT view into better focus: TT thinks 
of mindreading as being underwritten by things like mentally represented rules, principles, or 
propositions. The key notion here is that of generalizations: the theory’s denizens have the 
kind of generality found in the laws that constitute the content of a scientific theory. On this 
kind of picture, to explain or make sense of another’s behavior is to subsume it under a folk-
psychological law or principle, and to predict another’s behavior is to derive an expected 
result from one or more of these laws in combination with situation-specific information. 
The laws or “principles” of that make up the theory pick out, or purport to pick out, regular 
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causal relationships between mental states and other mental states, and between mental states 
and behavior. 
In an important sense, TT can be seen as an “internalized” version of the Sellars-
Lewis platitude picture sketched last chapter as the proper meaning for the external sense of 
“folk psychology.” Mindreaders, the story goes, walk around with some kind of internally 
stored version of the systematized collection of platitudes imagined by Lewis, and their 
success as mindreaders depend on (i) the closeness of the match between their theory and the 
world and (ii) their ability to efficiently deploy that theory in the appropriate ways at the 
necessary times. 
Nearly all the classic proponents of TT (e.g. Perner, 1991; Gopnik & Wellman, 1992; 
Baron-Cohen, 1995; Leslie, 1987) claim that, to one extent or another, our theoretical grip on 
other minds is something “tacit,” meaning simply that we lack conscious access to the 
content of the theory (Chomsky, 1965); it seems to be synonymous with Stich’s (1978) term 
“sub-doxastic.” The particulars of this notion aside, the motivation for it is not hard to 
discern: it seems highly implausible that we should be able to consciously access, process, and 
reflectively consider all the laws and principles that we would have to have stored in our 
heads as (at least) minimally-competent mindreaders. Although we may wield our theory 
adroitly—and recognize, perhaps, when the principles that compose it14 are confirmed or 
violated—we are mostly incapable of making those principles consciously accessible, let alone 
verbally explicit.15 
                                                
14 It is important to note that the content of these principles is not thought to match the content represented by 
the body of platitudes that, according to the Lewisian view, make up our folk-psychological (in the external 
sense) knowledge. If those contents did match, after all, it would be very strange to think of one, but not the 
other, as sub-doxastic. 
15 But see Maibom (2003) for an interesting attack on the claim that folk-psychological knowledge is at all tacit.  
Maibom herself is not a theory-theorist, but her critique of the frequent assumption of tacit knowledge on the 
part of the TT camp is incisive. 
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While something like this basic picture is common to all the TT accounts on offer, 
there is still room for variation among those accounts regarding, for example, how our folk-
psychological theories are acquired and modified over time. One popular view holds that we 
learn and refine our ability to mindread in a way that parallels the process by which scientists 
develop and refine scientific theories. This idea is most closely associated with the work of 
Alison Gopnik (1996a, 1996b), who has been one of its most visible advocates, along with 
Henry Wellman (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992) and Andrew Meltzoff (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 
1998). 
According to this “scientist in the head” view, as we grow from infancy into 
childhood and then maturity, we are constantly gathering data, building parts of our folk-
psychological theory, and testing its “hypotheses.” Worldly experience then gives us 
confirming and disconfirming data for our predictive and explanatory posits, and we (sub-
doxastically) revise our theories in light of these data.  For instance: if my tacit theory includes 
a principle connecting information about another’s bodily orientation toward me with that 
other’s willingness to help me with a task, that principle will be sensitive to subsequent 
experiences. If the bodily orientations my theory associates with “willing to help” turn out, as 
more data comes in, to be unreliable indicators of that psychological state-type, then my 
theory will have to change. 
Standing in opposition to the picture of mindreaders as amateur scientsts, constantly 
refining their folk-psychological theories in the light of experiential data, is what might be 
called the nativist picture. Among psychologists, prominent nativists include Alan Leslie (1987, 
1988, 1992) and Simon Baron-Cohen (1995), and, among philosophers, Jerry Fodor (1983) 
and Peter Carruthers (1996). This view holds, in general, that mindreading develops from a 
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highly canalized module that is, to a significant extent, insulated both from outside 
informational penetration and from conscious control. What results from this developmental 
trajectory is properly called a theory, but the process by which it develops is not the process by 
which scientific theories come into being. Evolution, not learning, deserves credit for tuning 
and honing the theory to its present usefulness. 
Further exploration of the debate between these two sub-factions of the TT camp 
would not be germane here; I have merely tried to lay out the rudiments of TT that feature in 
its most prominent incarnations. Before turning to simulationism, I want to plant the seed of 
an idea that will resurface later in this chapter. 
It is a central tenet of TT that folk-psychological knowledge—regardless of precisely 
how it is acquired—be spelled out in terms of subsumption under laws. Our interpretations of 
others’ behavior, for instance, have the content they do in virtue of these internally 
represented laws (“Why did he do Z?  Well, when people believe X and desire Y, ceteris paribus 
they do Z.”). Access to these laws, whether at doxastic or sub-doxastic levels, allows us to be 
successful mindreaders: through them we are able to make predictions, form explanations, 
interpret the actions of others, and achieve all the other countless feats of social cognition 
necessary for normal life.  
If TT is right about all this, then our explanatory and predictive abilities resemble 
scientific practices of explanation and prediction; the former are simply the “folk” 
counterparts to the latter. But I submit that something has gone seriously wrong here—that 
the analogy with science at the heart of TT is deeply confused. If this is indeed how 
mindreading works, then it hardly makes sense to compare our mindreading abilities to 
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scientific psychology—because the way mindreading works according to TT is nothing like 
the way scientific psychology works!  
According to TT, the causal regularities picked out by our tacit folk-psychological 
theory are what do the explaining—they are the explanantia. But the causal patterns and 
regularities specified by lawlike principles are not what psychologists see as the primary 
explanantia; on the contrary, they’re the primary explananda of cognitive science! Observing 
some lawlike regularity between mental states and behaviors is only a first step—science 
strives to explain why and how that regularity exists. In science, the goal of making accurate 
predictions about the behavior of some system is inseparably bound up with the goal of 
understanding the mechanisms at work in that system (Cummins, 2000). 
There is something of great value in the TT camp’s proposed resemblance between 
mindreading and mind science, but this fundamental misunderstanding of scientific inquiry—
which TT arguably “caught” by inheriting the impoverished view of science of the Sellarsian-
Lewisian platitude view that was TT’s precursor—makes that value hard to see.  
 
2.2.2 Simulation Theory 
I will now turn to the simulationist theory (ST) of mindreading, which for the last 25 
years has been TT’s nemesis and chief competitor. ST’s origins lie in the mid-1980s work of 
Robert Gordon (1986) and Jane Heal (1986), who gave parallel accounts of mindreading that 
challenged the then-dominant TT view; Alvin Goldman (1989) lent his voice to the 
simulationist camp soon after, and has remained one of its most prominent advocates. As 
with TT, there are a number of different versions of ST—the distinctions between Gordon’s, 
Heal’s, and Goldman’s particular views, for example, are neither few nor minor—but the 
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foundation of any ST view is the same, relatively straightforward idea: being a competent 
mindreader is not a matter of knowing or applying a stored theory about what others do and 
why they do it, but of having a properly functioning first-person simulative mechanism. We 
don’t navigate our social world by applying some (tacit) set of principles or laws, but by 
putting ourselves in others’ shoes.  
When we want to know what another person is thinking, or what they are about to 
do, or why they’re acting this way, we use our own mental processes and states as stand-ins for 
the mental processes and states of the other. When we surmise or understand what Smith 
believes, say, or try to guess at what he will do given his beliefs, we do so by running an “off-
line” simulation of Smith’s situation as if we were Smith.16  Instead of invoking a body of 
principles, laws, or propositions that pick out the causal relations relevant to mindreading, ST 
invokes some kind of resemblance between those relations and the causal relations that hold 
within the simulative act.  
Simulationists have tended to emphasize a few key points of contrast between their 
own view and TT, and bringing out some of these points will help us get a clearer sense both 
of ST itself and of its continued appeal. One of ST’s most intuitively attractive features is its 
neat avoidance of certain explanatory burdens. The traditional TT view holds that 
mindreaders must store in their heads an enormous number of lawlike causal generalizations 
(which must be available, if not for conscious access, then at least for inferential processing). 
Adherents of that view therefore face a number of daunting puzzles: they must at least begin 
to describe, for instance, how those generalizations might be acquired, and how they could be 
efficiently employed in folk-psychological reasoning, in psychologically plausible terms. ST 
                                                
16 This is not exactly how every simulationist would phrase things; Gordon (1986) would prefer to say that we 
imaginatively identify with Smith. Again, I am mostly glossing over these sorts of differences between versions of 
ST. 
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offers a seemingly attractive alternative: mindreaders don’t need to walk around with massive 
databases of psychological-behavioral generalizations in their heads to (for instance) reach 
conclusions about how another person will reason. All they need do is “plug in” the 
particulars of a situation to their own extant systems of reasoning; the parallels that hold 
between the simulating and the simulated systems take care of the rest. 
Defenders of ST also claim that their answer to the Character Problem is better 
supported by work in other branches of cognitive science: developmental psychology, 
neuroscience. Simulationists argue that the experimental results on children’s employment of 
“mindreading” abilities squares well with ST (and poorly with TT), and further that 
psychological conditions in which mindreading capacities are diminished (the disorders on 
the autism-Asperger’s spectrum) are accompanied by deficiencies in the ability to engage in 
pretend play. In particular, the mirror-neuron subsystem of the brain has received much 
attention as a possible functionally and anatomically distinct simulation-module.  If our 
mindreading behavior has identifiable neural correlates, and if these neural correlates also 
underwrite our capacities for simulation, the story goes, these considerations count as 
scientific evidence in favor of ST. 
Relative to TT, ST appears to have some appealing philosophical advantages, too. For 
one, it potentially avoids the threat of eliminativism about mental states. On many construals 
of TT, our internally stored folk-psychological theory has among its “theoretical posits” 
things like beliefs, desires, and the other propositional attitudes, and the lawlike principles 
populating any such theory must make reference to these attitudes. But if the eliminativist is 
right that there are no propositional attitudes, then any such theory contains terms that fail to refer, 
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and is therefore radically false.17 How much this counts in favor of simulationism is not 
obvious—after all, humans are far from perfect mindreaders—but considerations of charity 
should at least be afforded tiebreaker status. All else equal, it would seem preferable not to 
explain the mindreading abilities of ordinary people by attributing a radically false theory to 
them. In any case, simulationists need not worry about this eliminativist threat, since there are 
no laws or theoretical terms in their picture of how mindreading works. 
Finally, TT has come under criticism for having a too-narrow scope. The threat of 
eliminativism aside, TT’s strongest suit is the propositional attitudes and the associated tasks 
of predication and explanation. But the flipside of that strength is a telling weakness: because 
TT was built around this limited, belief-desire-intention picture of human cognition, it has a 
hard time incorporating the numerous and diverse other forms of social cognition that fall 
under the umbrella of mindreading. Simulationism seems better able to accommodate that 
diversity, while TT struggles to explain phenomena such as our lay abilities to empathize, to 
grasp emotions, and keep track of personality traits (Maibom 2003). To advocates of ST, its 
broader scope makes it a more complete and holistic theory of mindreading’s character. 
ST’s supposed advantages have not gone unchallenged, of course. Stich and Nichols 
(1995) and Gopnik and Wellman (1995) survey a host of experimental findings that seem 
either to fit poorly with the predictions of ST, or else demand significant emendations to the 
theory. More recently Rebecca Saxe (2005) makes a case against “pure” versions of ST that 
depends on evidence from neuroscience, developmental psychology, and social psychology. 
Saxe concedes that ST handles certain mindreading tasks well—the representation of emotions 
like fear and disgust, for instance (as in Adolphs, Damasio, Tranel, Cooper, & Damasio, 
                                                
17 A point initially articulated by Churchland (1981), and later by Stich (1983). 
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2000)—but claims that it does far less well accounting for the way we represent and reason 
about the epistemic states of others.  
To support her claim, Saxe employs the “argument from error,” which runs as 
follows: 
(1) On tasks that probe certain mindreading abilities, people err in systematic ways. 
(2) If ST were the right explanation for our ability to perform these tasks, then we 
would not expect the error data to be systematic. 
(3) TT, on the other hand, can account not only for the observed error, but the 
systematicity of observed error. 
(4) So TT is explanatorily superior to ST, at least as regards the mindreading abilities 
in question. 
Psychologists have employed versions of the argument from error—that is, using patterns of 
error to draw conclusions about the psychological mechanisms—since the time of 
Helmholtz. To take just one of the patterns of error identified by Saxe (2005), young children 
systematically conflate being wrong with being ignorant, as brought out nicely in the work of 
Ruffman (1996):  
In one experiment, a child and an adult observer (‘A’) are seated in front of 
two dishes of beads. The round dish contains red and green beads, but the 
square dish contains only yellow beads. Both A and the child watch while a 
bead from the round dish is moved under cover into an opaque bag. The 
child, but not A, knows that the chosen bead was green. Then the child is 
asked ‘what colour does A think the bead in the bag is?’ The correct answer is that A 
doesn’t know, or (even better) that A thinks it is red or green (but not 
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yellow)[.] Overwhelmingly, though, the children report that A thinks the bead 
is red. Note that this answer is not simply random: none of the children said A 
thinks that the bead is yellow. Rather, the actual result is best explained by an 
inaccurate generalization in the child’s developing theory of mind: ‘ignorance 
means you get it wrong’. Because A is ignorant of which bead was chosen 
from the round dish, A must think that it was the wrong colour, a red one. 
(Saxe, 2005, p. 178) 
Saxe’s point is not that ST is incapable of telling some story about how error simpliciter could 
come about; a popular strategy is to explain a simulative mechanism’s erroneous outputs by 
appealing to problems with the inputs to that mechanism. Rather, the point is that in many 
cases ST seems incapable of explaining why error arises in the systematic way that it does. By 
contrast, systematic error is rather easily captured by positing a fallible, satisficing internal 
theory of how other minds work, because any such theory will have certain blind spots as the 
unavoidable price of efficiency: “Systematic errors may be symptoms of a theory, but the 
errors are the exception, not the rule. Naive theories incorporate heuristics and 
simplifications precisely because (and only when) the short cuts usually generate accurate 
predictions and explanations, and do so efficiently” (2005, 176). 
 I now want to consider one particular debate within the wider TT-ST dialectic—the 
hue and cry over the evidential role of mirror neurons in adjudicating the Character 
Problem—because it exemplifies some of the fundamental confusions that have, by enabling 
and legitimizing otherwise meritless disputes, unduly hobbled philosophical and scientific 
progress. 
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2.3 CASE STUDY: MIRROR NEURONS AND SIMULATION THEORY 
 
2.3.1 Mirror Neurons: What and Why? 
As we learn more and more about the particular brain structures and processes 
involved in mindreading, theories about the character of mindreading become increasingly 
susceptible to empirical disconfirmation—and more eligible for empirical support. This is all 
as it should be. And unsurprisingly, simulationists and theory-theorists alike have gone 
hunting for brain structures and processes that might ground their respective views: 
proponents of ST like Hurley (2008a) and Keysers and Gazzola (2006) have gravitated 
toward the brain regions implicated by “shared circuits” hypotheses;18 those in the TT camp 
have gravitated toward the medial frontal cortex (as in Amodio and Frith, 2006). 
Neuroscience has thus come to provide a crucial constraint on proffered answers to the 
Character Problem; any such answer must admit of a plausible neural substrate.  
The highest-profile attempt to link neuroscientific findings to an account of 
mindreading’s character involves so-called mirror neurons. Mirror neurons are cells, found in 
certain regions of monkey brains (and, more recently, in bird and human brains), that become 
active both when the agent performs a particular motor action and when the agent sees a 
conspecific19 performing the same motor action. These groups of neurons seem capable of 
telling intentional action from mere and meaningless bodily movements, and of making 
remarkably fine distinctions between action-types (or subtypes); even when the movement 
                                                
18 Keyser and Gazzola hypothesize that “circuit composed of the temporal lobe (area STS (superior temporal 
sulcus) in monkeys or MTG (middle temporal gyrus) in humans), the rostral inferior parietal lobule (PF/IPL) 
and the ventral premotor cortex (F5/BA44+6) is involved both in our own actions and those of others, thereby 
forming a shared circuit for performing and observing actions” (2006, p. 379). 
19 The word “conspecific” shouldn’t be taken too strictly here; there is some evidence that mirror neurons can 
be activated by the observation of creatures outside of one’s own species. Figuring out the precise interspecies 
bounds of mirror neuronal activation is just one of the many ongoing mysteries about the mirror system. 
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profiles of two motor actions are highly similar, the mirror system can be differentially 
activated if the two movements terminate in different ways.  
 Mirror neurons first came to prominence in the 1990s, due to the work of Giacomo 
Rizzolatti and his colleagues at the University of Parma. The earliest major attempt to 
explicitly frame mirror neuron research as providing support for ST is Gallese and Goldman 
(1998), who discuss the involvement of mirror neurons in the mindreading capacity known as 
goal attribution or intentional attribution: the ability to grasp what another agent is trying to do. If 
you and I are having lunch, and you see me extending my arm toward the basket of French 
fries between us, you are likely to surmise, accurately, that I intend to grasp one of the fries in 
order to eat it.20 
To explain this capacity, the simulationist must give some account that involves your 
mental states and processes standing in for my mental states and processes. The prospects for 
such a story depend partly on whether it can be given a plausible neural implementation, and 
this is precisely the role for which mirror neurons have been tapped. 
 
2.3.2 The Mirror Neuron Hypothesis 
The operative conviction behind simulationist attempts to recruit the findings of 
mirror neuron research is what Emma Borg (2007) calls the Mirror Neuron Hypothesis, 
which can be put most generally as follows: 
                                                
20 I acknowledge the existence of conceptual distinctions between goals and intentions, as well as the rich and 
complex philosophical history of these distinctions (as in Anscombe, 1957); there is good reason to be careful 
about which term one uses in which context. However, because this issue is not directly relevant here, and since 
the psychological literature on this topic tends to be rather less scrupulous than philosophers might like, I will 
tend to ignore those distinctions, and treat as interchangeable the expressions “A’s goal is in Xing” and “A’s 
intention in Xing.” 
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(MNH) By neurologically grounding simulationist theories of mindreading, mirror neurons can provide 
empirical support for those theories. 
The natural response to the MNH is to ask how, exactly, mirror neurons are supposed to 
“neurologically ground” ST? The idea seems to be made up of two claims: (i) If ST is true, we 
should be able to find brain processes that are properly described as simulation, and which 
are implicated in mindreading tasks; (ii) the activity of mirror neurons can be properly 
described (at least sometimes) as simulation. 
The first claim looks unassailable; presumably even the most ardent theory-theorist 
would assent to it. After all, accepting (i) is a constraint on there even being a genuine debate 
about the relevance of neuroscientific research to the Character Problem. If there is no 
agreement that ST is open to confirmation or disconfirmation by neuroscience, then this 
whole discussion never gets off the ground. What is controversial about the MNH, therefore, 
seems to lie entirely in claim (ii), which is quite vague as stated. What does it mean to say that 
mirror neuron activity is (at least sometimes) properly characterized as a simulation?  
We might begin to answer that question by considering what it means to say that 
anything is properly characterized as a simulation. Consider an atmospheric scientist 
investigating the mystery of tornadogenesis—that is, how tornadoes take shape within 
previously non-tornadic storms. Aside from pure scientific curiosity, there’s an obvious 
practical motivation for this question: if scientists can discover what properties of a storm 
conduce to the formation of a tornado, they may be able to find ways of more efficiently 
spotting storms with those properties, and that in turn could mean better early-warning 
protocols for people living in areas where tornadoes frequently occur. Obviously the storms 
that give rise to tornadoes are resistant to direct, close-quarters study, and so scientists in this 
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field must make heavy use of computer simulations (see Orf, Semeraro, & Wilhelmson, 2007, 
for just one example). In these simulations, elements of the model behave in ways that 
resemble the ways elements of an actual storm would behave if it were actually occurring. 
Relations of resemblance or isomorphism, perhaps counterfactual ones, arise (or are 
deliberately created) between the simulator and the target system, and those relations allow 
information about the simulator to license conclusions about the target. These are 
simulations par excellence—now what about mirror neurons? 
Imagine watching someone perform some basic motor action—call it X. According 
to claim (ii) of the MNH, when you perceive a conspecific Xing, the elicited mirror neuron 
activity is just what would occur if you were Xing. Just as the computer-generated 
representation resembles the behavior of a real tornadogenic storm (if one were occurring), 
your mirror neurons’ pattern of activity resembles the mirror neuron activity that would be 
occurring if you were really Xing. To see how resemblance might be exploited for the 
purpose of goal attribution, we can give a schematic simulationist account: 
(1) An observer (O) sees an agent (A) performing an action (X).  
(2) O wants to know why A is Xing; in other words, O wants to ascertain A’s goal in 
Xing. 
(3) O generates a hypothesis goal (G) and feeds it into her own practical decision-
making systems as if G were actually her own goal, letting those systems simulate 
their counterparts in A. 
(4) O’s decision-making systems produce action X, but they produce it “offline,” so 
that O does not actually perform X. 
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(5) Since the output of O’s simulation (X) matches the action A has performed (X), 
O concludes that her hypothesis is correct and attributes G to A. 
Again, this is only a crude version of simulationist accounts (of the sort favored by Goldman 
2005b and others), but it captures the core idea of ST: on the basis of supposed resemblances 
between O and A, O comes to have information about the probable intentions behind A’s 
Xing. In the proposal sketched above, mirror neurons enter the picture at step (3) of the 
process, supplying the raw materials for generating the hypothesis goal, G. Supposing for the 
sake of argument that something like this account is correct, is it likewise correct to 
characterize the contribution of mirror neurons as simulation? In other words, is the MNH 
plausible? 
 
2.3.3 Explicit and Implicit Interpretations of the MNH 
Shaun Gallagher (2007) has given an extended critique of the MNH that will serve as 
a useful foil. Gallagher is far from alone in challenging the MNH (other attempts include 
Borg, 2007; Patricia Churchland, 2011; Jacob, 2008; Saxe, 2005), but his particular arguments 
are especially representative of the misunderstandings that cloud the mirror neuron debate.  
Gallagher identifies three ways of developing ST, which have different prospects 
regarding how they might incorporate the MNH, and against which he applies distinct critical 
arguments. The first two characterize simulation as personal-level, explicit, and conscious; in 
the discussion that follows I will elide the differences between these interpretations, simply 
because those differences are incidental to the question of whether mirror neuron activity can 
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properly be called simulation.21 The third interpretation of ST frames simulation as 
subpersonal, implicit, and unconscious.  
A brief sidebar: this way of grouping simulationist views smudges over some nuances 
that should, by rights, go un-smudged. For one, it suggests that the different construals of ST 
are monolithic. But this is hardly the case. Implicit-simulation advocates will certainly allow 
that simulative mindreading is sometimes personal-level, conscious, and explicit. There are 
undeniably times when we think to ourselves, “Now what would so-and-so do?  Let me put 
myself in her shoes….” What is the case is that, according to the implicit-simulation version 
of ST, these instances are relatively infrequent and unrevealing—they are exceptions to the 
rule. Implicit, subpersonal simulation is more cognitively fundamental and far more 
pervasive. And for that reason, it can tell us far more about how cognitive agents make sense 
of one another than these sporadic episodes of consciously accessible simulation. Conversely, 
the supporters of explicit-simulation accounts will surely allow that some episodes of 
simulation occur entirely outside of conscious awareness—their point, again, is simply that 
the canonical and interesting episodes of mindreading are explicit and consciously available. This 
is far from an insignificant issue, but it can be left to one side for my present purposes. The 
ultimate quarry, after all, is a more general point about the viability of the traditional TT-
versus-ST debate. 
Setting aside the nuances just discussed, on the explicit-simulation version of ST, the 
simulative process underwriting our ability to make folk-psychological attributions occurs at 
the level of conscious thought. What does the simulating is the whole person: it is I who 
consciously simulates the beliefs, desires, intentions, and emotions of another. Alvin 
                                                
21 The main difference, as Gallagher sees it, concerns the role (or lack thereof) deliberative inference plays in 
mindreading. 
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Goldman is perhaps the most influential explicit-simulation advocate (although he seems to 
have moved away from that position in recent years); he describes the attribution of mental 
states as occurring via consciously mediated, explicitly directed mental effort: 
First, the attributor creates in herself pretend states intended to match those of the 
target…. The second step is to feed these initial pretend states into some mechanism 
of the attributor’s own psychology…and allow that mechanism to operate on the 
pretend states so as to generate one or more new states. Third, the attributor assigns 
the output state to the target…. (Goldman 2005b, pp. 80–81)   
Note the robust personal agency that pervades this description: on Goldman’s view, one 
actively creates simulation-states in oneself, feeds them into a mechanism, and assigns the 
mechanism’s outputs to one’s target. There is room for the involvement of a subpersonal, 
unconscious mechanism, although Goldman’s remark is ambiguous on that point; he does 
not actually specify that the mechanism is subpersonal and unconscious. And even if we 
assume he means it that way, the mechanism only plays a role because one “allow[s it] to 
operate.”  
Joining this view of simulation with the commitments of the MNH produces the 
explicit-simulation position targeted by Gallagher. Against this position, Gallagher gives what 
he calls a “simple phenomenological argument.”  Put briefly—and the argument itself is 
brief—Gallagher’s claim is that all available phenomenological evidence indicates that we 
don’t often engage in conscious simulation of others’ behavior—not, at least, in the canonical 
“social perception” cases of mirror neuron activity. And because the explicit-simulation 
proponents of the MNH think otherwise, this evidence counts against their position (2007). 
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Brief or not, Gallagher’s argument is compelling. Phenomenological data are 
notoriously dicey grounds on which to build an argument, but in this instance they have some 
dialectical purchase. Because the explicit-simulation interpretation of the MNH carries a hefty 
phenomenological commitment, it is commensurately vulnerable to this sort of 
phenomenological objection. Let’s consider an example: when Smith sees Jones grasp the cup 
in front of him, Smith’s mirror neuron system fires just as it would if Smith were himself 
grasping the cup, and—so the story goes—this MN activity permits Smith to reason 
effectively about the intention behind Jones’s cup-grasping.22 
Yet in this everyday case, Smith is wholly unaware of any process of simulation or 
pretense occurring. To dissect the example to the point of inanity, if someone were to ask 
Smith what Jones was likely to do next after grasping the cup, and he answered, “He’s likely 
to put the cup to his lips and drink,” we might be tempted to say that this bit of folk-
psychological reasoning was subserved by Smith’s mirror neuron system. But surely Smith 
arrives at this answer without engaging in any explicit, effortful, conscious simulation. If 
simulation permits Smith to reason about Jones in this case,23 it does so below the threshold 
of conscious accessibility.  
 Having dispatched—or at least called into serious question—the explicit-simulation 
version of the MNH, Gallagher turns to consider the implicit-simulation position. This view, 
adherents of which include Vittorio Gallese (2007) and Susan Hurley (2008a), construes the 
simulation implemented by mirror neuron activity as occurring implicitly and subpersonally, 
                                                
22 A finer-grained story about how this mirroring might contribute to simulation-based mindreading is given in 
subsection 2.3.2. 
23 An assumption we will hold arguendo for the moment. The present issue is whether, if simulation explains this 
cognitive capacity, it is explicit or implicit simulation. A different argument could be pressed against the explicit-
simulation view from the perspective of orthodox theory theory: namely, that it gives a more straightforward 
description of how and why such mindreading capacities could be cognitively penetrable. 
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outside of conscious awareness. Clearly, no such phenomenological argument will work 
against this construal. Instead, Gallagher tries a sort of conceptual argument about what it 
means for something to be a simulation. By conceptual analysis of simulation, he attempts to 
show that what implicit-simulation proponents of the MNH call “simulation” doesn’t deserve 
the name. 
 
2.3.4 Gallagher’s Conceptual Argument 
Gallagher claims that according to ST’s own understanding of ‘simulation’, the 
subpersonal processes of mirror neuron activity cannot count as simulation. Arguing for this 
claim requires that we have an accurate picture of how ST understands ‘simulation’, and 
Gallagher attempts to provide that. He decocts a “consensus” definition from (some of) the 
Oxford English Dictionary’s definitions of the word along with a few quoted remarks from 
prominent simulationists. One might balk at the method employed by Gallagher here—surely 
one doesn’t expect to pull the true nature of simulation straight out of the OED!  Remember, 
though, that Gallagher’s conceptual analysis isn’t aiming at the truth about simulation; he’s 
simply trying to pin down a consensus definition from the perspective of simulationism. He does 
not need to show that mirror neuron activity fails to meet the true definition of simulation, 
only that the MNH clashes with ST’s own understanding of what counts as simulation; the 
collection of representative simulationist remarks is a perfectly good route to that more 
modest goal. 
 As Gallagher sees it, the attempt to frame mirror neuron activity as implicit, 
subpersonal simulation is undermined by fundamental assumptions about the nature of 
simulation built into the very framework in which the MNH occurs: 
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[T]he ubiquitous definition of simulation in ST involves the instrumental use 
of a first-person model to form third person “as if” or “pretend” mental 
states…If simulation is characterized as a process that I (or my brain) uses or 
controls, if this is what simulation is, then it seems clear that what is 
happening in the implicit processes of motor resonance is not 
simulation…Nor does it make sense to say that at the subpersonal level the 
brain is using a model or methodology, or comparing one experience with 
another, or creating pretend states, or that one set of neurons makes use of 
another set of neurons as a model. (2007, p. 73) 
This argument, too, is simple and relatively straightforward. We can reconstruct it as follows: 
(1) ST understands simulation as comprising processes like experience-comparison, and 
state-creation, and so forth. 
(2) But talk of these processes occurring subpersonally is nonsensical.  
(3) Therefore, the implicit-simulation version of the MNH is incompatible with the very 
theory it is meant to support.  
Assuming Gallagher has fairly characterized ST in premise (1), the persuasiveness of 
his argument depends on his justification for premise (2)—why he thinks talking about 
subpersonal model-use or experience-comparison or state-creation is nonsensical. Gallagher’s 
criticism has mainly to do with what he sees as the problematic passivity of mirror neuron, 
which passivity is incompatible with the definition of ‘simulation’ as something used or 
controlled: 
 These neuronal systems do not take the initiative; they do not activate 
themselves but are activated by the other person’s action…The other person 
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has an effect on us. The other elicits this activation. This is not a simulation, but a 
perceptual elicitation. It is not us (or our brain) doing it, but the other who 
does this to us. (2007, p. 73) 
This remark expresses the crux of Gallagher’s position: that mirror neuron activity, construed 
as part of an implicit and subpersonal ST, is mere elicitation—and therefore cannot rightly be 
called simulation. I will now offer a few responses to Gallagher’s argument. The first two are 
not especially deep criticisms, although I do think they target real and problematic errors in 
Gallagher’s argument; the third and final response goes a bit deeper, and leads into my own 
attempt to analyze the nature of simulation. 
 
2.3.5 Two Initial Replies 
Reply one: Gallagher’s conceptual argument suggests that descending to the 
subpersonal level means that we can only talk about the doings of neurons (or perhaps 
groups of neurons). But this is a strange, and I think mistaken, view. For one thing, Gallagher 
makes it sound as though there were only one subpersonal level. In fact, the number of 
distinct subpersonal levels is bounded only by how functionally salient and explanatorily 
useful these levels are. When we descend below the personal level to offer cognitive 
explanations, we are not bound to a single subpersonal level. And since we are not bound to 
any single subpersonal level, we are certainly not bound to the level of individual neurons (or 
neural groups). To assert otherwise is to simply throw away huge quantities of hard-earned 
functionalist vocabulary and explanatory power.  
Explaining some aspect of cognition is not a forced choice between a personal-level 
explanation and a story told in terms of individual neurons (or groups thereof)—we can, and 
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frequently do, tell stories in terms of systems, and circuits, and modules, and demons, and processing 
streams, and the like. Nothing illicit or occult is going on here, and no questions about the 
ultimate aptness of the mind-as-computer metaphor are being begged—such terms are 
simply the coin of the realm in broadly neuro-functionalist understandings of cognition, 
because they buy so much explanatory power. Imagine a historian who thinks he has to 
explain the origin of modern liberal democracy only in terms of either entire nations or single 
individuals. When he fails, we shouldn’t fault him for giving a bad explanation—we should 
fault him for having a terribly impoverished explanatory toolbox. 
Gallagher seems to think our explanatory toolbox is similarly impoverished. Perhaps 
it is true that no satisfying simulationist story can be told at the personal level; and perhaps 
the same is true at the level of individual neurons. But that is a troubling prospect only if one 
thinks those levels of explanation are the only ones available—which would be a very strange 
thing to believe. Historians can deploy notions of societal trends, class upheavals, political 
movements, and the rest of the rich explanatory vocabulary at their disposal; cognitive 
scientists have a similarly well-stocked arsenal of terms, and a convincing story about 
simulation going on in the brain may well include terms that operate at various intermediate 
levels of description (Bechtel and Mundale, 1999; Craver, 2007). I am not sure why Gallagher 
thinks, or gives the impression of thinking, that the MNH-enthusiast has so few explanatory 
options available. The fact is that there are many well-established subpersonal levels of 
neuropsychological explanation, and a satisfying account of neurally implemented simulation 
may require that we appeal to several of them. 
Reply two. For the sake of argument, let us concede the previous point. Let us suppose, 
contrary to fact, that we must restrict ourselves to talk of sets of neurons in order to tell a 
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satisfying story that frames mirror neuron activity as simulation (still assuming, as we should, 
that the personal-level story isn’t going to work). Even in this case, Gallagher still hasn’t 
given, or made any substantial attempt to give, persuasive reasons why we should consider 
talk of, for example, “one set of neurons mak[ing] use of another set of neurons as a model,” 
to be nonsensical. And given that cognitive scientists widely believe such talk not to be 
nonsensical—or, at least, that they would not find such talk obviously nonsensical—
Gallagher surely owes us more justification for that claim. From the fact that a subpersonal 
cognitive entity or neural system doesn’t X in the same way whole people do, it doesn’t 
follow that talk of subpersonal Xing is nonsensical. 
From the perspective considered in the first reply above, it seems as if Gallagher 
wants to scoop out most of the nouns in our explanatory vocabulary: once we descend to the 
subpersonal level, we can only talk about neurons or sets of neurons. But seen from the 
present perspective, it seems as if Gallagher’s beef is not with the nouns of our explanatory 
terminology, but with its verbs. Once we go subpersonal, we must restrict ourselves to talk of 
what neurons and sets of neurons do, which is…not much, apparently. 
 The point is familiar; we’re just looking at it from a different angle. The proper 
response is likewise familiar: if we accept Gallagher’s proposal, we do so without justification, 
we contravene the prevailing wisdom in cognitive science, and we give up the ability to talk 
meaningfully about what neural systems and subsystems and sub-subsystems do. Such talk is 
ubiquitous among cognitive scientists, who are happy to describe groups of neurons as keeping 
track of an object’s location, or storing information in long-term memory, or the like. Provided that we 
remain on guard against unquestioningly taking such locutions at face value, this kind of 
broadly functionalist language is perfectly legitimate, and it holds enormous explanatory 
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power. Our functionalist vocabulary has been so enlightening and so useful that we should 
need very strong reasons to give it up. Gallagher hasn’t offered any. 
 
2.3.6 Reply Three: A Little Story 
These issues aside, the most serious problem with Gallagher’s argument is this: the 
idea that something can be both an elicitation and a simulation seems not to occur to him; or 
else it seems so obviously false that he doesn’t feel the need to address it. At the heart of his 
position lies the apparent belief that if some process is an elicitation, then, ipso facto, it cannot 
be a simulation. This is an interesting idea, but I think it is wrong. At this point, it may help to 
reflect—pun unintended but unavoidable—on the everyday item for which mirror neurons 
are named.  
Imagine the following setup: Alex, Beth, and Carter are located at three different 
points in an L-shaped hallway—Alex and Carter at the extremes, and Beth is at the L’s joint 
(Figure 2.1).  
 
Alex is performing a sequence of dances, and Carter is tasked with predicting what dance 
steps Alex will perform next. And since Carter cannot himself see Alex dance, it is Beth’s job 
to relay to him information about the steps Alex is doing. 
Figure 2.1 
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 Now, how should Beth do this?  She wants to give Carter accurate and useful 
information. She herself has no dancing skills; since imitation is out, so she tries various 
methods: calling out the dance steps, writing them down, drawing pictures and diagrams, and 
even building a little scale action-figureish model of Alex. After exhausting these methods 
with little success, she hits upon an elegant solution: a mirror. Holding it just so, Beth allows 
Alex’s dance steps to be broadcast to Carter in real time and high-definition, as if he were 
himself seeing Alex (mirror-reversed, of course). This setup (Figure 2.2) is an instance of 
simulation via mirroring—the use Carter makes of the mirrored information can be properly 
described as process of a simulation.  
 
 Let’s now imagine that Beth, after some time, realizes that she has been rendered 
obsolete by her own innovation—all she’s doing is holding the mirror. Satisfied and 
somewhat bored, she leaves the hallway, propping the mirror against her chair (Figure 2.3). 
What should we say about this situation?  Surely it is still simulation; the fact that Beth has 
exited the picture has no impact on the successful mirroring of Alex’s dance, nor does it 
affect the ability of Carter to exploit that mirroring. 
 
Figure 2.2: simulation by 
mirroring 
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Evidently, Beth’s presence is incidental to the mirroring of Alex’s dance—and in fact, 
so is Carter’s. If Carter, too, left the premises (Figure 2.4), Alex’s dance would continue to be 
mirrored, because the mirroring itself is merely a passively elicited process; it will continue as 
long as the mirror is positioned appropriately for such elicitation.  
 
 
But though the mirroring would continue, it seems it would no longer count as simulation, 
because the mirroring would no longer be poised for the right kind of informational 
consumption by parties down the informational stream. In this case, what makes the mirror a 
simulator has nothing to do with who—if anyone—is controlling or initiating the mirroring, 
and everything to do with who stands ready to use that mirrored information, and how. The 
passivity of the mirror as a representational medium is of no import.  
Figure 2.3: simulation by 
mirroring (with B absent) 
Figure 2.4: mirroring without 
simulation 
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 Things are likewise, I contend, with the MNH: simulationists are not interested in the 
activity of mirror neurons as such—which can be activated either exogenously or 
endogenously—but in the way that that neural mirroring makes some cognitive difference 
downstream. When mirror neuron activity qualifies as simulation, what qualifies it as such, 
pace Gallagher, is not just the mirroring relation it implements, but in its cognitive role—what 
this “merely elicited” neural activity makes possible. When the information represented by 
mirror neuron activity makes the right sort of informational contribution—or when it is 
poised to make such a contribution—then what mirror neurons are doing is not mere 
mirroring, but simulation. 
 
2.3.7 A Fundamental Confusion 
Gallagher’s argument against a version of the MNH that interprets simulation as a 
primarily personal-level phenomenon may be decisive. Yet it is not clear how much support 
that position enjoys in the simulationist community; Goldman may have once endorsed 
something like it, but his more recent work (2008) seems to have moved toward the more 
plausible implicit-subpersonal version. And because that version of ST makes no problematic 
phenomenological commitments, Gallagher must try a different tack against it. His 
conceptual argument fails, I have argued, because his conception of simulation is too narrow. 
But the fate of Gallagher’s particular critique of MNH is a relatively minor concern in 
the context of the larger feud over the evidentiary value of mirror neurons and the TT-ST 
debate more generally—except that it serves as a cautionary example of a pervasive problem. 
Gallagher’s example shows how a seemingly well-formed broadside in this debate can mask a 
fundamental confusion (in this case, about simulation itself). The most effective response to 
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Gallagher is not to accept his conceptual analysis and attempt to resist the conclusion he 
draws, but to point out that his argument is founded upon a deep conceptual error.  
But Gallagher is not alone in making this error, nor is it unique to the critics of the 
MNH. In fact, defenders of the MNH are frequently guilty of an equal-and-opposite sort of 
misunderstanding. Just as Gallagher’s conception of simulation is too narrow, thereby ruling 
out a priori mirroring processes that may turn out to be genuinely simulative, many of the 
most enthusiastic touts of mirror neuron research have a conception of simulation that is far 
too broad, such that nearly all instances of mirroring wind up counting as simulation, and 
therefore as evidence in favor of simulationism (Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004; 
Oberman & Ramachandran, 2007; Shanton & Goldman, 2010). Sometimes these MNH-
defenders implicitly suggest or explicitly posit an equivalence between the notions of 
mirroring and simulation, as when Goldman says, with admirable unambiguity, “All mirroring 
is simulation” (2005c, p. 87).  
It bodes ill for the TT-ST debate that one of the central concepts in that debate—
simulation—is still an object of such deep confusion. As regards the difference between 
mirroring and simulation, the right course seems to be a middle one: mirroring is a process of 
exogenously elicited resemblance, but resemblance by itself is not sufficient for simulation. For 
a mirroring process to count as simulation, it must be used in the right way down the 
informational stream. And for it to count as simulation for the purposes of mindreading, its 
cognitive function must contribute to some mindreading capacity (like goal attribution). 
Mitchell Herschbach (2011) takes a major step in the right direction by providing a 
philosophically and psychologically respectable—and clear—conception of simulation. 
Basing his discussion partly on Robert Cummins’s (1996) distinction between 
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representational contents and targets, Herschbach’s general sense of simulation is that of “a 
species of representation that acquires its content by virtue of concrete resemblance, and its 
target in virtue of its use as a representation or stand-in” (p. 26). On this conception of 
simulation, mirroring processes may sometimes count as simulative in the way that MNH-
advocates say, but when and why this is the case will be mostly a matter for cognitive 
neuroscientists to settle. If participants in the debate over the Character Problem could adopt 
such a definition and stick to it, that debate would be far less likely to spin off into ill-posed 
and unproductive disputes of the kind exemplified by Gallagher’s (2007) criticism of the 
MNH. 
To be sure, basic questions regarding simulation would remain; for instance, the 
problem of how to accurately individuate simulative mechanisms. Even if all involved could 
agree that what makes a mirroring process properly simulative is (at least in part) the way its 
resemblance-based representational content is taken up downstream, we might still face 
tough puzzles about whether certain mirroring processes fit the bill. Suppose that there are 
mirroring processes that seem to represent only bodily information about an observed actor 
(as in Oztop, Wolpert, & Kawato, 2005), but that this information about the other’s body is 
exploited for inferences about the other’s mental states. Here the mirrored content is used for 
the right kind of cognitive purpose, but its immediate function seems only indirectly 
connected to the representation of another’s psychological states, and so perhaps it should 
not qualify as genuine simulation. I have no clear sense of how best to solve these problems 
of individuation—but at least they are real problems. 
This brings my case study of the mirror neuron controversy to a close. I have shown 
how this controversy is infected with deep confusion about even the most basic terms and 
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concepts, how these confusions impede substantive progress on the relevant questions, and 
how these confusions are unfortunately ubiquitous in the wider debate over the Character 
Problem. Recent years have seen some long-overdue efforts to clear up these confusions—
Herschbach’s (2011) is an excellent example—but one might wonder if there is a better way 
forward. 
 
2.4 SKETCHING A NEW ANSWER TO THE CHARACTER PROBLEM 
 
2.4.1 Mindreading as Model-Use: The Basic Idea 
Hybrid answers to the Character Problem represent a kind of half-measure; they 
begin from the conviction that both TT and ST, in their pure incarnations, have gotten it 
wrong. The popularity of such accounts—proposed by, among others, Botterill and 
Carruthers (1999), Nichols and Stich (2003), Perner and Kühberger (2006), and Goldman 
(2006)—reflects a growing recognition that no plausible account of mindreading’s character 
can be given solely in terms of simulation, nor solely in terms of theoretical knowledge. 
Furthermore, it signals an appreciation for the multifariousness of mindreading, which is now 
more widely understood as a loosely-united complex of diverse capacities, each suited to 
specific social-cognitive domains. All this is to be celebrated, as far it goes. 
Yet even the best hybrid accounts on offer still accept the conceptual framework 
defined by the binary TT-ST conflict, and I want to sketch a proposal for moving beyond 
that framework. While understanding mindreading as a hodgepodge of domain-specific 
theory- and simulation-based processes is an improvement over the monolithic accounts that 
have long defined the Character Problem, we can do better still. I suggest that by describing 
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mindreading’s intrinsic character as the deployment of a model, we can retain the insights and 
advances of the hybrid accounts (and their precursors from within TT and ST) while 
integrating those advances under a single conceptual heading and adding to our descriptive 
and explanatory power. The notion of mindreading, or folk psychology in some more general 
sense, as model-application is certainly not original to me. One can detect the germs of this 
notion in the work of some early simulationists (Gordon 1986, Goldman 1989) and in recent 
years it has received some attention from other philosophers and cognitive scientists groping 
for a way out of the traditional theory-versus-simulation impasse.24  
The treatment of models in cognitive science begins, it could be argued, even before 
the dawn of cognitive science so called, with the seminal work of Kenneth Craik (1943). 
Craik defines a model as “any physical or chemical system which has a similar relation-
structure to that of the processes it imitates, and which “works in the same way as the 
processes it parallels” (cited in Johnson-Laird, 1983, p. 3). From this remark, two different 
strands of discussion have grown: one strand focuses on the idea of mental models as 
nonlinguistic vehicles of cognition, and is perhaps most closely associated with the proposals 
of David Marr (1982) and Philip Johnson-Laird (1983, 2006). The second strand is less 
concerned with mental models as mental representations and more concerned with the 
construction and use of theoretical models in science. This strand is exemplified by the work 
of Ronald Giere (1988, 1999). 
I want to bring those strands together—but first, some general points about models. 
A model should be carefully distinguished both from its application to some target system 
and from any of its particular construals, or any set thereof. The former distinction can be 
highlighted by pointing out that models themselves cannot be true or false, while their 
                                                
24 Godfrey-Smith (2004, 2005); Proust (2007); Maibom (2003, 2007a, 2007b). 
 
 
69 
 
applications can.  A model itself is nothing but a highly abstract set of structural relations. As 
Maibom (2003) puts it, following Giere, models are “abstract systems that are not, in and of 
themselves, true or false of anything” (p. 308). An application of a model occurs when that 
model is used to cognize some target domain, such that (some of) the structural relations 
internal to the model are meant to mirror structural relations in the target domain. So, only 
our applications of these models can be true or false—or, as Cummins (1996) would put it, 
only our model-applications can be more or less accurate. 
According to the latter distinction—that between a model and its construal—a 
construal of a model is the way in which the model-user takes the model to represent the target 
domain.  On one construal of a model, applied to some target, the thought might be that the 
model simply provides a kind of predictively reliable input-output device.25 On another 
construal of the same model applied the same target, the model may be used as a highly 
accurate, fine-grained representation of the inner details of the target system (Godfrey-Smith 
2005). Note that changing the target to which the model is meant to apply does not alter the 
model itself; nor does changing how the model is construed. Models themselves are highly 
noncommittal entities; they are under no obligation to obey a particular construal. 
Keeping all this in mind, consider the proposal of Peter Godfrey-Smith (2005), who 
suggests that “ordinary folk-psychological skill might best be described not as grasp of a 
theory but as something like facility with a model. Perhaps when we find ourselves engaging in 
ordinary, unreflective folk-psychological interpretation, we are bringing something like a 
model to bear on the person we are trying to interpret” (p. 4). Godfrey-Smith’s remark is 
particularly relevant to the Character Problem because he is clearly gesturing toward the 
internal, rather than the external, sense of folk psychology—that is, mindreading. How might 
                                                
25 In science, these are called phenomenological models—e.g. Ohm’s Law, or the ideal gas law. 
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we start to flesh out Godfrey-Smith’s suggestion—what we might call the model theory (MT) of 
mindreading’s character? 
The most crucial challenge for getting MT off the ground is explaining how models 
could represent the things they would need to represent if they are to underwrite 
mindreading. That is, we need to have some sense of how a model could represent mental 
states like, for instance, the canonical propositional attitudes. We have a good grip on how a 
linguaformal vehicle might represent a belief or a desire, but with nonlinguistic models things 
are less clear.  
The key idea is one of embedment, which is analogous to recursion in symbol-systems. 
If a psychological state (e.g., belief) can be understood as a model of some state of affairs in 
the world, then it is no great leap to suppose that another model could contain that model 
embedded within it. As Johnson-Laird (1983) says, “A propositional attitude is a relation 
between an individual and that individual’s mental model of the relevant state of affairs. To 
represent a propositional attitude, it is merely necessary to allow a recursive embedding of 
mental models…” (p. 435). If a model itself is merely an abstract set of relations, there is no 
reason why one such set could not be embedded within another. Some models used for 
mindreading might involve linguaformal components, of course. Johnson-Laird & Byrne 
(1991, 2002), for instance, discuss mental models that include ingredients corresponding to, 
e.g., the negation sign, or brackets. But we need not worry that this fact endangers the status 
of MT as a genuine alternative to TT, because while linguaformal components are permitted 
for model-based cognition, they are not required for it.26  
                                                
26 Waskan (2006) argues that human cognition centrally involves the use of “intrinsic cognitive models” that, like 
scale models and computational models out in the world, help us “generate predictions concerning the behavior 
of some target system” (p. 198). Waskan’s theory cannot be considered in full here; nevertheless, I would count 
his conception of cognitive models, his sense of their predictive and explanatory roles in cognition, and the 
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2.4.2 Advantages of the Model Theory 
The chief advantage of MT is that it stands a chance of transcending the TT-ST-
hybrid quagmire by taking features from the two traditionally opposed camps and integrating 
them in a single conceptual framework. Like a hybrid theory, the notion of MT under 
development here can accommodate both theoretical and simulative elements. But in a 
hybrid account there is no deep reason why both sorts of elements must be involved; that 
idea simply stems from the recognition that neither TT nor ST can do the job alone. By 
contrast, a model must accommodate both theoretical and simulative elements, because both 
are necessary for any model to figure usefully in any cognitive task. A mental model that fails 
to be simulative in any respect will fail to match the world it is meant to cognize, and will be 
explanatorily powerless. Likewise, even the most accurate mental model will be useless to its 
host if its construals and applications are not aimed at the right targets. As Johnson-Laird 
(1983) puts it,  
…a model has, in Craik’s phrase, a similar ‘relation-structure’ to the process it models, 
and hence it can be useful explanatorily; a simulation merely mimics the phenomenon 
without relying on a similar underlying relation-structure. Many of the models in 
people’s minds are little more than high-grade simulations, but they are none the less 
useful provided that the picture is accurate…. (p. 4) 
Without simulation, models have no chance at accuracy; without theory, they have no chance 
at efficacy. Any plausible story about mindreading as model-use must therefore understand 
models as shot through with both simulative and theoretical components. 
                                                                                                                                             
advantages he offers for his hypothesis over prominent sentential and non-sentential rivals, as friendly to my 
view. 
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This integrative quality allows MT to accord well with scientific findings, in a way that 
is not open to the orthodox TT or ST views. To take an example from neuroscience, the fact 
that the mirror neuron system, which is tightly linked to goal attribution and emotional 
recognition, is to be functionally and anatomically distinct from the neural substrates of 
thinking about the epistemic states of others does not trouble the MT view. The mirror 
neuron system may subserve one class of mindreading models, while the epistemic-state-
ascription system may subserve a separate class. Both sets of brain subsystems can be 
described as housing the neural correlates of mindreading, because MT makes room for 
different models to be applied as the task environment changes. 
MT also has the attractive feature of avoiding problems that are specific to one or 
another of the two traditional positions. As discussed earlier, one of the problematic features 
of TT is that it appears committed to the postulation of an enormous amount of tacit folk-
psychological information. Since we are highly competent mindreaders who are nonetheless 
incapable of explicitly verbalizing (most of) the laws or principles that compose our internal 
“theory,” that body of theoretical knowledge must be more or less tacit. The idea is roughly 
parallel to Chomsky’s psycholinguistic theory—and TT is thus open to the same sorts of 
challenges and concerns that confront the Chomskyan program. MT gives us a way out of 
this problem, as Maibom (2003) points out. Instead of thinking of our mindreading 
competence as underwritten by a system of generalizations, laws, and principles, we can think 
of it as the ability to apply the right models and using the right construals of those models in 
the appropriate circumstances. The fact that we cannot spontaneously recite lawlike 
generalizations corresponding to our mindreading competence is hardly surprising, since 
according to MT the information that underwrites successful mindreading is not represented 
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linguaformally in the first place. We face no problem about accounting for tacit folk-
psychological knowledge, because there is no pressure to characterize that knowledge as tacit 
in the first place (Maibom 2003). 
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
The answer I have sketched to the Character Problem—and it remains, for now, only 
a sketch—represents a significant improvement over TT, ST, and the hybrid accounts that 
draw from these two theories. By virtue of the deep conceptual connections between the 
notions of model, simulation, and theory, MT is able to integrate the seemingly divergent insights 
of the orthodox views, yet avoids certain difficulties that persistently bedevil their adherents. 
And going forward, it gives us a new and more productive framework in which to adjudicate 
the fine details of how mindreading works. Instead of asking whether such-and-such an 
experimental result supports TT or ST, we can ask how best to incorporate that result into 
our picture of mindreading as model-use. 
One final point is worth highlighting, though I will not make much of it in the 
chapters to come. If something like MT is the right way to answer the Character Problem of 
folk psychology, then that suggests something important regarding the Domain Problem. If 
mindreading is fundamentally a matter of building, applying, and revising cognitive models 
that are paradigmatically nonlinguistic, then we have some reason to doubt that the territory 
of mindreading is circumscribed by the boundaries of language-use. It is to the Domain 
Problem, and the relationship between language and mindreading, that I now turn. 
  
 
 
74 
 
CHAPTER 3 
HOW NOT TO SOLVE THE DOMAIN PROBLEM 
 
3.1 DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
I turn now to the Domain Problem of folk psychology—that is, of mindreading. The 
domain of mindreading is simply the class of all instances of mindreading, and the Domain 
Problem is nothing more than the question of how to draw the boundaries of that class—
deciding what belongs to it and what does not.  
Put another way, it is the general form of the myriad specific questions that 
philosophers and scientists encounter whenever they ask if some apparent act of social 
cognition is really best understood as the exercise of a mindreading capacity. When the 
philosopher wonders about the kinds of mental representations necessary to sustain 
reasoning about another’s mental states, or when the primatologist wonders whether an 
apparent act of deceptive pretense involves the genuine intention to manipulate another’s 
beliefs—these are the sorts of questions that make up the Domain Problem. In one form or 
another, such questions have been nagging philosophers and scientists alike for the last 
hundred years, if not longer. But the first to explicitly articulate these concerns in terms of 
mindreading’s domain is Jose Bermúdez, particularly in his paper “The Domain of Folk 
Psychology” (2003a). 
In voicing the core questions of the Domain Problem, Bermúdez also goes some way 
toward a systematic mapping of the space of possible answers, identifying two opposed 
construals of mindreading’s domain—the narrow and the broad. On the narrow construal, 
mindreading is only operative when normally functioning adult humans “explicitly and 
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consciously deploy the concepts of folk psychology.” Conversely, what Bermúdez calls the 
broad construal holds that all or nearly all social cognition involves the ascription of 
intentional states and the use of those ascriptions to interpret, predict, and explain the 
behavior of others (2003a, p. 27). 
It’s worth pointing out, if only briefly, that Bermúdez’s phrasing subtly—and, I think, 
unfairly—favors the narrow-construal position. As he articulates the broad construal, it has 
positive content and is indeed maximally broad:  it extends mindreading’s domain about as far 
as possible. By comparison the narrow construal sounds moderate and cautious, 
recommending only a modest negative claim: that we should not assert that mindreading’s 
domain extends beyond those cases where it is explicitly, consciously used. Framed this way, 
the extreme broad construal seems a far more radical position than its extreme narrow 
counterpart. A fairer description would match the radical wide-construal position with a 
comparably radical narrow-construal position: namely, one that does assert a very tightly 
drawn domain. Bermúdez’s phrasing tilts the playing field in favor of the narrow construal; 
it’s a small rhetorical move, but it warrants comment—especially since he finally comes to 
favor a narrow construal. 
While Bermúdez deserves credit for making the Domain Problem explicit and 
illuminating the space of its possible answers, his own answers, falling close to the narrow 
end of the spectrum, are ultimately ill-supported (2003a, 2003b, 2007, 2009). Not only does 
Bermúdez miss a vital conceptual distinction in posing the problem—namely, the difference 
between asking which episodes of normal adult human cognition qualify as instances of 
mindreading and asking which creatures qualify as mindreaders—his position on mindreading’s 
proper domain is unconvincing. It depends on an intriguing, but ultimately unpersuasive, 
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argument that purports to conclude that mindreading requires the possession of a natural 
language. Despite his position’s defects, and aside from his prominence in the field, 
Bermúdez is worth our attention for several reasons: first, as mentioned above, he is perhaps 
the only figure on the map to explicitly identify the Domain Problem’s parameters; second, 
he offers a subtle and quite powerful answer to that problem; and finally, his view provides a 
good example of a certain type of approach to the Domain Problem, a type that warrants 
some further examination.  
In this chapter I offer an alternative to Bermúdez’s way of posing the Domain 
Problem, and then argue that Bermúdez’s “narrowist” position on mindreading’s domain 
depends on an unpersuasive argument—unpersuasive because it fails to acknowledge how 
nonlinguistic cognition might be capable of underwriting mindreading. I will close by 
reflecting briefly on the general type of position to which Bermúdez’s view belongs. I have no 
knockdown argument to make in this final section; I can only offer a sort of hunch about the 
conviction that underlies arguments of this type, based largely on how severely the 
circumstances of the debate are stacked against it. 
 
3.2 NO FRILLS 
Before engaging Bermúdez’s view directly, I should preemptively address a concern 
that might be percolating, and which stands in the way of making progress on the Domain 
Problem: the notion, increasingly popular in some areas of philosophical psychology, that 
mindreading is some kind of odd, marginal cognitive luxury or epiphenomenon.27  
Mindreading deserves little further attention from scientists and philosophers, say the 
proponents of this notion, because it carries scant cognitive value:  most of the feats of social 
                                                
27 For examples of this charge, see Hutto and Ratcliffe, eds. (2007), and Hutto (2008). 
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cognition traditionally explained in terms of mindreading use can be accounted for just as 
well—and perhaps even better—in other terms. On this view, the ability to ascribe mental 
states to others and make inferences based on those ascriptions is a fancy toy, useful for 
certain complex tasks of explicit, reflective, and conscious theorizing; the kind of thing we 
do, to use Peter Godfrey-Smith’s helpful example, in a court of law (2004, 152). But those 
reflective, explicit employments of folk-psychological capacities are quite rare relative to the 
countless feats of social understanding we have to perform every day: guessing on the fly 
what a fellow driver is about to do while traveling down a crowded highway, reading a 
friend’s emotional state from her vocal tone, wordlessly cooperating with someone to carry a 
heavy object through a doorway. And in situations like these, folk psychology has no 
discernible role to play, because these forms of social cognition are better explained by appeal 
to affective perception, sensorimotor attunement, eye-tracking, and the like—ways of 
navigating the social world that are simpler, more basic, and computationally cheaper than 
mindreading. And this point applies even more strongly, it is thought, to feats of social 
cognition performed by non-human animals or prelinguistic infants. 
The trouble with this charge is that, in fact, we have ample reason to think that 
mindreading does provide a substantial cognitive advantage. Take, for instance, the 
paradigmatic mindreading practice of ascribing a false belief to others. Suppose that I tell my 
friend to stay out of my room while I’m changing clothes. In truth, I need privacy to wrap 
her birthday present; but I (correctly) predict that she will refrain from entering the office 
because of a false belief about what’s going on inside it. This ability—that is, the ability to 
ascribe false beliefs, not necessarily to create them in others—is usually taken to be a 
necessary component of anything deserving the name “folk psychology” (in the internal 
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sense). According to the critics pushing the case for mindreading’s diminished utility, most of 
the everyday feats of social cognition traditionally understood as involving ascriptions of false 
beliefs can be and are accomplished without such ascriptions. In such cases, they ask, 
couldn’t the same results be achieved by much simpler and less cognitively expensive means? 
Perhaps the agent is merely representing the other as ignorant, rather than attributing to him 
or her a particular mental state—i.e. a false belief. 
This worry prompts an obvious initial reply: that attributing ignorance to an agent is a 
kind of mental state attribution—or rather, an attribution of mentality in general—and so 
falls under the umbrella of mindreading. Let’s suppose, as seems plausible, that X 
representing Y as ignorant about such-and-such doesn’t involve attributing any particular 
mental states to Y. Nonetheless it does seem to involve, or at least logically entail, the idea that 
Y is the right sort of thing to bear the property of ignorance. Except in highly figurative senses, 
we don’t talk about ice cream sundaes or oak trees being ignorant, and that’s not because we 
think of ice cream sundaes and oak trees as being wise and worldly—it’s because applying 
terms like ‘ignorant’ to such entities would be an obvious category mistake. We only attribute 
ignorance to entities we think are at least potential knowers—that is, entities with minds. So 
while X’s attribution of ignorance to Y is not, considered in isolation, an attribution of a 
particular mental state to Y, no such attribution could occur without X having already 
attributed, or being rationally obligated to attribute, particular mental states to Y. Therefore, 
because of its close logical and psychological connections to canonical mental state 
attribution, the attribution of ignorance should be seen as part of the mindreading family, 
which means that redescribing an apparent false-belief attribution as “merely” an attribution 
of ignorance still counts as offering an explanation in terms of mindreading. If this sort of 
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response holds up, it would appear to blunt the force of ignorance-attribution explanations as 
examples of mindreading’s overrated cognitive utility. 
But let’s suppose the response I’ve just outlined doesn’t hold up, or that it concedes 
too much. In sketching it, after all, I more or less admitted that attributing ignorance to 
another is not itself a mental state attribution; it certainly isn’t the ascription of any 
propositional attitude. If we give way on this point, even if only for the sake of argument, can 
we still make a case for the specific cognitive utility of making false-belief attributions, and by 
extension the general cognitive utility of mindreading?  
Consider a recent branch of empirical research on the social understanding of young 
children. In this area, experimenters must constantly consider the possibility that the false 
belief tasks they have designed can be successfully passed without any false belief ascription 
going on—that success could be achieved merely by the child having some (implicit) grasp of 
the difference between knowledge and ignorance. If the data from such experiments are open 
to interpretation along these ignorance-ascription lines, the purported cognitive utility of 
mindreading would be impugned.28 However, recent experimenters have taken care to design 
tasks where the “mere” ability to differentiate knowledge from ignorance will not do for 
successful performance of the task. These experiments have yielded good evidence that, contra 
the critics pushing the notion of mindreading’s superfluity, the ability to ascribe mental states 
is indeed cognitively useful. 
Buttelmann, Carpenter, and Tomasello (2009) provide an illustrative example of this 
brand of careful experimental design. In the “false belief” condition of their setup, a child 
witnesses an experimenter (E2) playing with a toy, placing it in one of two boxes, and then 
leaving the room. While E2 is gone, the child hides the toy in the other box and then locks the 
                                                
28 This same experimental hurdle will show up in the next chapter, although in quite a different context. 
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original (now-empty) box with a pin, assisted by another experimenter (E1). E2 then returns 
to the room and begins to pull, unsuccessfully, on the handle of the locked, now-empty box. 
After a few seconds, the child is permitted to help E2, or encouraged via general phrases like, 
“Go on, you can help!”  Buttelmann and his colleagues found that over 80% of the children 
in this condition went to open the box with the toy in it. And here is the ingenuity of this 
experimental design with regard to demonstrating the cognitive advantage conferred by the 
capacity to ascribe false beliefs to others:  interpreting the suggestion to “help E2” as “help 
E2 get the toy” rather than “help E2 open the empty box” requires that the child interpret E2’s 
attempts not simply as trying to open that box, but as trying to open that box because he falsely 
believes the toy is in there.  
Buttelmann et al. have controlled for alternative interpretations of these data, 
including the ignorance-ascription view. For a child merely ascribing ignorance—that is, a lack 
of cognitive content—to E2, the natural interpretation of E2’s behavior is “E2 is trying to 
open the box whose handle he is currently pulling on.”  And indeed, the data from a control 
condition confirm that idea. So the fact that children in the false-belief condition do not 
interpret E2’s behavior this way strongly suggests that these children are not attributing 
ignorance to E2. After all, to attribute ignorance is to attribute a lack of cognitive content—
and a lack of content does not drive or direct behavior in anything like the way positive 
content does. The children’s marked tendency to interpret E2’s behavior as they did reflects 
the strength of beliefs (including false ones) as directors and shapers of behavior.  
Buttelmann et al. put the point this way:  “If children…were simply attributing to E2 
a blank thought bubble of ignorance, then they would have no reason to go retrieve the 
toy…. To override the tendency to simply help E2 open the box…children in the false belief 
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condition had to attribute to E2 the false belief that the toy was in there” (2009, p. 342). 
Experimental designs like this one demonstrate how mindreading, even in its rudiments, can 
play a crucial role in enabling social activities like goal-sharing, cooperation, and deception—
hence it is not the case that mindreading is some kind of cognitive luxury that could only be 
useful in courtrooms and similarly special contexts.29 
To be appropriately cautious, I would not say that the above remarks constitute 
positive grounds for favoring a broad construal of mindreading’s domain. Rather, if these 
remarks are on target, I have simply assuaged a particular kind of worry, lately in vogue, 
which might lead one to think that a broad construal is obviously wrongheaded. After all, the 
worry goes, if mindreading offers no significant cognitive advantage then we have little 
reason to think it might have a broad domain. But since it clearly can make a major cognitive 
difference to forms of social life that are both common and crucial, we should remain open 
to the possibility that its domain might be broader than these worriers have thought. 
 
3.3 DIVIDING THE PROBLEM 
Buttelmann’s experiment gives us reason to put aside the charge that mindreading is a 
marginal quirk of human cognition. The matter of its domain, therefore, deserves the 
philosophical and scientific attention figures like Bermúdez pay to it. In the next section I will 
take up the account Bermúdez gives as his answer to the Domain Problem. First, though, I 
will argue for a different way of posing the question. One of the reasons the Domain 
Problem has proven so tricky is that philosophers and psychologists—Bermúdez included—
seem not to have noticed that attempts to address its animating questions fall rather neatly 
                                                
29 For further experimental work with a similar upshot, see Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Scott & Baillargeon, 
2009; Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007. 
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into two groups: there are really two Domain Problems or, at least, two sub-problems of the 
Domain Problem. These sub-problems, I will argue, can and should be kept distinct. 
One is a question about the social cognition of normally functioning adult humans. In 
essence, it asks, “How large a role does mindreading play in the social cognitive lives of this 
one particular kind of creature?”  It’s no surprise that this brand of cognition comes in for 
special concern—until roughly a hundred years ago, science and philosophy mostly took 
“thinking” to mean “the thinking done by normally functioning adult humans.”  And while 
this brand of cognition has perhaps lost its monopolistic grip on the attentions of 
philosophical and scientific inquiry, it remains an area of particular interest—and merits, for 
that reason, its own version of the Domain Problem, which I will call the Adult Swim 
Domain Problem.30 
By comparison, the second sub-problem of the Domain Problem has a far wider 
scope. It seeks to know what kinds of creatures engage in behavior that is best understood as 
involving mindreading. Put another way, it asks, “Who belongs in the club of mindreaders?” 
Asking and addressing this question means accepting the following two claims: 
(i) Normally functioning adult humans at least sometimes mindread, if anything does. 
(ii) Other kinds of creatures—non-human animals, human infants, people with certain 
cognitive abnormalities—display behaviors that seem, prima facie, potentially amenable 
to explanation in terms of mindreading.  
Neither claim appears particularly controversial. Unless one is skeptical about the very 
existence of mindreading, not much anxiety should attend claim (i); normally functioning 
                                                
30 The name refers to the practice of “Adult Swim” in public swimming pools: short periods, punctuated by 
lifeguard whistles, during which only adults are allowed in the pool. An abbreviated list of contemporary 
contributions to the Adult Swim Domain Problem could include Bennett (1976, 1978), Clark (1997), Davidson 
(1975, 1982), Dummett (1993), Gallagher (2001), Hutto and Ratcliffe (eds., 2007), McDowell (1994), Stalnaker 
(1984), Zahavi (2005).  
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adult humans belong to the club of mindreaders if anything does. Claim (ii) is no more 
contentious. Aside from the aforementioned skeptics (who wouldn’t accept (i) in the first 
place), only the most hard-nosed behaviorists would deny that, for instance, some non-
human animals engage in social behavior that, at least at first glance, one might attempt to 
explain in terms of mindreading. What is controversial, of course, is whether any of any of 
the behaviors in (ii) are properly characterized in those terms. If so, then that behavior belongs 
to the domain of mindreading, and the creature producing it belongs to the class of 
mindreaders.31 Since, unlike the Adult Swim sub-problem, this sub-problem ranges over all 
creatures capable of social cognition, I propose to call it the General Admission Domain 
Problem.32 
Given that we can separate these two distinct versions of the Domain Problem, why 
should we do so?  For one thing, insisting on this division confers a taxonomic advantage; 
gives us a way to consider more nuanced positions on the topic of mindreading’s domain. On 
Bermúdez’s original formulation there is only one Domain Problem, and only one dimension 
on which to plot attempted answers. But this one-dimensional setup smudges over some 
important subtleties. Suppose, for instance, that Philosopher X is highly skeptical about the 
pervasiveness of mindreading in the social cognition of normal adult humans, while 
simultaneously believing that many nonhuman animals are capable of mindreading. 
Philosopher Y is in complete disagreement:  she believes that adult humans’ social 
                                                
31 This certainly isn’t to say that the class of mindreaders can’t have subclasses of its own. Even those who 
contend that, e.g., prelinguistic infants mindread would acknowledge that they do so in a quite different way 
than do adult humans. We have no reason to think of mindreading as a unitary phenomenon; on the contrary, 
the best scientific theories highlight the domain-specificity and dissociability of the particular capacities that fall 
under mindreading’s umbrella. 
32 The contemporary genesis of the General Admission Domain Problem is Premack & Woodruff (1978); a 
partial list of significant contributions to this strand would include Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith (1985), 
Bermúdez (2003a, 2003b), Tomasello & Call (1997), Fodor (1992), Heyes (1998), Lurz (2007), Penn & Povinelli 
(2007), Povinelli & Vonk (2004), Sterelny (1998), and the relevant entries in Hurley & Nudds (Eds., 2006). 
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understanding is almost entirely explicable in terms of mindreading, and she is convinced that 
mindreading only occurs in (normally functioning) adult humans. When we try to map the 
positions of X and Y on a single spectrum, we run into two problems: 
(1) There is an old joke about statisticians: if you have one foot in a bucket of boiling 
water and the other foot in a bucket of ice water, a statistician will tell you that, on 
average, you’re comfortable. A single-spectrum picture invites a similar sort of 
confusion. X and Y wind up labeled as middle-grounders, even though each holds a 
pair of rather extreme views about mindreading’s domain. Insisting on a division 
between the two “halves” of the Domain Problem, as I recommend, throws the 
extremity of their views into sharp relief.  
(2) On a decent taxonomic map representing opinions about the domain of mindreading, 
the markers for X and Y should be about as far apart as possible. But on the single-
spectrum picture we get from Bermúdez, X and Y are neighbors! Mapping positions 
on mindreading’s domain in two dimensions instead of one, as I recommend, 
captures the dual disagreement between X and Y, and accurately places their views at 
opposite corners of the map. 
A related advantage of making this distinction explicit is that doing so makes it easier to hold 
certain sorts of nuanced positions on mindreading’s domain without automatically flirting 
with inconsistency. While it is often the case that proponents of a narrow answer to the Adult 
Swim problem favor a comparably narrow answer to the General Admission problem (and 
vice versa), and while this often true of “broadists” as well,33 it is not always the case. And our 
way of viewing these problems should not suggest that holding divergent opinions about the 
                                                
33 Archetypal figures here would include Dummett (1993) and Davidson (1975; 1982) on the narrow side, and 
Bennett (1976; 1978) and Stalnaker (1984) on the broad side. 
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Adult Swim and General Admission problems—as the hypothetical X and Y both do—is 
inconsistent or even outlandish. 
To be sure, making certain kinds of claims can commit one to similar answers on 
both versions of the Domain Problem. Consider the claim R, which says that mindreading 
only34 occurs during episodes of conscious reflection mediated by natural language.35 
Someone holding R would favor a narrow answer to the Adult Swim problem, since episodes 
of conscious, reflective folk-psychological reasoning mediated by natural language seem to 
make up a rather small part of human social cognition.36 Holding R would further commit 
one to a narrow answer to the General Admission problem, since it follows from R that only 
language-using creatures are even capable of mindreading. Under certain conditions, then, one 
might well end up with the same sort of answer on both halves of the Domain Problem. But 
absent such conditions, it is perfectly legitimate to hold divergent views about the two 
versions of the Domain Problem, and following my recommended distinction makes this fact 
evident.  
Dennett (1978), for instance, seems to occupy a position very near to the hypothetical 
Y discussed above:  he is skeptical about the putative mindreading abilities of nonhuman 
animals and prelinguistic infants (hence a General Admission narrowist) but quite bullish on 
the contribution a natural language makes to the Intentional Stance, which he takes to be a 
pervasive feature of human social cognition (hence an Adult Swim broadist). And whatever 
the specific merits of his views on these matters, the main point is that keeping the Adult 
                                                
34 This “only” here is meant to denote metaphysical necessity. 
35 By which I simply mean a public, personal-level language (i.e., not a language of thought). 
36 One might well disagree on this matter of empirical fact, and I certainly haven’t offered any substantial 
evidence for it. However, that would be a debate held within the bounds of the Adult Swim problem—a first-
order debate, one might say. The present discussion is second-order: the question is how to draw the contours of 
the first-order problems to be solved, and what the logical relations are (if any) between certain first-order 
positions. 
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Swim and General Admission problems distinct reminds us that there is nothing inherently 
troubling about simultaneously advocating divergent construals of mindreading’s domain. 
Another reason, perhaps even stronger, to favor this distinction is pragmatic:  doing 
so helps to separate two workspaces, each of which is large and messy on its own. The 
philosophical and scientific literature on these matters is huge, and riddled with red herrings, 
unhelpful debates, and misunderstandings. If the proposed distinction gains acceptance as an 
explicit “axiom,” then perhaps someone whose provenance is really the Adult Swim problem 
will refrain from picking an unproductive fight with someone working exclusively on the 
General Admission problem. Of course, crosstalk will still be possible, and it should be more 
productive once framed as being between two problems and not internal to a single one. One 
shouldn’t suppose, because Adult Swim and General Admission sub-problems are distinct 
psychological-philosophical issues, that progress made on one problem cannot have 
implications for the other. In fact, any such implications will be easier to trace once the two 
versions of the Domain Problem are properly demarcated. 
 
3.4 THE GENERAL ADMISSION DOMAIN PROBLEM AND HOW NOT TO SOLVE 
IT 
I have suggested a way to frame the Domain Problem—namely, as two distinct 
problems with similar concerns—that improves on Bermúdez’s (2003a) account by clarifying 
and compartmentalizing the work to be done. And while both Domain Problems are worthy 
of the philosophical and scientific attention they continue to receive, for my part the most 
interesting and philosophically urgent issues lies within the bounds of the General Admission 
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problem. Therefore the remainder of this chapter, along with the next one, will focus 
exclusively on it. 
For experimental psychologists working out in the empirical trenches, the General 
Admission Domain Problem presents as a host of tricky empirical questions that motivate, 
and sometimes frustrate, scientific research. Imagine a team of research psychologists 
observing the behaviors of a range of subjects, including adults with autism or certain sorts of 
aphasia, infants and children (some with autism or aphasia, some without), and nonhuman 
animals. The psychologists see some of them performing tasks of social cognition that seem, 
prima facie, like they might be enabled by mindreading:  cooperation, joint attention, 
deception, imitation, and a huge host of others. 
Of course, nobody can directly observe whether mindreading is in use, so the 
experimental psychologists try to design their experiments and gather their data in ways 
conducive to making intelligent conjectures about when and where this unobservable quarry 
is to be found. Obviously, this will be a long and difficult grind. 
But wait! Perhaps philosophy can rescue these poor psychologists from their endless 
empirical slog. Many philosophers have thought it possible to give a general answer to the 
General Admission problem, based on metaphysical or conceptual considerations instead of 
the messy data of laboratory or field research. Such an answer could clear up these 
experimental predicaments in a hurry. It might allow us to draw a bright and permanent line 
between the mindreaders and everything else, and might let us do so irrespective of what the 
putative empirical evidence says—irrespective, indeed, of whether any such evidence exists. 
This, in fact, is the approach taken by Bermúdez in his sustained defense of a narrow-
construal answer to the General Admission side of the Domain Problem (2003b; 2009). His 
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conclusion and reasoning have both been popular among philosophers and remain so; I will 
show what goes wrong with that answer, and conclude by recommending a wholly different 
approach.  
Four factors make the General Admission problem an especially tough nut to crack:  
(i) What counts as a mindreading capacity is controversial.  
(ii) What counts as evidence of a mindreading capacity is controversial. 
(iii) What is cognitively necessary for having a mindreading capacity is 
controversial;  
(iv) Mindreading capacities are multifarious, and in many cases dissociable. 
Factors (ii) and (iv) are properly empirical-methodological problems, which I will take up in 
the next chapter. Regarding factor (i), my arguments in chapters 1 and 2 provide a tentatively 
stable sense of what counts as a mindreading capacity. The following discussion is concerned 
primarily with factor (iii), since it lies at the core of Bermúdez’s position, and restricts its 
focus to one mindreading capacity in particular: the ability to represent others’ propositional 
attitudes and exploit those representations in intelligent behavior. It is fairly safe to say that 
normally functioning adult humans exercise this ability; whether any other creatures do is an 
open question. This chapter and the next try to make some (very modest) headway on that 
question. 
 
3.4.1 Introduction and Cartography 
I begin with two definitions. First, by “nonlinguistic creature,” I simply mean a 
creature that lacks a public language. To the best of our knowledge, this group includes all 
nonhuman animals, prelinguistic infants, and certain language-impaired or otherwise 
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cognitively disabled adults. Second, and following Bermúdez (2009), by the phrase “engaging 
in propositional attitude mindreading” (hereafter PAM), I mean “behaving in ways that 
depend systematically on attributing propositional attitudes to others.” 
With these terms securely in place, we can meaningfully articulate a Big Question that 
is, in fact, a sub-question of the General Admission Domain Problem: Do any nonlinguistic 
creatures engage in PAM? For a long time the dominant position on this question was an 
unequivocal, uncontroversial no. But in recent years new empirical data and fresh 
philosophical arguments37 have reopened this question, prompting renewed defenses of the 
traditional position.38 The path to a solution is thick with philosophical and scientific 
entanglements; we should try to map out the territory before we enter, beginning with an 
attempt to determine the necessary conditions for any creature39 to be capable of PAM.  
For the moment, suppose that we have indeed ascertained the necessary condition(s) 
for engaging in PAM. Let’s call this condition (or set of conditions) ‘X’. For now we will not 
worry about what X is, nor whether it picks out a single condition or a set thereof; X is 
simply a placeholder, handy for our present purpose of surveying the road ahead of us. Once 
we have a clear sense of condition X, we must ask whether it is possible for a nonlinguistic 
creature to meet that condition, and here arises our first opportunity to answer the Big 
Question for good and all.  
                                                
37 The new data come from work with corvids (Clayton & Emery, 2009; Clayton, Dally, & Emery, 2007), 
cetaceans (Tschudin, 2001, 2006), primates (Burkart & Heschl, 2007; Flombaum & Santos, 2005; Hare et al., 
2000; Melis, Call, & Tomasello, 2006), infants (Baillargeon, 2004; Luo, Kaufman, & Baillargeon 2009; Onishi 
and Baillargeon, 2005; Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997), and aphasics (Apperly & Butterfill 2009; Apperly, Samson, 
Carroll, Hussain, & Humphreys, 2006; Varley and Siegal 2000; Varley, Siegal, & Want, 2001; Wellman et al. 
2002). Fresh philosophical arguments include those of Herschbach (2008), Fitzpatrick (2008, 2009), and Lurz 
(2007, 2009, 2011).  
38 In, e.g., Bermúdez (2003a, 2003b, 2005, 2009), Heyes (1998), Penn & Povinelli (2007), Povinelli & Vonk 
(2006). 
39 If ‘creature’ is too narrow, then substitute ‘system’ to include the possibility of PAM occurring in non-
biological entities. 
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If it is impossible for a nonlinguistic creature to have X, then it follows deductively that 
nonlinguistic creatures do not engage in PAM; if they cannot do it, then they do not do it. 
But suppose it can be shown that it is at least metaphysically possible for a nonlinguistic 
creature to have X; we would then have to ask whether any nonlinguistic creature actually has 
X. If none does, then a negative answer to the Big Question follows once again. But even if it 
could be plausibly shown that some nonlinguistic creatures actually do have X, and are 
therefore capable of engaging in PAM, we would still need to determine whether these 
creatures actually exercise this capacity. It is one thing to say that a creature has what it takes, 
cognitively speaking, to engage in PAM, and quite another to say that creature exhibits 
behaviors best explained by an appeal to PAM. After all, X is only a necessary condition (or 
set thereof); a creature could perfectly well have X yet not engage in PAM. 
So goes the forking path toward the Big Question. There are many routes by which to 
answer it in the negative; the only route to an affirmative answer demands that we (1) 
determine what is cognitively necessary for PAM, i.e. condition X; (2) show that some 
nonlinguistic creature satisfies condition X; and (3) show that this creature actually engages in 
PAM, i.e. satisfies conditions that are jointly sufficient for PAM. It may help to see things 
represented graphically, as in Figure 3.1:  
 
 
 
91 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 
 
3.4.2 Strong Deflationism about PAM: Two Arguments 
Now that we have a better sense of the terrain, we can roughly categorize the parties 
in this debate: those who argue that nonlinguistic creatures do engage in PAM we will call 
inflationists; those who argue that nonlinguistic creatures do not engage in PAM we will call 
deflationists. These positions admit of various strengths, of course, which correspond to 
different ways of answering the questions in Figure 3.1. Bermúdez defends what might be 
called strong deflationism: the view that nonlinguistic creatures cannot, eo ipso, engage in 
PAM (and therefore do not).  
Before considering Bermúdez’s particular arguments, a programmatic point is in 
order. Bermúdez’s strong-deflationist view is actually more sweeping than I have suggested. 
What is required to 
engage in PAM? 
X 
Is it possible for a non-
linguistic creature to have X? No Yes 
Nonlinguistic 
creatures do 
not engage in 
PAM. 
Do any nonlinguistic 
creatures plausibly have X? 
No Yes 
Do these creatures plausibly 
engage in PAM? No 
Yes Nonlinguistic creatures do engage in PAM. 
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He not only denies the possibility of nonlinguistic PAM; he denies the possibility of any form 
of substantive mindreading (substantive mindreading) for nonlinguistic creatures. The 
specific point about PAM simply follows logically from that more general claim; since PAM 
is a subtype of substantive mindreading, nonlinguistic creatures are eo ipso incapable of PAM. 
My motive for concentrating on Bermúdez’s specific thesis regarding PAM is 
dialectical: it ensures that I confront his position in its most plausible guise. Even among 
those who are open to the idea of nonlinguistic mindreaders, the notion that a creature 
without language could engage in mindreading via the attribution of propositional attitudes 
might seem a bridge too far. Those inclined to question Bermúdez’s strong deflationism 
about nonlinguistic substantive mindreading in general might be happy to go along with his 
specific position on nonlinguistic PAM. By lodging my upcoming critique against this more 
modest and plausible claim, I will be giving Bermúdez the fairest possible hearing. And if I 
can rebut his reasoning for this specific conclusion, then his more general claim—that 
nonlinguistic substantive mindreading is impossible in principle—will fall as well. 
Bermúdez offers two independent lines of argument for his strong-deflationist 
position: Argument A begins by alleging that many inflationists reason by way of an analogy 
between nonlinguistic and linguistic creatures. According to this analogical inference, 
similarities in performance on social-cognitive tasks reveal similarities in the cognitive 
processes enabling those performances; and since language users perform those tasks via 
PAM, nonlinguistic creatures with comparable performative abilities probably do so as well. 
But this argument by analogy depends for its strength on a serious overestimation of PAM’s 
prevalence in adult human cognition—a proper appraisal of PAM’s role in social cognitive 
tasks reveals the argument to be quite weak. 
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Argument B takes a different tack. Inflationists treat questions about whether some 
particular nonlinguistic creature engages in PAM as open and empirically decidable. But this 
approach is deeply mistaken: by its very nature, the mind of a nonlinguistic creature does not 
have what it takes for PAM—namely, certain second-order cognitive capacities that are only 
possible when mediated by sentences in a natural language. And since no nonlinguistic 
creature can engage in PAM, it follows that no nonlinguistic creature does so.40 
 
3.4.3 Discarding Argument A 
One might think it odd that Bermúdez even bothers with Argument A, given the 
conclusion purportedly established by Argument B. As Figure 1 shows, establishing that 
nonlinguistic creatures lack some necessary condition for PAM leads straightaway to a strong-
deflationist conclusion, and obviates the need to engage empirical questions about what the 
actual competences of nonlinguistic creatures are, or which cognitive processes underwrite 
those competences—the very questions that Argument A treats as live and deserving of 
engagement. If Argument B has it right, then the inflationist analogy targeted by Argument A 
is not just flawed, but trivially flawed. If nonlinguistic PAM is metaphysically impossible, then 
the claim that PAM is fundamental or central to the cognitive economy of normally 
functioning adult humans is not just an assumption lacking support—it’s irrelevant. But 
perhaps Bermúdez is simply covering his bases, providing an empirically grounded 
deflationist argument just in case his conceptually grounded one fails. So let’s suppose, for 
the moment, that Argument B can be effectively rebutted. How fares Argument A?   
                                                
40 Both these arguments are made in Bermúdez (2009); earlier versions of them appear in Bermúdez (2003a, 
2003b, 2005). 
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Not very well, as it turns out. Bermúdez claims that inflationists favor the following 
inferential schema: 
(1) Some nonlinguistic creatures perform competently on social-cognitive task T1, and 
adult humans perform competently on social-cognitive task T2. 
(2) T1 is analogous to T2. 
(3) Adult humans competently perform T2 via PAM. 
(4) Therefore, these nonlinguistic creatures competently perform T1 via PAM.41 
Now, one could criticize applications of this schema in various ways: by denying that 
nonlinguistic creatures really have T1-competence; by questioning the similarity of T1 and 
T2; by objecting to the inferred similarity between the means by which T1 and T2 are 
competently performed. Bermúdez takes a different tack, targeting in a general way the 
grounds for premise (3). He claims that “even if one thinks that it is acceptable to reason 
analogically” as above, “it is important to start from an accurate picture of how humans solve 
problems of social interaction and social coordination” (2009, p. 153). 
As a general point, that’s surely correct: it’s independently desirable to have “an 
accurate picture” of the cognitive processes underlying our competences, and the more 
accurate our picture, the less likely we are to erroneously apply the above inference schema. 
We can readily invent a hypothetical cautionary tale to illustrate this point: suppose a well-
meaning inflationist applies the schema to some nonlinguistic creature and some pair of 
analogous tasks.  Because she thinks PAM is far more pervasive and fundamental in human 
cognition than it actually is, she incorrectly believes that task T2 is performed via PAM in 
                                                
41 This is not exactly the way Bermúdez puts it; he phrases things in terms both more general (“many problems 
of social cognition” instead of T1/T2) and more narrow (the contrast is between humans and animals, not 
between normally functioning adult humans and everything else). I have made slight changes to better fit the 
present discussion, but all the important features of the inference (and Bermúdez’s critique of it) should still 
hold. 
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normal adult humans; in asserting (3), she asserts a falsehood. She may have terrific empirical 
data obtained by ingenious experimental design; her analogical inference will nevertheless be 
unwarranted. Note, though, that this cautionary tale applies just as well to the deflationist 
position: a well-meaning deflationist might have too narrow a picture of PAM’s role in our 
cognitive economy, and so might refrain from making this analogical inference in a 
circumstance where it actually would be warranted. So far, Bermúdez has only cautioned us to 
avoid error in our picture of PAM’s role in human cognition—no reason has yet been given 
to think that inflationists are especially prone to error in asserting (3).  
Bermúdez, therefore, needs a story about why we are far more likely to overestimate 
PAM’s role in human cognition than underestimate it—why premise (3) is in general unlikely 
to be true. The story he offers draws on the idea of a frame-based system.42  Of course, there’s 
nothing about the idea of frame-based social cognition itself that precludes the involvement 
of PAM, but frames provide a theoretical tool for seeing how certain tasks of social 
navigation might be accomplished by employing PAM differently, less centrally, or not at all.  
Bermúdez claims that, contra the received wisdom in philosophy and psychology, 
many of our everyday social interactions can be competently navigated without PAM, 
because their highly stereotypical nature makes them amenable to frame-based strategies that 
render PAM cognitively otiose. When tasks arise in the formulaic kinds of contexts that 
pervade our social world, we can successfully perform very complex feats of prediction, 
coordination, and cooperation without using PAM. By exploiting a frame that “fits” a given 
situation, an agent can exploit a useful representation of the world without having to represent 
the propositional attitudes of others in the situation. To successfully navigate the highly 
                                                
42 An idea due, in this form, to Marvin Minsky (1975). Of course, many of Minsky’s insights themselves have 
precursors with less computationalist or representationalist sympathies, e.g. in the work of Heidegger 
(1953/1996) and Merleau-Ponty (1945/2002). 
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stereotypical “ordering-a-beer” situation, for instance, I need only exploit the right frame; 
competent performance does not require that I represent the bartender’s beliefs, even if those 
beliefs are indeed a relevant feature of the scene. Naturally, circumstances may arise that 
interfere with successful performance: if the bartender brings me a glass of bourbon, for 
instance, PAM may well be brought to bear (“The bartender must think I wanted a 
bourbon!”). But, the story goes, this only occurs when circumstances shift the situation out of 
the relevant frame. That PAM might stand poised for deployment in an out-of-frame case 
does not mean it is active in the normal, in-frame case. 
There is much to like about the idea of frames, especially in its more contemporary 
versions. But even if this neo-Minskyan view (Nebel, 1999) is on the right track and we ought 
to generally scale back our assessment of PAM’s role in adult human cognition, we may still 
hold to the analogical inference schema. Premise (3) may have a low likelihood when its range 
of application is maximally general—when all social-cognitive tasks are in play, the likelihood 
that any one of those tasks is normally performed via PAM in adult humans may be quite 
low. But of the inflationists who can be fairly identified as users of this analogical inference 
schema, most are interested in a far narrower range of social-cognitive tasks: the ones that are 
widely agreed to be prime avenues for PAM. Tasks falling under the ‘false-belief’ heading, for 
instance, are interesting precisely because we typically think that successful performance on 
such tasks is normally, if not invariably, achieved via the use of PAM. So while Bermúdez’s 
story about frames may damage the general justification for premise (3), it hardly has that 
effect on the assertions of premise (3) inflationists are likely to actually make. 
So even on the supposition that it is worth making, Argument A turns out not to be 
very troubling. It claims to discredit inflationism by showing how it relies on an analogical 
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schema43 that invites us to overestimate of PAM’s place in the social intelligence of adult 
humans; but the argument does no such thing. Scrupulous inflationists are in fact on guard 
against just this sort of overestimation—and when making this analogical inference, they are 
careful to focus on task-types that are (typically) avenues for PAM-deployment. 
If all this is right, then two points follow: first, we now have additional motivation to 
insist on the logical independence of (i) what is true of PAM’s role in normal adult human 
cognition and (ii) whether PAM has any role at all in the cognition of nonlinguistic creatures. 
The independence of these two topics has already been discussed in this chapter, as one 
reason for keeping the General Admission Domain Problem, which deals with (ii), distinct 
from the Adult Swim Domain Problem, which concerns (ii). The failure of Bermúdez’s 
Argument A supports this policy of separation: its failure is a failure to draw plausible 
inferential links between (i) and (ii).  
Second, and of more immediate consequence, we can at least provisionally defer 
Bermúdez’s Argument A. Without further reason to think inflationists are unjustified in 
asserting premise (3), Argument A does no significant damage to the inflationist analogy it 
purports to discredit. On the other hand, if Argument B turns out to be decisive, then the 
inflationist analogy is trivially doomed, in which case Argument A is superfluous. The project 
of exploring and responding to Bermúdez’s deflationism therefore reduces to the project of 
addressing Argument B. And since Argument B claims that nonlinguistic creatures, just in 
virtue of being nonlinguistic creatures, fail to meet the necessary conditions for engaging in 
PAM, our next step is to get clearer about exactly what those necessary conditions are.  
                                                
43 I am conceding for the sake of argument that Bermúdez is correct in asserting that inflationists need to use, or 
at least like to use, the above analogical schema. In fact, that pattern of reasoning is far less important to the 
inflationist program than Bermúdez thinks, but expanding upon this point is outside the scope of the current 
discussion. 
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3.4.4 A Key Distinction 
There are many kinds of mindreading, and many kinds of minds. We want to know, 
for the particular kind of mindreading at issue, what kind of mind is required for doing it. 
Recall the definition of PAM: behaving in ways that depend systematically on attributing 
propositional attitudes to others. As a species of what Bermúdez calls substantive 
mindreading, then, PAM requires the ability to represent the propositional attitudes of 
others—call this the metarepresentational ability—and the ability to systematically exploit 
those representations to generate intelligent behavior. Call this latter the cognitive-dynamical 
ability. Much of the literature on nonlinguistic mindreading conflates the two, so we ought to 
expand upon, and further motivate, this distinction. Regardless of what downstream errors 
might be invited by this conflation, we have independent reason not to muddy the conceptual 
waters. 
First, consider the metarepresentational ability. PAM requires being able to represent 
the propositional attitudes of others, attitudes that bear representational content of their own. 
Of course, all by itself this metarepresentational ability is pretty inert. Imagine a cognitive 
system C that does nothing but generate representations like (S) Jo believes that the cheese is in the 
fridge. Sentence S is a metarepresentation: it represents a proposition (that Jo believes that the 
cheese is in the fridge) that is itself decomposable into a subject (Jo), a proposition (that the cheese is 
in the fridge), and an attitude relating them (believes). Put another way, S represents propositional 
content that itself represents propositional content. Entirely in virtue of generating sentences 
like S, then, system C has the metarepresentational ability.44 
                                                
44 I am imagining, in this example, that the representations C generates are bona fide contentful representations, 
and not mere indicators or referrers, in the sense of Cummins & Poirier (2004). 
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But obviously C, as described thus far, falls well short of being able to engage in 
PAM. There must be more to PAM than the metarepresentational ability alone. What C lacks 
is anything like a cognitive architecture capable of productively exploiting the 
metarepresentations it generates. Though C can metarepresent, it cannot harness that ability 
in ways systematically productive of intelligent behavior. To harbor information about others’ 
propositional attitudes is not (all by itself) to be capable of using that information to more 
intelligently navigate a social environment. The metarepresentational ability, then, is 
dissociable from the cognitive-dynamical ability—the ability to engage in what Andy Clark (1997) 
calls “second-order cognitive dynamics” with respect to the propositional attitudes of others. 
The dissociation runs the other way, too: with respect to some domain, one can 
engage in cognitive dynamics and yet lack certain representational powers. Engaging in 
cognitive dynamics means wielding concepts—and concepts are not representations, despite 
some often-misleading talk (e.g. Fodor, 1975). As Cummins (1996) points out, following the 
dominant usage in psychology, having a concept of something is not equivalent to (or even 
necessarily connected with) having a representation of that thing: one can have knowledge of 
a domain and reason effectively about it without also having the ability to represent items in 
that domain. One can have (and effectively wield) concepts of elevators, God, justice, and 
subatomic particles—yet be utterly able to represent any of these things. 
The metarepresentational and cognitive-dynamical abilities are, I have argued, distinct 
and doubly dissociable: an agent can have one without the other, and vice versa. Both abilities 
are required for PAM—more precisely, the interaction of both abilities is required for PAM. If 
this is right, then it seems most sensible to proceed in two stages: first, we must establish 
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what is required to represent another’s propositional attitude; second, we must establish what 
is required for that representation to figure in cognitive dynamics. 
 
3.4.5 Metarepresentation and Iconicity 
To have a representation of another’s propositional attitude requires having a mental 
representation of a mental representation—in other words, to have a mental metarepresentation. 
But just what is cognitively necessary to harbor metarepresentations depends on what one 
takes metarepresentation to be. And any conception of metarepresentation must depend on a 
more fundamental conception of representation itself: just what it is for something to 
represent something else. Plainly, we will need to lay some serious groundwork, starting with 
a plausible philosophical theory of representation. 
Give or take a few details, the theory I adopt is that of Robert Cummins,45 according 
to which representation is structural isomorphism and the content of a representation is that 
with which the representation shares structure. Central to this theory is what Cummins calls 
the target-content distinction, one upshot of which is that the usual way of asking what a 
representation R is a representation of is ambiguous: one could be asking for R’s target or its 
content. The difference can be illustrated by an example involving a mislabeled map: suppose 
you have been given a map labeled “Champaign”, which you intend to use to navigate the 
downtown area of Champaign, Illinois. Unbeknownst to you, though, there was a mix-up at 
the cartographer’s—the map should have been labeled “Urbana.” You will have a rough time 
navigating downtown Champaign with this map: you benightedly take it to share structure 
with downtown Champaign, when it instead shares structure with downtown Urbana. Asking 
                                                
45 As expressed and refined in Cummins (1996); Cummins & Poirier (2004); Cummins, Blackmon, Byrd, Lee, & 
Roth (2006). 
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what the map is a representation of is therefore ambiguous: to the extent that we are 
interested in what you are using the map to cognize, we are asking for the map’s representational 
target (namely, downtown Champaign); to the extent that we are interested in what the map 
actually shares structure with, we are asking for the map’s representational content (namely, 
downtown Urbana). On this account, representational accuracy occurs when there is a good 
structural match between target and content; error occurs when a representation gets aimed 
at a target with which it does not share structure. Representational accuracy, of course, is 
entirely distinct from the usefulness of a representation.46  
A notable feature of this account is that representations do not have unique contents 
(since a map could share structure both with downtown Urbana and with, say, the Parisian 
sewer system circa 1900). One might wonder how such representations could satisfy what 
Cummins calls the “explanatory constraint” on any plausible theory of representation, that is, 
that any such theory must be able to underwrite the type of representational explanation that 
is ubiquitous in cognitive science. But this worry is unfounded, so long as the target-content 
distinction is respected. On Cummins’s view, a cognitive-scientific explanation of some 
performance is not to be cashed out solely in terms of representational contents, but in terms 
of, among other things, the degree of match between content and target. 
So goes the theory; we must now extend this theory of representation to yield a 
conception of metarepresentation, which is a phenomenon not extensively discussed by 
Cummins. If representation is isomorphism, then metarepresentation will be a kind of nested 
isomorphism: a representation has the content it does in virtue of sharing structure with that 
content; a metarepresentation will have its content in virtue of sharing structure with that 
                                                
46 It is “often expensive in terms of computational resources, and may sometimes lead to intractable 
representations. A city map that shows all the streets will often be too big to read, unless the reduction is too 
small for anyone to see” (Cummins, Poirier, & Roth, 2004, p. 302). 
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content, some element of which will itself be a representation of some further content, had in 
virtue of a further structure-sharing.  
To make the idea vivid, imagine a high-resolution photograph P, taken from 10 feet 
off the ground in the middle of Times Square at time t. In one corner of the photograph, we 
see a tourist holding a subway map, a large portion of which is clear and in frame. The 
photograph is a metarepresentation:  
1. Because P shares structure with the arrangement of people and things in Times 
Square at t, that state of affairs (call it C1) is P’s content.  
2. C1 includes as a component a subway map S. 
3. Because S shares structure with the New York City subway system, that state of 
affairs (call it C2) is S’s content. 
4. So, P’s content C1 includes a representation S that has content C2. 
It is important to note that in this example, the representation relation appears to be 
transitive. Assigning the letter ‘r’ to the relation that holds between a representation and its 
content (or a part of its content), we can observe that 
PrS & SrC2 & PrC2 
At first glance this point seems entirely natural: if X and Y share structure and Y and Z share 
structure, then X and Z should share structure, too. But here our extension of Cummins’s 
theory hits a snag. Cummins, while simultaneously holding that representation is grounded in 
isomorphism and that the isomorphism relation is transitive, explicitly denies that the 
representation relation is transitive (Cummins & Poirier, 2004). How can we maintain the 
apparent transitivity of representation within a broadly Cummins-style view?47 
                                                
47 Cummins’s rationale in holding that isomorphism, but not representation, is transitive, rests on the idea that 
representational vehicles can have many different structures. If X and Y share some structure or other, and Y 
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Help is to be found, I think, in the work of François Recanati (2000a; 2000b) on 
mental metarepresentation. Recanati begins from the plausible principle that, for any mental 
content Q that itself has further representational content P, one cannot entertain Q without 
also entertaining (or being poised to entertain) P. To entertain the proposition that Jo believes 
the cheese is in the fridge, I must be able to entertain the proposition that the cheese is in the fridge. 
What underwrites this idea, Recanati argues, is the fact that metarepresentation has the 
property of iconicity.  
Iconicity, in necessarily brief terms, is a piece of terminology native to cognitive 
linguistics. It denotes resemblance between a sign’s syntactic or formal features and its 
semantic features—or, put another way, it denotes resemblance between sign and signified. 
Boldface type is an example of iconicity: typically, using boldface signifies emphasis, and 
boldface is itself formally emphatic.48 Another example is euphemistic circumlocution:  the 
politician’s friend, “I do not have that information at this time” (instead of “I don’t know”) is 
a phrase both syntactically and semantically indirect.49  With respect to metarepresentations, 
Recanati gives the following “Principle of Iconicity”: 
Attitude reports and other metarepresentations contain the object-representation not 
only syntactically…but also semantically: the proposition Q expressed by dS [a 
complex sentence that contains a sentence S as a component] ‘contains’ as a part the 
proposition P expressed by S—and that’s why one cannot entertain Q without 
entertaining P. (Recanati, 2000a, p. 318).  
                                                                                                                                             
and Z share some structure or other, this is no guarantee that X and Z will share any structure at all (personal 
communication). I am inclined to disagree to this extent: if there is a structural mapping from X to Y, and a 
different structural mapping from Y to Z, then there ought to be some structural mapping from X to Z, though it 
may well be (i) non-obvious and (ii) dissimilar from both the X-Y and Y-Z mappings. 
48 So long, of course, as the boldface type is surrounded primarily by text that is not boldface; both the formally 
and semantically emphatic effects of boldface type depend on its being judiciously used. 
49 This sketch of iconicity is all too brief; it is a complex and variegated topic in cognitive linguistics, and has a 
history in philosophy of language going back at least as far as C.S. Peirce. 
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Thus, a metarepresentation is both about the object-representation it represents and about the 
content of that object-representation. Recanati calls this feature transparency, a locution that 
calls up the idea of “looking at” a metarepresentation and being able to “see through” it to 
the content borne by the object-representation.  
Recanati is a philosopher of language, and his discussion is unsurprisingly focused on 
linguiform metarepresentations—sentences that contain other sentences as representational 
contents. But in the concluding remarks of Recanati (2000a), he suggests that his account 
could safely be extended to other representational vehicles. The principle of iconicity and the 
property of transparency are just as well satisfied by nonlinguistic structures as by linguistic 
ones, after all. Consider our Times Square example again in terms of metarepresentational 
transparency: one can (literally) look at the photograph and (literally) see the structure of the 
New York City subway system. One cannot entertain the content borne by the photograph 
without entertaining (or being poised to entertain) the content borne by the subway map. The 
photograph is both an image of Times Square and, in virtue of iconicity and transparency, an 
image of the subway system. 
A theory of metarepresentation, to be both philosophically and psychologically 
respectable, must meet four desiderata: 
(1) It must be grounded in a conception of representation as isomorphism; 
(2) It must explain the principle that, for any mental content Q that itself has further 
representational content P, one cannot entertain Q without also entertaining (or being 
poised to entertain) P;  
(3) It must be generally applicable with respect to representational vehicles (i.e., it mustn’t 
only work for representations of a certain kind); and 
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(4) It must construe the representation-as-isomorphism relation as transitive. 
Trying to satisfy these constraints by simply extending Cummins’s account of representation 
in an “orthodox” fashion will not do. To meet all four of the above conditions, we must 
supplement his theory with Recanati’s iconicity thesis. Pace Cummins and Poirier (2004), 
representation is indeed transitive. Understanding representation as isomorphism should 
incline us that way, but Recanati’s point about the transparency of metarepresentation shores 
up this idea. By combining the insights of Cummins and Recanati, we have arrived at a theory 
of metarepresentation worth wanting.  
 
3.4.6 Challenging Argument B 
Bermúdez, for his part, allows that nonlinguistic creatures are (at least in principle) 
capable of metarepresentation.50 What he denies in Argument B is the possibility of 
nonlinguistic creatures combining metarepresentation with second-order cognitive dynamics 
in the way necessary for genuine “intentional ascent” of the sort exemplified by PAM (2003b, 
p. 170). Let us reintroduce that argument in a more extended schematic form:  
1. Necessarily, any instance of PAM use is an instance of thinking about thoughts. 
2. Necessarily, any instance of thinking about thoughts is an instance of second-order 
cognitive dynamics. 
                                                
50 It is worth noting that although Bermúdez is a strong deflationist about nonlinguistic mindreading, and so 
gives a decidedly narrow-construal answer to the General Admission Domain Problem, he is hardly inhospitable 
to nonlinguistic thought in general. Denying that (for instance) animals engage in mindreading is easy if one has 
a generally dim view of their social cognitive capabilities in general; much of the justification needed for the 
specific claim has already marshaled, one supposes, to support the generally minimalist thesis about animal 
cognition. But Bermúdez is no minimalist; his 2003b is mostly a broadside against minimalism about 
nonlinguistic thought. Although he believes the lack of a public language places significant constraints on 
cognitive abilities—his stance on the General Admission problem being a case in point—he is generally 
hospitable to, and persuasive in arguing for, a fairly robust picture of nonlinguistic cognition. So, unlike others 
who endorse strong deflationism about mindreading, Bermúdez does not rely upon, or even hold, a general 
skepticism or minimalism about nonlinguistic thought. To my mind, this makes him an even more suitable 
dialectical foil. 
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3. Necessarily, any thought figuring in second-order cognitive dynamics must be 
vehicled by sentences in a natural language. 
4. Nonlinguistic creatures perform feats of social cognition sans natural language.  
5. So nonlinguistic creatures’ feats of social cognition are not instances of second-order 
cognitive dynamics. 
6. So nonlinguistic creatures’ feats of social cognition are not instances of thinking 
about thoughts. 
7. Therefore, nonlinguistic creatures’ feats of social cognition are not instances of PAM. 
The argument is valid, and premises 5 and 6—which depend on premises 1 through 
4—are not vulnerable to independent criticism. Premises 1 and 4 appear unimpeachably 
plausible; the former because it merely states a necessary condition of PAM, and the latter 
because any nonlinguistic creature’s feats of social cognition must be done in the absence a 
natural-linguistic representational scheme—because nonlinguistic creatures, by definition, do 
everything in the absence of such a scheme.51 
Premises 2 and 3, then, appear to be the only potential points of vulnerability. In a 
remark that brings both premises together, and upon which his entire argument seems to 
hinge, Bermúdez says that “intentional ascent requires the ability to ‘hold a thought in mind’ 
in a way that can only be done if the thought is linguistically vehicled” (2003b, p. ix). Much 
would seem to turn on just what this “way” of holding thoughts in mind is supposed to be. 
Bermúdez clarifies that it amounts to “entertaining them consciously and considering how 
they relate to each other logically and evidentially” (2003b, p. 159). Using a term borrowed 
                                                
51 Someone bullish about the linguistic capabilities of certain primates might want to include them in the class of 
mindreaders. There are two points to make in response here:  (a) Bermúdez is not committed to the claim that 
having language is a sufficient condition for mindreading, only that it’s a necessary one; and (b) if some critter 
initially counted among the casualties of Bermúdez’s argument turns out to have language after all, that result 
wouldn’t endanger premise 4; it would simply mean that premise 4 no longer applied to this particular critter. 
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from Andy Clark (1997), Bermúdez calls this sort of metathinking second-order cognitive dynamics. 
So the fates of premises 2 and 3 rest on whether intentional ascent really does require second-
order cognitive dynamics, and whether second-order cognitive dynamics really must be 
vehicled linguistically. I argue that Bermúdez is not justified in asserting premise 3:  by his 
own lights, in fact, he ought to deny it.52, 53 
To see why, let’s begin by choosing an exemplar type of nonlinguistic mental 
representation:  a mental map, say.54  According to premise 3, mental maps cannot figure in 
second-order cognitive dynamics. The problem, according to Bermúdez, is that second-order 
cognitive dynamics requires “considering how [thoughts] relate to each other logically and 
evidentially” (2003b, p. 159). But the logical and evidential relations between thoughts are 
fixed by certain formal properties of those thoughts, and we have no sense of how this might 
be accomplished at the level of mental maps. Chunks of natural language wear their evidential 
and logical relations on their sleeves, as it were—for instance, by including truth-functional 
connectives like if…then and not. Conversely, Bermúdez (2003b) says, we do not have “any 
idea” of how to assess logical and evidential relations among mental maps (p. 162). 
Therefore, on Bermúdez’s view mental maps (and all other nonlinguistic representational 
types) are simply the wrong sorts of things to figure in second-order cognitive dynamics. 
But this line of reasoning neglects the possibility that second-order cognitive 
dynamics might be accomplished by a kind of division of representational labor. There might 
be one vehicle-type representing the thought (or metathought) and another vehicle-type 
                                                
52 In fact, premise 2 is vulnerable as well, and effectively challenged by Fodor (2003). 
53 The impetus for the following argument comes from a remark made by Lurz (2007). 
54 A mental map is simply the mental-imagery equivalent of a physical map. A (purportedly) canonical use of 
mental maps occurs when rodents retain the ability to navigate a maze despite significant environmental 
changes.  
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entirely serving as the “handle”55  by which the thought is held in mind long enough for the 
agent to consider its logical and evidential connections to others. These are the two roles that 
need filling in second-order cognitive dynamics:  why should it be impossible that the roles 
could be filled by distinct vehicle-types?  Staying with the example of mental maps, it seems 
plausible that, in some hypothetical instance of social cognition by a nonlinguistic creature, a 
language-like vehicle56 could achieve the representation of the “logical and evidential” 
connections between thoughts, while mental maps could be used to hold these metathoughts 
in mind long enough for the requisite second-order cognitive dynamics to occur (Camp, 
2007).  
To see more clearly the distinction between these roles, consider the example given 
by Lurz (2007) of trying to solve a problem about the relative ages of people in a group. First 
we are given pieces of information:  Q is older than N but younger than K, who is older than 
P but younger than B, who is younger than that Q but older than N...and so on. We are then 
asked to answer questions like, “Who is older, P or K?”  In doing so, our thoughts about the 
logical relations between the given bits of information may well be vehicled in natural 
language—but it’s quite plausible that we use nonlinguistic representations to hold these 
thoughts in mind long enough to formulate our answers. Think how useful it is, for 
answering such questions, to form a mental image in which the relative spatial location of a 
name corresponds to that person’s relative age:  a sort of “ladder” on which Q is above N but 
below K, and so on. This example shows how a representational vehicle-type can be involved 
                                                
55 Baars (1997). 
56 Not a natural language, but something perhaps with comparable systematicity: for instance, a subpersonal 
Language of Thought (LOT). I myself am no fan of LOT as a theory of mental representation, and in fact there 
are good reasons to think that any representational task achievable in LOT is achievable in nonlinguistic terms. 
But for the present discussion, it is probably easiest to imagine this representational role being filled by LOT. 
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in second-order cognitive dynamics without having to itself represent the logical and evidential 
relations between thoughts. 
So even if Bermúdez is correct in claiming that we have no idea how to assess logical 
and evidential relations between things like mental maps—and I’m not at all sure he is 
correct—it would not follow ipso facto that mental maps have to meet this requirement in 
order to be involved in second-order cognitive dynamics. Now, perhaps no single 
representational vehicle-type can fill both roles simultaneously, or perhaps only natural 
language can do so—these strike me as open questions—but Bermúdez has given us no 
reason to favor any particular answer to those questions, nor to think that that any single type 
of representation should have to fill both roles simultaneously. One might be inclined to think 
that way if one were a strict and absolute representational monist, but that view looks wilder 
every minute, and in any case it isn’t Bermúdez’s view.  
By definition, PAM involves the attribution of propositional attitudes, but there is 
nothing in its definition that restricts the number or nature of representational vehicles. And 
since premise 3 is meant to be true necessarily, the mere possibility of this “division of vehicle 
labor” scenario is enough to rebut Argument B. And because Argument A has already been 
shown inert, we may securely conclude that Bermúdez does not adequately justify his strong 
deflationism about nonlinguistic substantive mindreading—since, after all, he cannot even 
provide adequate justification for the more modest and specific strong-deflationist claim 
regarding PAM. So Bermúdez’s narrow-construal answer to the General Admission Domain 
Problem—based as it is on his strong deflationism about nonlinguistic substantive 
mindreading—does not hold up well under scrutiny.57 
                                                
57 To address a big-picture concern: it may turn out that there are no propositional attitudes, except in the sense of 
Dennett (1998): namely, propositional attitudes are what we are inclined to say. If so, then it would be trivially 
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3.5 WHERE SHOULD WE GO FROM HERE? 
As mentioned earlier, Bermúdez’s argument belongs to a category—strong 
deflationism—the members of which share the motivating conviction that nonlinguistic 
mindreading is a metaphysical impossibility. Demonstrating this impossibility would amount 
to solving the General Admission problem in one fell swoop on metaphysical grounds: 
because only language-users can mindread, the domain of mindreaders extends no further 
than the class of language-using creatures.  
Is it possible to draw any interesting conclusions about the prospects for this type of 
approach? Certainly nothing follows logically about the general approach taken by Bermúdez; 
the fact that his Argument B fails does not guarantee that similarly conceived arguments are 
doomed to fail. Nevertheless, as we take stock of how to invest our energies with respect to 
the Domain Problem(s), we may hazard some general remarks about the attractiveness of 
strong deflationist accounts. 
Note first the considerable burden of proof weighing on advocates of strong 
deflationism. Establishing a metaphysical impossibility is difficult in general, and especially 
difficult in this case. In many cases, arguments for a conclusion that so-and-so is 
metaphysically impossible crucially depend on making appeals to the intuitions of their 
readers—one is invited, gently or not, to share the arguer’s intuition that so-and-so is not 
merely unlikely or outlandish, but genuinely impossible. Now, suppose we set to one side the 
vast body of recent research that highlights (1) the variability of modal intuitions across 
                                                                                                                                             
true that only language-users can engage in PAM, and the attention I have paid to showing the in-principle 
possibility of nonlinguistic PAM would have been wasted. But by the same token there would be nothing 
interesting about the strong-deflationist claim that nonlinguistic PAM is impossible. After all, PAM is (in this 
scenario) a highly atypical and rather marginal form of social cognition, since it applies only to verbal behavior. 
The rest of our mindreading capacities—more central, more numerous, and altogether more interesting—would 
remain in need of investigation. What sorts of cognitive processes underlie these core mindreading capacities in 
adult humans, and whether any nonlinguistic creatures exhibit such capacities, would remain open questions. 
Bermúdez’s position would, I submit, be no better off. 
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different populations and (2) the sensitivity of intuition-based philosophical judgments to 
factors we might charitably call “non-rational.”58 When the object of our invited modal 
judgments is something as strange and abstruse as nonlinguistically-vehicled mental state 
attributions, we should not be surprised if we find no strong and stable intuitions at all. 
More generally: as we pursue truth about the nature of mind, we should not be 
surprised if limiting our tools to a priori argumentation and first-personal introspection 
produces scant success (and numerous errors). Now more than ever, philosophers of mind 
share the sense that robust empirical engagement is crucial to untangling the mysteries of 
cognition, and they take an increasingly dim view of the purely a priori-introspective approach 
that is common to strong inflationist arguments. Bermúdez’s conviction that thoughts about 
thoughts cannot have nonlinguistic vehicles is partially propped up by the fact that he has never 
noticed having any such thoughts. To see how shaky this inference is, suppose—contrary to 
fact—that we had decisive a priori reasons to think that mindreading must be vehicled in a 
public language in the case of normally functioning adult humans. It would still not follow 
that that conclusion extended to other kinds of minds. Even if it were true that adult human 
minds can only entertain metathoughts vehicled in natural language, the minds of 
nonlinguistic creatures would be—as far as we know—under no obligation to obey that 
constraint. 
Furthermore, as Lurz (2007) points out, the view in question flatly contradicts an 
enabling assumption of the scientific researchers working on the question of mindreading’s 
domain. It’s an almost banal point, but these experimental psychologists think their work 
matters, that it goes some way, however small, toward settling that question. They believe their 
                                                
58 See, for instance, Weinberg (2007), the articles collected in Knobe & Nichols, eds. (2008; forthcoming), or the 
review offered in Knobe et al. (2012),  
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work with infants, nonhuman animals, and persons with cognitive or linguistic disabilities 
produces relevant data.59 But if those occupying Bermúdez’s position are right, then the 
experimental psychologists are badly mistaken. As far as the General Admission problem is 
concerned, their work does not matter; their data are not relevant. Because the question of 
nonlinguistic mindreading can be settled by metaphysical and conceptual considerations, 
empirical investigation has nothing to offer. Pointing out just how profoundly the strong 
deflationist position clashes with prevailing scientific attitudes does not constitute a decisive 
refutation of that view. Nonetheless, to be in such deep and irresolvable tension with the best 
science is not, in general, what one wants in a philosophical theory. 
With all this in mind, it seems safe to say that the strong deflationist position, 
founded on the notion that the General Admission Domain Problem can be settled from the 
armchair, faces rather long odds. Of course, a hypothetical defender of this view might 
justifiably say I have failed to offer decisive reasons for its falsity: “True, we have high 
standards to meet; but we believe we can craft arguments that meet them. True, we have to 
rely on fallible methods, but so do you; and we believe the general problems with 
introspection do not imperil our particular arguments. True, our position contradicts a basic 
supposition held by many experimental psychologists; but the fact that psychologists working 
on the General Admission problem think their work matters is perfectly consistent with it 
not, after all, mattering. You have merely stated the convictions native to our view and the 
circumstances of the debate—you haven’t offered any substantive reason to think the view is 
false.”  
                                                
59 For instance:  on nonhuman animals, see Clayton & Emery (2009), Melis et al. (2006), Burkart & Heschl 
(2007), Flombaum & Santos (2005), Hare et al. (2000), Tschudin (2006). On human infants and young children, 
see Baillargeon (2004), Onishi & Baillargeon (2005), Luo et al. (2009), Repacholi & Gopnik (1997). On aphasics, 
see Varley & Siegal (2000), Varley et al. (2001).  
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I have to concede this point:  the fact that the deck is stacked against the view of 
which Bermúdez is an exemplar hardly entails that this view is false. But until the theoretical 
question of whether nonlinguistically-vehicled mindreading is possible gets settled for good, 
we must unfortunately face the crass practical question of where to channel our intellectual 
resources. And, other things being equal, we should direct them toward the projects and 
programs that seem most likely to bear fruit. Where should we go from here with respect to 
the Domain Problems? I can only hazard my own guess, but it is a guess not without ground: 
the smart money is on treating them as empirical and methodological challenges; they are 
quite difficult enough that way, and they still provide ample opportunities for philosophers to 
make significant contributions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
HOW TO SOLVE THE (GENERAL ADMISSION) DOMAIN PROBLEM 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Let us begin again, then, with two anecdotes drawn from field work with 
chimpanzees: 
 
Puist, a heavy, older female, pursues and almost catches a younger opponent. After 
her narrow escape, the victim screams for a while, then sits down, panting heavily. 
The incident seems forgotten, and ten minutes later Puist makes a friendly gesture 
from a distance, stretching out an open hand. The young female hesitates at first, then 
approaches Puist with classic signs of mistrust, such as frequent stopping, looking 
around at others, and a nervous grin on her face. Puist persists, adding soft pants 
when the younger female comes closer. Soft pants have a particularly friendly 
meaning; they are often followed by a kiss, the chimpanzee’s chief conciliatory 
gesture. Then, suddenly Puist lunges and grabs the younger female, biting her fiercely 
before she manages to free herself. (de Waal 2005, p. 158) 
 
“One chimp was alone in the feeding area and was going to be fed bananas. A metal 
box was opened from a distance. Just at the moment when the box was opened, 
another chimp approached at the border of the clearing. The first chimp quickly 
closed the metal box and walked away several metres, sat down and looked around as 
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if nothing had happened. The second chimp left the feeding area again, but as soon as 
he was out of sight, he hid behind a tree and peered at the individual in the feeding 
area. As soon as that individual approached and opened the metal box again, the 
hiding individual approached, replaced the other and ate the bananas.” (Frans Plooij, 
as quoted in Whiten and Byrne, 1988, p. 242) 
 
As these examples show, nonlinguistic creatures are capable of some strikingly impressive 
tasks of social cognition. They engage in what looks like deception and trickery, even counter-
deception; in addition, they are known to cooperate and coordinate; they seem acutely 
attuned to the perspectives, preferences, and even the feelings of others around them.  
Nobody doubts that (some) infants and animals really perform these sorts of complex 
social-cognitive behaviors. What arouses debate—what is at the heart of the General 
Admission Domain Problem—is finding the right explanations for these behaviors. Can 
nonlinguistic creatures actually cognize and reason about the mental states of others—in 
other words, can they mindread? Or are they only very clever at reading their conspecifics’ 
bodies and behaviors—so clever that we are tempted to imbue them with our own capacity 
for mindreading? 
As I argued in the previous chapter, these are not questions likely to be settled from 
the armchair. The most robust attempt to do so, that of José Bermúdez, tries to establish in 
principle limits on nonlinguistic thought—but that line of argument is deeply unconvincing. 
Perhaps it could be rehabilitated or replaced with something more plausible. In the meantime, 
however, I find my resources better spent not wondering whether nonlinguistic mindreading 
is possible, but trying to determine the extent to which it is actual.  
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But to frame this question in empirical terms is neither to say that it is simple nor that 
philosophers lack a part to play in working toward its solution. On the contrary, the General 
Admission Domain Problem, construed as an empirical question, remains extremely thorny, 
and philosophers can usefully contribute in at least two major, interrelated ways: as 
innovators and critics of experimental design, and as appraisers of methodological principles 
that guide the collection and interpretation of data. This chapter will clarify the nature of 
those two roles and, by way of example, illustrate how philosophers can productively work 
within them. 
 
4.2 HOW TO DETECT NONLINGUISTIC MINDREADING? 
In the scientific study of nonlinguistic mindreading, as in science more generally, 
novel questions and hypotheses sometimes bubble up before viable experimental methods of 
probing them have been established. To illustrate how philosophers can foster progress on 
the General Admission problem by proposing new experimental methods or variations on 
established ones, I will provide two related examples: one from the late 1970s, and one from 
the recent literature.  
 
4.2.1 The Genesis of the False Belief Test 
In the late 1970s, Premack and Woodruff (1978) famously raised the question of 
whether chimpanzees can be mindreaders; using data collected from working with a chimp 
named Sarah, they answered that question with a provisional “yes,” and their article set off a 
roiling debate among philosophers and psychologists on all sides of the issue. The most 
penetrating criticism of Premack and Woodruff’s conclusion was that their data failed to 
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screen out other, more plausible interpretations of Sarah’s behavior, according to which Sarah 
was not mindreading at all. In light of that criticism, the following challenge presented itself: 
if our experimental quarry is the ability to reason about others’ mental states, then we need an 
experimental design under which a subject could produce a behavior X only by attributing 
mental states to another. In response to this challenge, three philosophers—Jonathan Bennett 
(1978), Daniel Dennett (1978), and Gilbert Harman (1978)—made the same suggestion 
independently: such an experiment would have to centrally involve the holding of a false 
belief. 
To see why this is the case, let’s construct a toy experimental paradigm, the first 
incarnation of which we will rig to fail. We want to test the hypothesis that a subject S can 
cognize the mental states of a target T, so we design a task to see whether S can correctly 
anticipate where T will look for an object of interest, on the assumption that correct 
anticipation requires having a belief about where T believes the object is located.60  On each 
trial, the object is placed into one of several colored boxes in full view of both S and T; S is 
then prompted to choose the box that T will look inside. A correct response occurs when S’s 
choice matches where T looks for the object. 
The obvious problem with this experimental setup is that there are multiple cognitive 
paths to a correct response, and not all of them run through the mind of T. According to one 
interpretation, S produces the correct response as follows (let’s suppose the object is placed 
into the green box): 
                                                
60 A disclaimer: it is practically impossible to discuss this scientific enterprise without using terms like “belief,” 
but I urge readers to treat these terms as placeholders, and not as signs that I wholeheartedly endorse the truth 
of belief-desire-intention (BDI) psychology or the reality of the propositional attitudes, or that the scientists 
under discussion do so. The problem of how to settle the referent of a term like ‘belief’ is not directly pertinent 
here, which may be why psychologists seldom even broach the issue in their research. Let ‘belief’ stand for the 
kind of mental state that is somehow evaluable in terms of truth or accuracy, and which functions in reasoning 
in roughly the way beliefs function according to BDI psychology. 
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(1) If T will look in the green box, then choose the green box.  
(2) If T believes the object is in the green box, then T will look in the green box.  
(3) T believes the object is in the green box.  
(4) So T will look in the green box.  
(5) So, choose the green box. 
This path requires that S be capable of attributing mental states to others, and on this 
interpretation a correct response supports the hypothesis. But another interpretation looks 
equally plausible: 
(i) If the object is in the green box, then choose the green box. 
(ii) The object is in the green box. 
(iii) So, choose the green box. 
By this path, S doesn’t need to have beliefs about T’s mental states to reach the right 
behavior; all S needs are beliefs about the world. 
 Our toy experimental setup cannot tell between these two interpretations, and the 
problem lies with the fact that T’s belief about the object’s location is true. What T believes 
about the object’s location—that it is in the green box—is also directly available for S’s 
perceptual access. S doesn’t need to cognize T’s perspective to grasp that the object is in the green 
box; that information is right there in the environment for the perceptual taking. Indeed, our 
experimental setup all but ensures this information is taken up by S. And so when S produces 
the “correct” behavior, we cannot know whether this is because S has formed beliefs about 
T’s beliefs, or simply about the world. 
But if we could engender in T a false belief about where the object is—by putting it in 
the green box while T watches, but then switching it to the blue box when T looks away—we 
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could approach a better test of S’s ability to anticipate T’s behavior. For then T’s behavior 
would be informed by false information—which is eo ipso unavailable for S’s direct perceptual 
access. In this case, what T (falsely) believes about the object is that it is in the green box; and S 
cannot get this information via perception; indeed, S has perceptual access to contradictory 
information. In this case, accurately anticipating T’s behavior means accurately cognizing the 
information shaping that behavior: S must get a cognitive grip not just on the world, but on 
the world from T’s perspective. 
This story is a simplification of even the earliest false belief tests. Nonetheless it 
serves to illustrate the contribution that Bennett, Dennett, and Harman made. Faced with a 
challenge presented by Premack and Woodruff’s intriguing but problematic research, they 
proposed a new experimental paradigm for continuing that research in a more rigorous and 
fruitful way. Their proposals led to an explosion of work on so-called “false belief 
understanding” in a wide variety of subjects: normally functioning adults; persons with 
autism, cognitive disabilities, and neurological conditions; young children and infants; and 
non-human primates as well as other animals. Today, this paradigm remains both prevalent 
and controversial: whether it can reveal as much as its supporters claim, and how to properly 
administer it to nonlinguistic creatures, for instance, are both live topics of debate in the 
contemporary literature (as in Bloom & German, 2000; Herschbach, 2008). 
 
4.2.2 Old Challenges… 
More than 30 years after Premack and Woodruff’s work, mindreading research on 
nonlinguistic creatures continues to be plagued by a familiar challenge: whenever researchers 
observe a behavior that looks prima facie like a potential instance of mindreading, a plausible 
 
 
120 
 
alternative explanation is inevitably lurking nearby, poised to frame the behavior as merely an 
instance of behavior (and not mind) reading. A specific version of this general worry is what 
Povinelli and Vonk (2004) and Hurley and Nudds (2006) call the “logical problem”: for any 
mindreading hypothesis61 generated in the course of research, one can generate a 
complementary behavior-reading hypothesis.62 The problem is called “logical” because it 
appears to be experimentally insoluble: it holds for any mindreading hypothesis that is 
supposedly up for empirical confirmation. 
Though the logical problem is meant to hold for research into nonlinguistic 
mindreading generally, it will help to look at a particular case: the question of whether 
chimpanzees can cognize what conspecifics see, where that ability is construed as the ability to 
(a) apply the mental-state concept see to conspecifics and (b) use that application in the 
intelligent guidance of behavior. One might notice that we have shifted from talk of belief to 
talk of seeing; nevertheless, given the epistemic dimension of the mental concept see and the 
types of experimental protocol typical of this research program, we can safely place it in the 
broader lineage of the false belief paradigm. The relevant experimental protocol is a food-
competition design developed by Hare and colleagues.63  
I choose this experimental approach for two reasons. First, it has produced a large 
body of data and a high-profile debate; second, the relative simplicity of this experimental 
design makes it easier to see how it seems to falls victim to the logical problem. First, though, 
we will need to briefly sketch the experimental approach and the logic behind it.  
                                                
61 That is, one that purports to explain an observed behavioral effect in terms of the exercise of a mindreading 
capacity. 
62 For an explanation of why this problem is distinct from other methodological puzzles about nonlinguistic 
mindreading, see Lurz (2009). It is appropriate at this point simply to note the assumption often smuggled into 
formulations of the logical problem: that behavior-reading hypotheses are, other things equal, more plausible 
than their mindreading complements. What underwrites this assumption, and whether it deserves any credence, 
will be discussed later in this chapter. 
63 In, e.g., Hare et al. (2000); Hare, Call, and Tomasello (2001); Bräuer, Call, and Tomasello (2007). 
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Dominance hierarchies in chimpanzee social groups dictate certain behavioral 
regularities: if a piece of food is accessible by both a dominant and a subordinate chimp, the 
dominant will pursue it and punish any subordinates who dare to compete with it. 
Accordingly, subordinates do not pursue food that is accessible by a dominant chimpanzee. 
The food competition paradigm was conceived to test whether chimpanzees can take the 
visual perspectives of others. The creators of this paradigm reasoned that if a subordinate 
chimpanzee can tell when a dominant chimpanzee can (and cannot) see a piece of food and 
use that information to anticipate the dominant chimp’s behavior, this ability should show up 
in the subordinate’s food-gathering preferences. 
In the ur-version of this paradigm (Hare, Call, Agnetta, & Tomasello, 2000), a large 
middle room separates two small rooms. Researchers place a subordinate chimpanzee in one 
of the small rooms and a dominant chimpanzee in the other. The chimps are prevented from 
entering the middle room by guillotine doors, which are opened wide enough for each chimp 
to see the middle room and each other. Researchers place two identical pieces of food in the 
center of the middle room. The guillotine doors are then opened all the way, allowing the 
chimps to enter the middle room (in a revised version of the experiment, the subordinate is 
given a small head start to control for the possibility of the subordinate waiting to see what 
the dominant actually does). In the experiments’ preliminary and training phases, the 
subordinate chimpanzee learns that he can only reliably retrieve food that is more readily 
accessible (visually and physically) to him than to the dominant chimpanzee, and that the 
dominant chimpanzee will always retrieve food that is either equally accessible to both of 
them, or more readily accessible to the dominant chimpanzee. 
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After these initial phases, a variety of experimental conditions are tested. We can 
restrict our attention to three: the “no barrier” or control condition, the occluder test, and the 
transparent barrier test. In the “no barrier” condition, both pieces of food are equally visible 
to both chimps. In the occluder test, an opaque barrier is placed in the middle of the central 
room, followed by the two pieces of food—one out in the open, and one behind the barrier, 
hidden from the dominant chimpanzee’s view but visible to the subordinate chimpanzee. In 
the transparent barrier test, the setup is the same, only the barrier is transparent rather than 
opaque—meaning that both pieces of food are visible to both chimpanzees. Hypothesizing 
that chimpanzees can indeed cognize what their conspecifics see, Hare and colleagues 
predicted that the subordinate chimpanzees would show a significant preference for the food 
“to which they had exclusive visual access” (Hare et al., 2000, p. 779).   
Indeed, the observed data seemed to bear out that hypothesis. In a “no barrier” 
condition, the subordinate showed no preference for one piece of food over the other. But in 
the occluder test, the subordinate showed a significant preference for the piece of food to 
which it has exclusive visual access. And when the opaque barrier was swapped out for a 
transparent one, the effect disappeared—the subordinate showed no preference for either 
piece of food (see Fig. 4.1). To explain these results (and others like them), Hare et al. 
propose a mindreading model, according to which chimpanzees are able to take the visual 
perspectives of others. On this model, the subordinate is sensitive to whether or not the 
dominant chimp can see a piece of food in the competition area, as well as to the connections 
between seeing and acting. 
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     “No barrier” condition   “Opaque barrier” condition                 “Transparent barrier”  
 
Figure 4.1 
 
But as Hare et al.’s critics (e.g. Penn & Povinelli, 2007; Povinelli & Vonk, 2004; Lurz, 
2001) pointed out, the logical problem undermines this experimental protocol. For any 
mindreading model on offer, we can generate a complementary behavior-reading model that 
predicts the very same behavioral data. To see how, consider the notion of direct line of sight.64 
Direct line of sight is simply the spatial arrangement that obtains between an object and some 
subject’s open and appropriately oriented eyes, an arrangement traceable by “an 
unobstructed, notional, straight line” (Heyes, 1998, p. 113). Note that while seeing is a mental 
concept—that is, it picks out something not directly observable—direct line of sight is not. 
Whether a direct line of sight relation obtains is, at least in principle, observable. Now, one 
might plausibly think, in creatures capable of making attributions of the mental concept 
seeing, such attributions are made (or withheld) on some observable basis, including 
information about whether a direct line of sight relation obtains. If so, then judgments about 
whether the seeing concept obtains will closely track judgments about whether the direct line 
of sight relation obtains. On this view, the inference- and behavior-guiding functional role of 
a seeing judgment is similar to the role of a judgment about direct line of sight. 
                                                
64 Equivalent locutions for “direct line of sight” are “eye-object line” (Heyes, 1994; 1998) and “uninterrupted 
visual access” (Penn & Povinelli, 2007); I follow Okamoto-Barth, Call, and Tomasello (2007) and Lurz (2009) in 
using the term “direct line of sight.” 
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So perhaps, say critics of Hare et al., the subordinate chimpanzee is merely making 
judgments about direct line of sight, which we humans all too easily mistake for judgments 
about seeing. According to the logical problem, to generate a complementary behavior-
reading model, all we need do is replace the mindreading model’s talk about seeing with talk 
about direct line of sight. Following the criticisms of Penn and Povinelli (2007), Povinelli and 
Vonk (2004), and Lurz (2001; 2009; 2011), we can construct a simple chart that illustrates the 
different patterns of practical reasoning each model ascribes to the subordinate chimpanzee 
(D = the dominant chimpanzee). 
 
 
Figure 4.2 
 
As Figure 4.2 shows, the two models reach the same predictions about how the subordinate 
chimpanzee will expect the dominant chimpanzee to behave, and how the subordinate 
chimpanzee will modulate his behavior accordingly. But they differ in how they characterize 
the subordinate chimpanzee’s inferential path: while the mindreading hypothesis credits him 
with command of the mental concept seeing—a command that, plausibly, depends upon his 
Mindreading Hypothesis 
  
(P1) D will go for all and only the food he can 
see. 
(P2) D can see food placed behind the 
transparent barrier, but not food placed 
behind the opaque barrier. 
Behavior-reading Hypothesis 
  
(P1) D will go for all and only the food in his 
direct line of sight. 
(P2) D has direct line of sight with food 
placed behind the transparent barrier, but not 
with food placed behind the opaque barrier. 
(C1) So, D will go for the food placed behind the transparent 
barrier, but not the food placed behind the opaque barrier. 
(C2) So, go for the food behind the opaque barrier, but not the 
food behind the transparent barrier. 
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being able to wield the purely behavioral concept direct line of sight—the behavior-reading 
hypothesis only credits him with the latter ability. The present experimental protocol seems 
incapable of screening out this kind of behavior-reading hypothesis. There are no data 
predictable by a mindreading hypothesis that cannot also be predicted by a complementary 
behavior-reading hypothesis. So goes the logical problem.65 
 
4.2.3 …and New Solutions 
Robert Lurz (2009; 2011) suggests an ingenious new protocol to deal with this 
problem, the broad strokes of which I will give here to illustrate the kind of design changes 
that are possible in this area. Lurz’s proposal uses the same basic setup as Hare et al.’s barrier 
protocol, but with a twist: instead of hinging on the fact that opaque (but not transparent) 
barriers affect the visibility of objects in perspective-sensitive ways, it hinges on the fact that 
colored transparent barriers affect the apparent color of objects in perspective-sensitive ways. 
While Hare et al.’s experiments probed the chimpanzee’s mastery of the mental concept seeing, 
Lurz’s proposal aims to probe the chimpanzee’s mastery of the mental concept seeing-as.  
In the protocol’s preliminary phase, the two chimpanzees are familiarized with two 
objects: a desirable yellow banana, and a plastic orange banana, which look quite alike except 
for their color. The subordinate chimpanzee learns that the dominant chimpanzee will go for 
all the yellow bananas that are visible and accessible to him, but that after a few trials he (the 
dominant chimpanzee) won’t go for the plastic orange bananas. Then, in the training phase, 
the subordinate chimpanzee is acquainted with transparent barriers—one clear, one red—and 
how they affect the appearance of the real and plastic bananas: to one looking through the 
                                                
65 There are other prominent and interesting experimental protocols in the field of chimpanzee mindreading 
research, as in Heyes (1998)—but the logical problem applies in the same way, mutatis mutandis, to such 
protocols. 
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red barrier, yellow objects behind the barrier look orange; orange objects look darker orange. 
The subordinate chimpanzee’s training continues until it pursues yellow bananas seen 
through the red barrier with the same “speed and alacrity” with which it pursues yellow 
bananas (Lurz, 2009, p. 315). 
The experimental phase then follows the example of Hare et al. In the red barrier test, 
two red transparent barriers are placed in the middle of the central room. A yellow banana is 
placed behind one of the barriers and a plastic orange banana is placed behind the other, such 
that both objects are on the subordinate’s side of the barriers. Both chimpanzees are then 
given the opportunity to retrieve the objects, with the subordinate getting a slight head start. 
In the first alternative barrier test, the setup is the same, only instead of two red transparent 
barriers, there is one red and one clear barrier. A yellow banana is placed on the subordinate 
side of the red barrier; an orange plastic banana is placed on the subordinate side of the clear 
barrier. The second alternative barrier test replicates this setup, only both the objects placed 
behind the barriers are yellow bananas.  
According to the mindreading hypothesis this protocol aims to test, the subordinate 
chimpanzee knows (or comes to know) that the dominant chimpanzee sees yellow bananas 
behind red barriers as orange (and therefore undesirable) and yellow bananas behind clear 
barriers as yellow (and therefore desirable); this hypothesis predicts that the subordinate 
chimpanzee will preferentially go for the former, but not the latter. As before, we can use the 
mindreading hypothesis to generate a complementary behavior-reading hypothesis. But this 
time, things are different: 
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Figure 4.3 
 
As Figure 4.3 shows, the two hypotheses make different predictions—not only about the kind 
of inferential pattern the subordinate will follow, but about which behaviors he will produce. 
It is this latter difference that matters, for now we have an experimental protocol that is 
immune to the logical problem: under this protocol, one cannot simply take a mindreading 
hypothesis, replace the talk about seeing-as with talk about direct line of sight, and generate a 
complementary behavior-reading hypothesis that makes the very same behavioral predictions. 
In other words, we should be able to use this protocol to obtain data that can tell between 
these rival hypotheses (Lurz, 2009, pp. 317-8). 
Though the physical details here are important, the true ingenuity of Lurz’s proposal 
lies in its conceptual shift from seeing to seeing-as. In any given situation, facts about whether 
the mental concept seeing applies supervene on facts about whether the relation of direct line 
Mindreading Hypothesis 
  
(P1) D will go for all and only the accessible 
bananas he sees as yellow. 
(P2) Red transparent barriers make one see 
yellow objects behind them as orange and 
orange objects as dark orange; clear barriers 
do not change the way objects look. 
Behavior-reading Hypothesis 
  
(P1) D will go for all and only the yellow 
bananas in his direct line of sight. 
(P2) Both red and clear transparent barriers 
preserve direct line of sight with objects 
behind them. 
(C1) So, when the yellow banana is placed 
behind the clear barrier, D will go for it, seeing 
it as yellow; but when the yellow banana is 
placed behind the red barrier, D will not go 
for it, seeing it as orange.  
(C2) So, go for yellow bananas behind the red 
barrier rather than yellow bananas behind the 
clear barrier. 
(C1) So, when the yellow banana is placed 
behind either the red or the clear barrier, D 
will go for it, since D has direct line of sight 
with it. 
  
(C2) So, go with equal preference for yellow 
bananas placed behind the red and the clear 
barriers. 
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of sight obtains; there can be no change in the former without some change in the latter. For 
this reason, mindreading hypotheses framed in terms of seeing can be rephrased as behavior-
reading hypotheses in terms of direct line of sight without changing the behavioral predictions. But 
this does not seem to be the case for seeing-as; the seeing-as facts do not supervene in the 
same way on facts about direct line of sight. After all, the former can change—as they do 
when an object goes from seen-as-yellow to seen-as-orange—without the latter changing along 
with them. An experimental protocol that focuses on seeing-as, then, seems immune to the 
logical problem; under such a protocol, the complementary mindreading and behavior-
reading hypotheses will make different predictions, and will therefore be amenable to 
experimental confirmation and disconfirmation.  
Of course, overcoming the logical problem is not the end of the road; Lurz takes care 
to note that while his proposal should screen out this sort of behavior-reading hypothesis, it 
will not screen out every possible behavior-reading hypothesis (2009, p. 318). Of course, no 
protocol can meet such a lofty standard, so that isn’t a terribly troubling drawback. Still, there 
are at least two aspects of Lurz’s proposal that demand further attention: 
(1) Visual illusion. The shift from seeing to seeing-as brings with it a shift from simple cases 
of occlusion—where a chimpanzee’s view of some object is entirely blocked by an 
opaque barrier—to more complicated cases of visual illusion, wherein unusual 
perceptual circumstances provide misleading information about an object’s 
properties. As Lurz himself notes, there has been precious little work done on how 
chimpanzees encounter and deal with visual illusions. Theoretically, this deficiency 
should be easy to remedy: the literature on visual illusion in humans is so massive and 
well-staked-out that certain research programs could presumably be transferred, with 
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proper tweaking, to chimpanzees. More data along these lines would help shore up 
Lurz’s proposal by providing a body of knowledge about what counts as species-
normal behavior for chimpanzees with respect to visual illusions, and particularly 
color illusions. Without such a body of knowledge to serve as a background, it would 
be hard to draw larger conclusions from data collected under a Lurz-type protocol.66 
(2) Artificiality. Even if one were to implement Lurz’s proposal and find experimental 
data to support a mindreading hypothesis, one might worry about the protocol’s 
remoteness from conditions that obtain in the natural environment of chimpanzees. 
And while there is nothing about Lurz’s protocol that makes it less ecologically 
plausible than the designs it is intended to supplant, a general concern remains about 
the representativeness of data obtained in highly artificial laboratory settings after 
intensive periods of training. It would be interesting on its own merits if captive 
chimpanzees with the benefit of training could exhibit mindreading abilities; it would 
be more interesting if that result could license an inference that chimpanzees in the 
wild possess such abilities as well. And this brings us to another methodological 
challenge: how to design experiments that marry the rigor and manipulability of 
laboratory protocols with the ecological naturalness of field research. 
To my knowledge, no researchers have explicitly taken up Lurz’s suggestion; perhaps there 
are as-yet-unnoticed problems with it, in addition to the concerns sketched above. At the 
moment, though, the proposal stands as an untested but promising example of how progress 
can be made on the General Admission problem by conceiving of fresh experimental 
                                                
66 The importance of conducting research on animal cognition against a stable background of what constitutes 
species-normal behavior should not be overlooked, any more than one should overlook the importance of 
conducting research on infant cognition against a stable background of what constitutes age-normal behavior. 
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methods. I now consider the methodological principles underlying and shaping research on 
that problem. 
 
4.3 IN SEARCH OF GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
Tacitly or not, every cognitive scientist brings into the field or the laboratory certain 
assumptions, methodological principles, rules of thumb, heuristics, and biases, which guide 
their experiments and inferences. Some of these assumptions may be unwarranted; some 
heuristics may be more trouble than they are worth; some rules of thumb may slow scientific 
progress; some biases may need correcting. Scientists interested in the General Admission 
Domain Problem, like all scientists, want their work to be guided by good methodological 
principles, and so it is vital to sort the good ones from the bad. The basic strategy for doing 
this job goes as follows:  
(1) Survey the experimental work to see what guiding principles seem to be operative. 
Sometimes these principles will be explicitly stated; sometimes they will appear only 
implicitly. 
(2) For each such principle, try to decoct from scientific practice and theory what the 
principle really says. Some scientists may have defective conceptions of a principle; 
others may talk as if the principle meant X but allow it to guide their research as if it 
meant Y. 
(3) Evaluate the worth of the principle. Some will carry certain benefits along with 
certain costs; these should be weighed against each other, the goal here is a judgment 
about what role (if any) the principle ought to play in future empirical work.  
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To see the task more clearly, imagine that you are a psychologist studying social cognition in 
nonhuman animals; you observe a set of behaviors that look, prima facie, like an instance of 
mindreading—something that fits the superficial profile of, say, deception. To flesh out the 
details, we can borrow an actual case drawn from work by Ristau (1991) on broken wing 
displays in piping plovers. Upon detecting a predator near its nest, a plover will drag one of 
its wings behind it in the sand, creating a display convincingly similar to the behavior of 
plovers with genuinely injured wings.67 The appearance of injury distracts and entices the 
predator, luring its attention safely away from the plover’s nest and her defenseless offspring. 
The question confronting you, the psychologist, is simple: what is the right 
explanation for this intriguing behavior? You might think the appearance of deceptive 
pretense suggests a mindreading model: the plover thinks its behavior will cause the predator to have a 
false belief. To endorse that model is to assert that the plover is capable, in at least one sort of 
case, of forming beliefs about predators’ beliefs. Such a model purports to extend the domain 
of mindreaders, if only a tiny bit, into the realm of nonlinguistic creatures. Of course there 
are other available explanations for the plover’s behavior: for instance, the plover thinks its 
behavior will protect its nest from predators; this hypothesis attributes beliefs to the plover, but not 
beliefs about beliefs. Or perhaps the plover is performing a motor routine in response to certain stimuli; 
this hypothesis attributes no beliefs to the plover at all.68 Given these various candidate 
hypotheses, which would impute various kinds of psychological capacities to the plover, you 
want to know before you begin rigorous laboratory experimentation or in-depth field 
observation: is there a bit of methodological doctrine that could rule out one hypothesis, or a 
                                                
67 Ristau’s work is helpfully discussed by Dennett (1991; 1995); see also Sober (1998), who draws on both 
Ristau’s field work and Dennett’s discussion. 
68 I don’t mean to suggest that holding this motor-routine hypothesis amounts to denying that piping plovers 
can have beliefs in general; one can certainly do the former without being rationally required to do the latter. All 
I mean to say is that this hypothesis, all by itself, does not ascribe this ability to the plover. 
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rule of thumb that could boost the plausibility of another? Here is where a guiding 
methodological principle is wanted. 
We have seen, in the previous chapter, an attempt to establish a certain very sweeping 
hypothesis that skirts the need for such principles: according to Bermúdez (2003b; 2009), a 
nonlinguistic creature is ipso facto incapable of mindreading. If this were true, then the 
“deception” explanation of the plover’s behavior could be ruled out straightaway: plovers 
aren’t language users, and so can’t have thoughts about thoughts—therefore, they can’t 
engage genuine deception, and we, as experimenters, need not worry about testing this 
hypothesis. But as I and others have argued, there is no good reason to think Bermúdez’s 
hypothesis is true—no reason to think language is a necessary condition of having thoughts 
about thoughts—and therefore no reason to let it constrain scientific practice. I turn, 
therefore, to the consideration of more promising guiding principles. 
 
4.3.1 The Specter of Anthropomorphism 
 
There is an universal tendency among mankind to conceive all beings like themselves, 
and to transfer to every object, those qualities, with which they are familiarly 
acquainted, and of which they are intimately conscious…. (Hume, 1740/1978, p. xix) 
 
One such principle applies specifically to the study of animal minds; it stems from 
concerns about anthropomorphism that are more general than the particular issue of 
mindreading. Whenever questions are raised about how to study and interpret animal 
behavior in a scientifically respectable way, one finds the specter of anthropomorphism 
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hanging heavily over the discussion—that one should avoid unduly anthropomorphic 
explanations of animal behavior is a popular shibboleth, and one that has long attended the 
scientific study of animal cognition.69 And although both anthropomorphism and anxiety 
about it have long histories in and outside of this field, they remain poorly understood. In line 
with the strategy outlined above, I will try to clarify just what anthropomorphism is and how 
it functions in this context; I will then argue that the anti-anthropomorphic “rule of thumb” 
said to hold sway in animal psychology is neither well founded nor very well understood. If 
we want to move forward on the General Admission Domain Problem, we should discard it. 
The specter of anthropomorphism has haunted animal psychology since its inception, 
although the term has diverse areas of application and charges of anthropomorphism have a 
history stretching back to the pre-Socratics.  
Witness this fragment of verse from Xenophanes of Colophon, which critiques the 
Homeric-Hesiodic theology of his time, according to which the gods had many human or 
humanoid qualities: 
But mortals consider that the gods are born, and that they have clothes and speech 
and bodies like their own…. But if cattle and horses or lions had hands, or were able 
to draw with their hands and do the works that men can do, horses would draw the 
forms of the gods like horses, and cattle like cattle, and they would make their bodies 
such as they each had themselves. (Kirk, Raven, & Schofield (Eds.), 2007, pp. 168-9) 
Xenophanes might seem to engage in a bit of anthropomorphism himself in this 
fragment: having identified the human tendency to anthropomorphize, his rhetorical 
flourish appears to infer counterfactually from that tendency the conclusion that 
                                                
69 There are too many examples to list here; the excellent anthology Rational Animals? (Hurley & Nudds [Eds.], 
2006) collects many recent representative instances. 
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other animals would (if they could) have a parallel tendency to zoomorphize. That is, 
from the premise that humans have the disposition to form the gods in their own 
image, he seems to infer counterfactually that animals would (if they could) have that 
disposition too. Of course, the idea of animals with humanlike cognitive capacities 
was an absurdity for the pre-Socratics; Xenophanes is more likely being purposely 
ironic than unwittingly inconsistent. In any case, worries about anthropomorphism 
are nothing new—but we should try to settle more specifically what this term means 
in the present context before discussing it further.  
4.3.1.1 Squaring Up to Anthropomorphism 
Some of the clearest thinking on this topic comes from Kristin Andrews, who defines 
anthropomorphism in the arena of animal psychology as “the attribution of uniquely human 
mental characteristics to non-human animals” (2011, p. 469). This definition is a good start, 
but it needs some refinement: first, it should properly include the attribution of non-mental 
characteristics, because characteristics that are not themselves mental may still be relevant to 
the formation of a psychological explanation. If one ascribes to an animal, e.g., a behavioral 
regularity that is uniquely human, and if that ascription figures in one’s formation of a 
psychological explanation of something that animal does, then one is guilty of 
anthropomorphism regardless of whether any uniquely human mental characteristics are 
ascribed to the animal.  
Second, the term should not limit itself to attributions of uniquely human 
characteristics: the problem at the core of anthropomorphism is not that human scientists 
attribute to animal X a quality that is uniquely human, but that human scientists attribute to 
animal X a quality that it does not have, but which humans have, and that the fact that humans have 
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this quality plays some explanatory role in the mistaken attribution. This second point 
illuminates a third one: anthropomorphism worthy of the name should only apply to cases 
where one’s belief that humans have characteristic C plays some role in attributing C to a 
nonhuman animal. The term is meant to pick out the habit of illicitly extending some 
characteristic known to be possessed by humans to a nonhuman animal, where that knowledge 
figures in the illicit extension.  
So, on this refined version of Andrews’s gloss, anthropomorphism is the attribution 
to a nonhuman animal of a characteristic it does not have—a characteristic that 
(i) either is itself mental or figures in the formation of a psychological explanation;70 
(ii) that is known to be possessed by humans; and 
(iii) that is attributed to the animal in question at least partly because of (ii). 
This definition is clumsier than the one proposed by Andrews, but it better captures the 
relevant phenomenon. What it also captures, though not explicitly, is the notion that 
anthropomorphism is to be avoided: it is an error. So how should scientists interested in 
animal psychology—and those who draw on their research—avoid making this error? To 
avoid it entirely, we would need to know which human characteristics are and are not shared 
by nonhuman animals, which we could discover by checking our exhaustive list of human 
characteristics against our exhaustive list of nonhuman mental characteristics. Of course, 
there are no such lists—and if there were, we wouldn’t need to do the science anyway! 
Figuring out which mental characteristics are possessed by nonhuman animals just is the task 
for researchers in animal cognition, and the General Admission problem is but one branch of 
                                                
70 In the interest of brevity, I will sometimes collapse these two categories into a single one, which I will call 
“mental characteristics.” For the remainder of the discussion of anthropomorphism, though, one should read 
“mental characteristics” as picking out a class that comprises both strictly defined mental characteristics and 
characteristics that, while not themselves mental, are relevant to the construction of psychological explanations 
of behavior. 
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that task.71 We can’t structure our science in a way that preemptively eliminates the possibility 
of anthropomorphic error; such error must be avoided on the fly, as the science is being 
done. 
Before examining some ways to commit and avoid committing anthropomorphism, 
we should step back and ask just how strong our inclination to avoid this kind of error ought 
to be. We should be generally averse to mistakes, certainly, but might our anxiety about a 
certain kind of error lead us into more serious and frequent error of another kind? Some have 
argued that the specter of anthropomorphism, for various reasons, has tended to blind us to 
the risk of its counterpart error, committed when we conclude that an animal lacks some 
characteristic, which it in fact does have, and which humans have, too (Andrews, 2011; 
Sheets-Johnstone, 1992; de Waal, 1999; Whiten & Byrne, 1988). The former kind of error is a 
false positive; it rejects a null hypothesis that is in fact true. The latter is a false negative; it 
does not reject a null hypothesis that is in fact false. In the familiar framework of Neyman 
and Pearson (1933), the former error is properly called a type I error; the latter is a type II 
error. The overriding concern with anthropomorphism one finds in discussions of animal 
cognition speaks to an evident bias in favor of avoiding type I errors at the risk of making 
type II errors; indeed, this bias is something of a rule of thumb in animal psychology 
(Andrews, 2011). We can ask two important questions about this bias: first, where it comes 
from; second, and more importantly, whether it is justified. Addressing the former question is 
a bit speculative, but I will sketch some ideas. 
                                                
71 Seen through this lens, Bermudez’s a priori strategy functions as a safeguard against anthropomorphism via the 
following inference: since humans are the only species with a public language, and since public language is a 
necessary condition of mindreading, we may conclude that other species do not engage in mindreading, and so 
avoid the temptation to ascribe this uniquely human capacity to animals. But this inference’s second premise is 
false, making the inference unsound. Bermudez’s principle is of no help to those who wish to avoid 
anthropomorphism. 
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4.3.1.2 The Roots of Anthropomorphism Anxiety 
As we’ve seen, a complete history of the anthropomorphism-phobic bias would have 
to start in antiquity. Xenophanes’ fragment may not seem relevant to the present debate: after 
all, he was writing many centuries before anything that resembles a scientific inquiry of animal 
cognition, and his topic was not animal behavior but human theology. Still, his critique 
suggests one source of the anti-anthropomorphic bias to be found in contemporary animal 
psychology: the idea that humans, even ones as wise as Homer and Hesiod, are inherently 
prone to anthropomorphism. To Xenophanes, it is natural for a creature to project the 
features it knows itself to have out onto the world—erroneous, perhaps, but natural. In more 
contemporary terms, the idea is that someone studying animal cognition will be far more 
likely to commit type I than type II errors. And if so, it would seem prudent to be especially 
vigilant about avoiding type I errors, even if that means increasing one’s risk of type II errors. 
Another source of anxiety about anthropomorphism is the idea that rejecting 
anthropomorphic explanations is the appropriate expression of a respectably scientific 
worldview. Once, the best scientific theories attributed souls to plants and planets in order to 
explain their behavior; now they invoke mechanistic processes of photosynthesis and 
gravitational attraction. For the last few centuries at least, science has been engaged in a large-
scale purge of animistic or mentalistic elements from its theories. And while such elements 
might remain useful metaphors for teaching the rudiments of science to lay people—water 
“seeks” its own level, I’m told—they are increasingly absent from reputable scientific 
theories. This large-scale move from animism to mechanism fosters a suspicion against 
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anything smacking of mentalistic language.72 To be respectably “scientific,” one might think, 
is to be averse to hypotheses that posit mentality in cases where there is the mere possibility 
of a more mechanistic explanation. 
A similar story can be told when we move from the historical trajectory of science to 
the psychological development of an individual. It is well-established in developmental 
psychology that very young children are disposed to see intentional behavior everywhere; 
they are chronic and inadvertent anthropomorphizers (Boyer, 1996). Shedding this proclivity 
is part of growing up; through neurological development and the influence of culture, we 
grow less inclined to anthropomorphize. Adults who seem not to have shed this proclivity are 
labeled as benighted, childish, excessively soft-hearted, or even mentally ill. It seems plausible 
that the stigma attaching to excessive lay anthropomorphism reinforces a disdain for 
anthropomorphism as it occurs in science, too. 
There are also specific trends and moments in the history of animal psychology that 
may have contributed to the high degree of anxiety about anthropomorphism. Although the 
behaviorist research program (with its assiduous evasion of all anthropomorphic language) 
was officially discarded long ago, its influence in contemporary cognitive science remains 
palpable. That legacy is particularly salient in the study of animal behavior, where many 
researchers still employ experimental methods born in behaviorism’s heyday. One also thinks 
of embarrassing episodes like the story of Clever Hans, a horse who gained fame in the early 
years of the 20th century. Hans earned his moniker from his apparent ability to perform 
arithmetic calculations; he amazed crowds and convinced scientists. But the truth eventually 
came out: Hans was not an equine math wiz. As the psychologist Oskar Pfungst showed, 
                                                
72 I’m leaving the issue of religion totally aside here, since it is not strictly relevant; obviously, though, the 
histories of religious thought and mentalistic scientific explanation are linked by some very deep-running 
connections. 
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Hans’s ability to “solve” an arithmetic problem was really a different ability altogether: Hans 
was picking up on subtle behavioral cues unconsciously manifested by his handler, which 
betrayed the right answer to the given problem. The initial, anthropomorphic explanation—
“Hans can solve math problems just like we can!”—was replaced with a more scientifically 
sound, less anthropomorphic explanation. The Clever Hans fiasco suggested that lay people 
and scholars alike could be led far astray by a tendency to ascribe human-like mental abilities 
to animals; surely such episodes have shaped the prevailing wisdom about how to responsibly 
study animal cognition. 
Finally, some have suggested that contemporary anthropomorphism-phobia may 
partly stem from a kind of lexical asymmetry: namely, that while the term anthropomorphism has 
wide currency, there is no comparably popular term for its counterpart (Andrews, 2011; 
Sheets-Johnstone, 1992; de Waal, 1999). In the field of animal psychology, the relevant type I 
errors have a single and widely known name, but the relevant type II errors do not. It seems 
plausible that this asymmetry in language might foster an asymmetry in methodology: to a 
scientist on the lookout for errors, the error-type with a famous and richly connotative name 
is likely to appear more salient than the error-type with no name at all. Whether the 
introduction of a specific term for type II error in animal psychology might help in correcting 
this asymmetry, as some have proposed, is not clear—at this point, it is not clear whether this 
asymmetry stands in need of correction at all—but it would be independently useful to have a 
term for this phenomenon. I’ll adopt Frans de Waal’s (1997, 1999) suggestion, anthropodenial, 
which, though admittedly a bit ungainly, is at least etymologically appropriate. With this term 
in hand, we can turn toward an analysis and evaluation of anthropodenial as a guiding 
principle. 
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4.3.1.3 Getting Past Anthropodenial 
So much for the sources of anthropomorphism anxiety; we now need to reckon 
whether the bias engendered by that anxiety truly earns its keep as a scientific rule of thumb. 
According to the traditional position, the danger of committing anthropomorphism is 
somehow greater than the danger of committing anthropodenial, and so the asymmetric 
attention paid to avoiding anthropomorphism is justified. But there is no good reason to 
think that this is the case. Elliott Sober suggests that science should be equally on guard 
against anthropomorphism and anthropodenial, because they are two sides of the same coin: 
[Both anthropomorphism and anthropodenial] say that some hypotheses should be 
presumed innocent until proven guilty, while others should be regarded as having 
precisely the opposite status. Perhaps these default principles deserve to be swept 
from the field and replaced by a much simpler idea—that we should not indulge in 
anthropomorphism or in anthropodenial until we can point to observations that 
discriminate between these two hypotheses. It is desirable to avoid the type-1 error of 
mistaken anthropomorphism, but it is also desirable that we avoid the type-2 error of 
mistaken anthropodenial. (2005, p. 97)  
Kristin Andrews (2011) goes further than Sober in arguing that, contra the traditional 
position, science should take more care to avoid errors of anthropodenial than errors of 
anthropomorphism. She bases this claim on a compelling picture of science as being, in its 
best manifestations, more concerned with reaching the truth than with avoiding error: 
For progress in science to be possible, one must be open to being wrong, one must 
ask questions even when the answer turns out to be no, and one must challenge the 
null hypothesis in order to examine its accuracy. The willingness to be wrong is a 
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willingness to make type-1 errors in the course of the acquisition of new knowledge. 
(2011, p. 474) 
The fundamental riskiness of the scientific enterprise, says Andrews, permits us to be free 
from excess caution about anthropomorphic error. 
Sober and Andrews would surely agree that some degree of caution about 
anthropomorphic error is warranted. Even if we concede that harmless truth, however, there 
are further complications for the traditional position. As it is usually framed, the risk of 
anthropomorphism lies in being led to attribute more psychological sophistication to an animal 
or species than is warranted, and the most famous historical cases of anthropomorphic error 
(like Clever Hans) tend to reinforce that impression. But as Andrews (2011) shows, 
anthropomorphic error can also lead, somewhat paradoxically, to anthropodenial—that is, to 
the unwarranted denial of some psychological property to an animal or species.  
A recent and prominent example comes from the research on proto-moral cognition 
in chimpanzees. This line of research was itself inspired by a series of findings in behavioral 
economics suggesting that human beings frequently make decisions (for instance, about how 
to distribute resources) in ways starkly inconsistent with the rational choice model long 
favored by orthodox economic theory. Humans, it seems, operate with an implicit norm of 
fairness, and will, in many contexts, make decisions that are “irrational” if it means enforcing 
or upholding that norm (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). When chimpanzees were 
tested with similar experiments, they were found to behave differently from humans—and 
the conclusion was drawn that chimpanzees lack a norm of fairness (Jensen, Call, and 
Tomasello, 2007). 
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Andrews (2011) argues that the researchers, in drawing that conclusion, were making 
an error of anthropodenial—but one that was itself the product of a more fundamental 
anthropomorphic error. The original experiments with humans, and the hypotheses those 
experiments were devised to test, were informed by an (accurate) backdrop of assumptions 
about species-normal behavior for humans; for instance, that humans have certain 
expectations about the sharing of unexpected wealth. By simply transposing the established 
experimental protocol into the world of chimpanzees, the chimpanzee researchers assumed 
(unknowingly, let’s suppose) that, with respect to unexpected wealth, what is species-normal 
for humans is also species-normal for chimpanzees. But this is precisely not the case 
(Andrews, 2011).  
And so the unwarranted assumption that chimpanzees were like humans with respect 
to unexpected wealth wound up leading to an unwarranted inference that chimpanzees are 
unlike humans with respect to a norm of fairness.73 This example is instructive because it 
subverts the traditional picture according to which anthropomorphism leads to type-I but not 
type-II error. It shows us, as scientists and philosophers interested in the reasoning of 
scientists, how keenly aware we need to be of the sometimes counterintuitive ways that errors 
can interact. 
The rule of thumb recommended by the traditional position says that avoiding 
anthropomorphic error should be a special concern for animal researchers working on the 
General Admission Domain Problem. But this rule doesn’t serve to further scientific 
progress; if anything, it hampers such progress. Perhaps Sober has it right, and scientists 
should not worry about either anthropomorphism or anthropodenial unless they have some 
                                                
73 This is not to say that the right conclusion to draw is that chimpanzees do have a norm of fairness—only that 
the research in question does not persuasively establish that they do not.  
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specific and strong reason to do so. Or perhaps Andrews has it right, and scientists working 
on the mindreading abilities of animals should pursue bold hypotheses and experimental 
protocols, even if it means an increased risk of anthropomorphic error. In any case, the 
traditional position has been shown to be seriously unjustified. 
 
4.3.2 Decanonizing Morgan’s Canon 
I now want to consider another principle frequently cited in the literature on the 
cognitive abilities of nonlinguistic creatures: Morgan’s Canon. Though originally developed as 
a principle of animal psychology, the Canon has found purchase in cognitive science more 
generally. One finds appeals to it, both explicit and implicit, as a rule of thumb for guiding 
scientific inferences about the extent to which nonlinguistic creatures may engage in 
mindreading. In this section, I will examine Morgan’s Canon with two questions in mind: 
first, what does the Canon (or its contemporary equivalent) say? Second, is the Canon 
justified as an inferential rule of thumb—and why, or why not? 
4.3.2.1 What Does the Canon Say? 
Morgan’s Canon is named for its inventor and proponent C. Lloyd Morgan, a 
comparative psychologist working at the turn of the 20th century. The canon appears most 
clearly in the first edition of Morgan’s Introduction to Comparative Psychology: “In no case may we 
interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be 
interpreted as the outcome of one which stands lower in the psychological scale” (1894, p. 
53). In a reformulation published in 1903, Morgan adds an important caveat: his canon “by 
no means excludes the interpretation of a particular activity in terms of the higher processes, 
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if we already have independent evidence of the occurrence of these higher processes in the 
animal under observation” (1903, p. 59).  
I should briefly point out some relevant features of the canon as stated by Morgan 
himself. First, note that in his later formulation, Morgan shifts from talk of faculties to talk of 
processes: I’ll follow this later terminology.74 As for the qualification added in 1903, it marks a 
significant weakening of the canon: instead of forbidding a “higher” explanation whenever a 
“lower” one is available, the qualified canon forbids a higher explanation when a lower one is 
available and no independent evidence in favor of the higher explanation has been found. 
Even so qualified, the canon’s core meaning remains intact: it prescribes some brand of 
conservatism in adjudicating rival psychological explanations of animal behavior. More 
specifically, this conservatism has something to do with what Morgan calls higher and lower 
“psychical” processes. We might restate the core of the canon this way: given two candidate 
interpretations or explanations, we should always prefer the one that rings in lower 
psychological processes (provided we have no independent evidence that favors the other 
one). Plainly, in figuring out what Morgan’s Canon prescribes, all the action lies in getting 
clear on these notions of “higher” and “lower.”  
What Morgan himself meant by “higher” and “lower” is not of much interest, though 
describing and defending a psychological scale was indeed the main thrust of his Introduction to 
Comparative Psychology. Morgan’s conception of that scale is heavily Spencerian, following a 
linear model of evolutionary progression from simplicity to complexity. One of the features 
that made the Canon such an exciting commodity was the way it took this Spencerian model, 
which had previously been applied solely to somatic processes and structures, and applied it to 
psychological ones. Morgan’s substantive view about the psychological scale seems to have 
                                                
74 See Boakes (1984) for a discussion of this issue. 
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understood the “higher” psychological processes as involving the “perception of relations,” 
but it has been shown (Boakes, 1984; Gottlieb, 1979) that this interpretation is viable only on 
the condition that one already takes the Canon to be correct!  
Given that an historically faithful reading of Morgan’s Canon depends on both the 
prior acceptance of the Canon and a problematic picture of evolution, nothing like what 
Morgan originally meant could be of much interest to present-day psychology. If the canon’s 
operative notions of “higher” and “lower” are tied to an obsolete, Spencerian picture of 
evolution, the whole canon belongs in the historical dustbin where failed alternatives to 
Darwinism tend to wind up. We need an interpretation of the canon that doesn’t immediately 
render it irrelevant; there should be a way of reading it as an ancestor of some current and 
robust methodological principle in contemporary science. Robert Boakes suggests seeing the 
canon as “simply the application of the general law of parsimony to explanations of 
behavior” (1984, p. 40). And indeed this interpretation of Morgan’s Canon is widespread in 
the contemporary literature: the canon is frequently invoked as a corollary of Ockham’s 
Razor specific to the arena of comparative psychology.  
Since Ockham’s Razor is a principle recommending parsimony in general, and since 
Morgan’s Canon expressly prefers explanations of behavior that deal in terms of lower 
psychological processes, the Morgan’s-Canon-as-Ockham’s-Razor interpretation must draw 
some connection between how “high” or “low” a psychological process is and how 
parsimonious an explanation that rings in that process must be. So filling in this 
interpretation of the canon would require that we first tell a plausible story about what makes 
a psychological process “higher” or “lower”; and then explain why lower-process 
explanations are more parsimonious than their higher-process rivals. 
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Unfortunately for this interpretation, psychologists and philosophers who invoke the 
canon in the name of parsimony scarcely offer such an account—they tend instead to simply 
assert that the canon-as-Razor supports their hypotheses, as if that claim’s meaning and 
justification were clear to everyone. Not only is there a glaring lack of positive argument for 
the canon-as-Razor view, there are compelling arguments against it.75  Elliott Sober (1998), 
himself drawing on Newbury (1954), argues that even if we have a reasonable interpretation of 
“higher” and “lower”—and more on that below—there is no reason to think that “lower” 
explanations are ipso facto more parsimonious than “higher” ones. Of course, one could 
interpret “higher” and “lower” such that these relative terms simply mean ‘less parsimonious’ 
and ‘more parsimonious’, but that reading looks pretty wild. And even if we allow it, we’ve 
simply changed the subject: Morgan’s Canon drops out of the discussion entirely, and we’re 
faced with the question of whether Ockham’s Razor has special significance for the General 
Admission Domain Problem. This will be discussed in 4.3.3 below; for now, we should keep 
looking for interpretations of Morgan’s Canon on which it retains some independent 
meaning. 
 Perhaps the canon is best understood in the spirit Morgan originally intended it, even 
if he happened to get the content wrong. Morgan proposed his canon in an environment of 
what he—justifiably—saw as excessive and incautious anthropomorphism on the part of 
animal psychologists (like George Romanes, a friend and colleague of Darwin’s). 
Embarrassing examples like “Clever Hans” suggested that lay people and scholars alike could 
be led far astray by a tendency to unduly ascribe human-like abilities to animals. So perhaps 
Morgan’s Canon is best seen as a corrective to this tendency—a rule of thumb designed to 
safeguard us against our own anthropomorphic prejudices.  
                                                
75 See, for instance, Sober (1998, 2008, 2009); Fitzpatrick (2008, 2009). 
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I have already pointed out, in this chapter, the problems inherent in anti-
anthropomorphic bias. But there are further problems with this reading of the canon, since it 
depends on a presumed link between an explanation’s relative degree of psychological 
sophistication—that is what “higher” and “lower” mean on this account—and its relative 
degree of anthropomorphism. This interpretation of the canon assumes that between two 
rival psychological explanations, the “higher” one—i.e. the one positing more sophisticated 
psychological processes—will be more anthropomorphic than its rival. But this is unjustified. 
There is no guarantee that anthropomorphic explanations will be “higher” on the scale of 
cognitive sophistication than their non-anthropomorphic rivals. The intuition that human 
psychological processes are in some sense “higher” than those of other animals is obviously a 
powerful one—but without further argument, that intuition looks rather like a prejudice of its 
own. Even if our tendency to anthropomorphize the minds of other creatures needs a 
corrective—and, again, there are reasons to be skeptical about that idea—our self-
aggrandizing anthropocentrism might seem to call for one too (Fitzpatrick, 2008; 2009). 
Part of why the “corrective” reading won’t work is that it has no (plausible) account 
of what the canon means by “higher” and ‘lower.’ Sober (1998) offers a better one, which 
stems from a simple intuition: a “higher” psychological mechanism should allow a creature to 
do more than does its “lower” counterpart. Some might object that Sober’s account 
operationalizes—in some improper way—the relevant notion of ‘higher.’ Perhaps that 
objection merits more attention, but I won’t deal with it in these pages. There are few 
attempts in the literature to give a clear account of what “higher” ought to mean; the rare 
exceptions seem either to flirt with operationalism, to beg the important questions, or to fold 
the canon into Ockham’s Razor. An operationally flavored account thus seems the canon’s 
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best chance for significance. Another advantage of going operationalist, of course, is that it 
allows us to see clearly how Morgan’s Canon might hook up with actual scientific practice. 
Here is how Sober puts his definition: “One internal mechanism is higher than 
another if and only if the behavioral capacities entailed by the former properly include the 
behavioral capacities entailed by the latter” (1998, p. 236). We should note, if only in passing, 
that Sober’s definition covers all internal mechanisms, of which psychological processes are 
just one interesting subset. On Sober’s account, calling one psychological process higher than 
another is equivalent to saying that the first entails all the behavioral capacities entailed by the 
second, plus some more. Again, this option is attractive because it shows how Morgan’s 
Canon, interpreted along these lines, might be wielded in empirical psychology: it gives us a 
straightforward way of experimentally confirming or disconfirming the presence of a target 
psychological process.76   
Following Sober, we can schematize an example: take two psychological processes, L 
and H. L entails a set of behavioral capacities B1, while H entails a set of behavioral capacities 
B2; B2 properly includes B1. In other words, a creature with H can perform all the behaviors in 
B2; a creature with L (and lacking H) can only perform all the behaviors in B1. Given all this, 
then according to the account on offer H is higher than L. Armed with this framework, a 
researcher aims to determine experimentally whether an animal harbors L or H (or both). 
What can she hope to learn, and how can this explication of Morgan’s Canon help?  
Much will depend, of course, on the data. She might observe a behavior that lies 
inside B2 but outside B1; that would be a nice result. Since, according to the present account, 
an organism with L alone could not perform that behavior, she could confidently claim to 
                                                
76 Of course, having an in principle straightforward way for experimentally settling some question doesn’t mean 
that in practice it will be easy to do. What Sober recommends gives scientists a nice way to interpret data—but 
designing experiments so that they produce useful data is another matter, and a very tricky one. 
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have confirmed the presence of H. But what happens when she observes a behavior that falls 
inside B1? Such a case presents three candidate hypotheses: either both psychological 
processes are present (H&L), or the higher alone is present (H&-L), or the lower alone is 
present (-H&L).77  Two of these hypotheses posit the presence of H, and here Morgan’s 
Canon enters the picture as a potentially helpful principle. Remember: the canon enjoins us 
to reject a higher explanation when a lower one is available. So assuming all else is equal—
specifically, assuming that our researcher lacks independent evidence for any of the three 
hypotheses—Morgan’s Canon recommends that she choose -H&L, the lone hypothesis that 
doesn’t ring in H. This looks like progress: we have a clear interpretation of Morgan’s Canon 
that gives it freestanding significance, and which allows the canon to be straightforwardly 
deployed to guide scientific reasoning. 
4.3.2.2 Is the Canon Justified? 
Some guides, however, lead us astray—and Morgan’s Canon does so here, even on 
this promising interpretation of its meaning. Our researcher cannot justifiably choose -H&L 
as things stand; there simply isn’t enough evidence to make that hypothesis more probable 
than its rivals. We can make things somewhat easier on her by imagining that she knows to a 
virtual certainty that possession of H entails possession of L (but not the converse). This 
knowledge rules out the H&-L hypothesis. But note that we have to stipulate that this 
entailment holds. We can’t presume that it does, because an entailment between two 
mechanisms can fail to hold even when the set of behaviors enabled by H properly include 
those enabled by L.  
                                                
77 Let’s imagine that the behaviors in B1 require that either L or H be present; no other mechanism could 
produce them. 
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Still, stipulating that possession of H entails possession of L narrows our researcher’s 
field of vision down to two hypotheses, and it might seem to be of further inferential help: it 
is a theorem of probability that if X entails Y but not conversely, the probability of Y is 
greater than that of X. So given her knowledge of the assumed entailment from H to L, our 
researcher can justifiably say that Pr(L) > Pr(H). But (a) she could have said that before 
collecting any data, and (b) that isn’t the issue anyway. The choice facing our researcher is not 
between H and L, but between H&L and -H&L. And neither the laws of probability nor the 
data have anything to say about the relative probabilities of those hypotheses (Sober, 1998, 
pp. 236-9). 
Sober does suggest one way that this interpretation of Morgan’s Canon might provide 
genuine justification for inferences of this sort: if continued observation or experimental trials 
fail to detect or elicit any behavior from B2 that doesn’t also belong to B1, that fact can 
constitute evidence favoring the more ‘conservative’ hypothesis, -H&L. If the period of 
observation is long enough, the trials numerous enough, and the conditions diverse enough, 
our epistemic situation can change from “merely not observing an event” to having 
“observed a nonevent” (1998, p. 237). 
This seems sound, although the connection between an inference of this kind and 
Morgan’s Canon is more tenuous than supporters of the canon might like. After all, Morgan’s 
1903 modification of his canon says that one may justifiably prefer a higher-process 
explanation “if we already have independent evidence of the occurrence of these higher 
processes in the animal under observation.”  This caveat suggests that Morgan’s considered 
view intended the canon to apply to cases where rival hypotheses fit the evidence about 
equally well. Sober’s point about the epistemic significance of observing a nonevent may be 
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sound, and may justifiably incline us toward preferring a lower-process hypothesis in that 
case—but exactly because the hypotheses have turned out to fit the evidence unequally well. 
Morgan’s Canon does not seem to be pulling much weight here, even though the 
recommended hypothesis is the one the canon would endorse.  
These points should hold for psychological explanations of animal behavior generally; 
but I will try to make them a bit more concrete by seeing how they apply to the specific 
questions composing the General Admission Domain Problem. We’ll start by getting 
acquainted with a useful piece of philosophical-psychological language due to Dennett (1971, 
1987): the idea of orders of intentionality. Put briefly, it is simply a way to sort mental states 
coarsely according to what, if anything, they are about. A first-order mental state is defined 
negatively: it is not of or about a mental state. My desire for a tasty plum is an archetypal first-
order mental state, since it is about a plum, which is not a mental state. We can define a 
second-order mental state recursively: a mental state that is about a first-order mental state. 
My belief that Ophelia desires a tasty plum is an archetypal second-order mental state, since it 
is about a first-order mental state of Ophelia’s. We could continue up the ladder of 
intentionality, of course—a third-order mental state, for instance, is about a second-order 
mental state—but the concept should be clear enough. We can also descend the ladder to what 
is called a zeroth-order mental state: a state involving no thought at all. If talk of zeroth-order 
intentionality sounds odd to the point of paradox, it probably should—but it is useful as a 
limit case (Sober, 2009). 
To see orders of intentionality in action, let’s look at two cases as described by Sober 
(1998), one of which we’ve already discussed: 
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When an ant in the species Solenopsis saevissima dies, its fellow workers carry the body 
out of the nest to discard it. Why do they do so? One possibility is that the workers 
believe that the immobile organism is dead, and they have the desire to rid the nest of 
dead individuals. A better explanation is provided by the fact that the dead ant exudes 
oleic acid. Workers are disposed to pick up and discard anything that smells of this 
compound, even living ants that perverse biologists have daubed with the tell-tale 
substance…. When a piping plover (Charadrius melodus) sees a predator approach its 
nest, it will produce a broken wing display, dragging its intact wing along the sand as 
if the wing were injured…. Why does the bird do this? One possibility is that the 
plover wants to protect its young and believes that the display will induce a false 
belief in the predator. A better explanation is that the plover wants to protect her 
young, and believes that the broken wing display will have that effect. (1998, p. 224)78 
These examples illustrate the usefulness of the notion of orders of intentionality—not only 
for classifying mental states, but for classifying mentalistic explanations: in each case, the two 
rival explanations differ in their posited order of intentionality. In the case of the ants, the 
former explanation rings in first-order intentionality; the latter, zeroth-order intentionality 
(that is, it makes no reference whatever to mental states). In the case of the plover, the 
former explanation rings in second-order intentionality (the plover’s beliefs about a predator’s 
beliefs); the latter, first-order intentionality.  
It seems safe to presume that having nth-order intentionality allows an organism to do 
more than does (n - 1)-order intentionality. That is, the behavioral capacities entailed by the 
possession of nth-order intentionality properly include the behavioral capacities entailed by 
                                                
78 Sober draws the first example from Wilson (1971), although, as with the piping plover example, he may have 
first encountered it in Dennett (1991; 1995). 
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the possession of (n - 1)-order intentionality. Given this assumption, and staying with Sober’s 
explication of Morgan’s Canon in terms of the behavioral capacities respectively entailed by 
two psychological processes, we can say that when two rival explanations are pitched at 
different levels of intentionality, Morgan’s Canon will recommend the lower-order 
hypothesis. And as Sober himself notes, in both cases—the ant and the plover—the lower-
order explanation is the better one. So once again it seems Morgan’s Canon might be a 
helpful guide after all; let’s look closer. 
A case where the rival hypotheses are pitched at different orders of intentionality is 
exactly the sort of case that puts the problem of mindreading’s domain front and center. We 
can now revisit the case of the plover with this orders-of-intentionality framework in mind, to 
see whether Sober’s insights about the inferential utility of Morgan’s Canon hold up. As it 
happens, the previously schematized example fits the plover case nicely. Our researcher 
knows there are two psychological processes or mechanisms whose presence is at issue: L 
(first-order intentionality) and H (second-order intentionality). She knows that H entails 
behavioral capacity set B2, that L entails behavioral capacity set B1, and that B1 is a proper part 
of B2. Moreover, she has read a little philosophy of mind, in which one finds the orthodox 
view that second-order intentionality entails first-order intentionality (but not conversely)—
so she is confident that H entails L. She observes the plover’s broken wing display, which 
belongs (for argument’s sake) to B1. Now, because H entails L, she can eliminate the H&-L 
hypothesis; and for the same reason, she can conclude from probability theory that Pr(L) > 
Pr (H). But L and H aren’t her options—her options are H&L and -H&L, and she has 
neither data nor probabilistic inference rules to help her choose between them. 
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This doesn’t mean she is stuck, of course—it just means that further observations of 
B1 behaviors won’t be particularly helpful (qua B1 behaviors, anyway). She will need new data, 
and perhaps new experimental designs. And, as Sober suggests, she can profit by observing 
the lack of certain behaviors. Provided her observations or experiments are sufficiently 
rigorous, she may discover significant absences in the behavioral repertoire of the plover: 
namely, among those behaviors that belong solely to B2 (not to B1). If she can confidently 
identify a range of behaviors that belong to the B2-minus-B1 set and demonstrate that she has 
observed the plover not performing those behaviors (as opposed to not observing the plover 
performing them), she may be justified in preferring the -H&L hypothesis. But again, notice 
what a modest role Morgan’s Canon plays in this story: even if the lower-order explanation 
turns out to be the right one, that conclusion will be justified far less by the canon than by 
thorough, scrupulous, and creative experimental work.  
The frequent invocations of Morgan’s Canon in the literature79 suggest that the canon 
is an important, sound, and well-understood precept of comparative psychology. But as we’ve 
seen, the canon has—at best—a modest role to play in guiding inferences about the 
interpretation of animal behavior. Morgan’s Canon has some value, but it isn’t the 
heavyweight methodological principle we’ve been looking for to help us solve the General 
Admission Domain Problem. 
 
4.3.3 The Principle of Conservatism 
I now want to take up one of the most widely—and confusedly—used principles to 
guide scientific reasoning about nonlinguistic mindreading. Recall the last chapter’s grouping 
                                                
79 See, for instance, Custance, Whiten, & Friedman (1999), Graham (1998), Wilder (1996), Karin-D’Arcy (2005), 
Manning and Dawkins (1998). 
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of inflationist and deflationists. Inflationists think there are nonlinguistic mindreaders. Or, to put 
it a bit more cautiously, that some nonlinguistic creatures engage in some mindreading 
tasks—and deflationists think they do not. Having dispatched the “strong” deflationism of 
Bermúdez and others, according to which nonlinguistic creatures are not capable of 
mindreading, I want to look at a principle often employed to bolster what might be called the 
weak deflationist position: namely, that while nonlinguistic creatures may be in principle 
capable of mindreading, the evidence is not compelling that any such creatures are, in fact, 
mindreaders.  
Frequently, the dialectic between inflationists and weak deflationists operates as 
follows: an inflationist (or group thereof) points to some recently-gathered data as providing 
good, if not always decisive, evidence that some nonlinguistic creature has some mindreading 
capacity or other. The deflationists respond, sometimes citing data of their own, with moves 
meant to discredit or call into question the purported evidence of nonlinguistic mindreading. 
One of these moves is the application of the principle of conservatism.  
In its most general form, the principle of conservatism simply says that if we have 
two models offered as rival explanations for some data set—one inflationist and one 
deflationist—then all else being equal we should choose the deflationist one. In the coming 
sections, I argue for the following theses:   
(1) There are several possible ways to interpret the principle of conservatism, but it is 
best understood as appeal to parsimony. 
(2) For the principle of conservatism to be justified on grounds of parsimony, it must 
either assume a domain-general conception of parsimony or a domain-specific one. 
But neither conception adequately justifies the principle of conservatism. 
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(3) Because the principle’s only plausible source of justification fails to support it, we 
should reject it. 
(4) Rejecting the principle of conservatism, since it props up deflationist conclusions, 
should boost our confidence in certain inflationist hypotheses. 
I will make these points by using the food-competition paradigm discussed earlier as a case 
study of how the principle of conservatism is used to support deflationist conclusions, and 
why that support is illusory. 
With respect to the food competition experiments, the inflationists’ mindreading 
model credits the subordinate chimpanzee with second-order mental states—beliefs about 
the dominant chimpanzee’s perceptual states, perhaps—and as such is a second-order 
model.80 The deflationists’ behavior-reading model credits the subordinate with first-order, 
but not second-order, mental states—beliefs about the dominant chimpanzee’s behavioral 
patterns, perhaps—and as such is a first-order model. Like Morgan’s Canon, the principle of 
conservatism tell us that, when two rival explanatory models are pitched at different orders of 
intentionality and are otherwise equal, we should choose the explanation that invokes lower-
order intentionality. What makes the principle of conservatism distinct from Morgan’s Canon 
is that the former, but not the, latter is grounded in concerns about parsimony. 
 
 
 
                                                
80 I am not sure whether all second-order models, in virtue of crediting their subjects with second-order mental 
states, are thereby logically (or nomologically) bound to also credit their subjects with first-order mental states; 
that would seem to depend on whether the capacity to form second-order mental states somehow entails the 
capacity to form first-order mental states. The consensus among philosophers of mind is that there is at least a 
nomological entailment here. I am not sure this consensus view is correct, though at the moment I have nothing 
beyond a vague hunch about it. Regardless, any remotely plausible construal of the mindreading model offered 
by Hare et al. should credit the subordinate chimpanzees with first-order as well as second-order mental states. 
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4.3.3.1 Grounding the Principle 
In its most general tiebreaker form, the principle of parsimony is as follows: if we 
have two hypotheses equal in all other respects, we should prefer the simpler one.81 If 
parsimony is indeed meant to ground the principle of conservatism, then lower-order (e.g., 
behavior-reading) models are simpler than their higher-order (e.g., mindreading) rivals, and 
are therefore preferable.  
Before we can evaluative the justificatory link between parsimony and the principle of 
conservatism, however, we must ask whether reading the principle this way is interpretively 
plausible. Surely a good reading of the principle of conservatism ought to harmonize, as 
much as possible, with actual scientific practice. That is, we should strive for a reading on 
which, the scientists who use the principle are saying what they take themselves to be saying. 
To that end, we can return to our case study of the food competition paradigm to see what 
deflationists think they are saying when they appeal to the principle of conservatism in 
support of their behavior-reading models.  
The relevant deflationist challenge to Hare et al. (e.g., Povinelli & Vonk, 2004) takes 
the form of the following argument: because mental states are not directly observable, they 
must be inferred from what is observable in the environment. In order to have second-order 
mental states, as Hare et al.’s mindreading model proposes, the subordinate chimpanzee must 
make an inference about the dominant’s mental state on the basis of the situation’s 
observable features, and then adjust his actions accordingly. Imagining, as we did before, that 
we can “translate” the subordinate chimpanzee’s thoughts into English, the mindreading 
model ascribes these sorts of inferences to the subordinate: 
                                                
81 Whether simplicity is really the same thing as parsimony is not clear; I follow common usage in the 
mindreading literature in using these terms interchangeably. 
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• “There is an opaque barrier between the piece of food and the dominant, so he can’t 
see the piece of food—I’ll go for it.” 
• “There is a transparent barrier between the piece of food and the dominant, so he can 
see the piece of food—I won’t go for it.” 
Focusing on this intermediate inferential step ascribed to the subordinate, deflationist critics 
contend that the mindreading model posits more than is required to explain the behaviors 
observed in the food competition experiments. A behavior-reading model, on which the 
subordinate has only first-order mental states about the observable features of the situation, 
can account for the data just as well. According to this kind of behavior-reading model, the 
subordinate’s inferential steps (again, translated into English) would be of the following sort: 
• “There is an opaque barrier between the piece of food and the dominant—I’ll go for 
it.” 
• “There is a transparent barrier between the piece of food and the dominant—I won’t 
go for it.” 
In an echo of the logical problem discussed earlier in the chapter, both of these explanatory 
models seem to equally well account for the experimental results—the subordinate 
preferentially pursues the food behind the opaque barrier, but shows no preference in the 
transparent barrier condition—but the mindreading model has to posit an additional 
inferential step to do so, and it is this “excess” bit of inferential attribution that drives the 
deflationist critique.  
Our test case nicely illustrates the principle of conservatism in action, and it vindicates 
our interpretation of the principle as an appeal to parsimony: because a behavior-reading 
model is enough to account for the data, we should opt for it instead of its rival mindreading 
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model. Some deflationist critics of Hare et al. are more explicit than others about the greater 
parsimony behavior-reading models purportedly have82, but even when the appeal is implicit, 
it is clear that parsimony is what’s meant to be doing the work. 
If an appeal to parsimony is indeed driving the principle of conservatism, and if the 
principle is a legitimate inferential move, then it must be justified on grounds of parsimony. 
The focus of this section is whether that justificatory link actually holds, and that discussion 
must begin by noting a fundamental controversy about the philosophical-scientific 
conception of parsimony. Specifically, it is up for debate whether any conception of 
parsimony could hold generally across all domains of scientific investigation. When an 
astrophysicist claims her theory is simpler than its rival, for instance, it not obvious that her 
claim means the same thing, or has the same warrant, as would a similar claim made by a 
population geneticist. If parsimony can be given a viable domain-general conception, then 
appeals to parsimony mean the same thing, and are warranted for the same reasons, across all 
scientific domains. If not, then appeals to parsimony must be evaluated relative to the 
particular scientific domain in which they are made.  
So, if the principle of conservatism is justified on grounds of parsimony, there are 
only two ways that could be true: it might be justified in terms of a domain-general 
conception of parsimony, meaning that behavior-reading models are simpler than 
mindreading models irrespective of the background theories particular to this scientific domain. 
Alternatively, it might be justified in terms of a domain-specific conception of parsimony, 
meaning that what makes behavior-reading models simpler than mindreading models 
depends on particular features of the scientific domain in which these explanations are 
advanced. I argue that neither of these options works, implying that parsimony cannot justify 
                                                
82 Burkart & Heschl (2007) are quite explicit, for instance; Povinelli & Vonk (2006), less so. 
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the principle of conservatism; and that, since parsimony is the principle’s best hope, the 
principle is not justified. 
4.3.3.2 Conservatism as Domain-General Parsimony 
Let’s first suppose parsimony can be given a viable general account that justifies the 
principle of conservatism. Elliott Sober (2009) illustrates some problems with trying to make 
such an account work within a Bayesian hypothesis-testing framework, and proposes instead 
a framework from model selection theory, one which does not appeal to prior or posterior 
probabilities. In model selection theory as pioneered by Hirotsugu Akaike (1973), the goal of 
model selection is predictive accuracy. So the question is not “whether a model is true or 
probably true,” but “whether it will accurately predict new data when its parameters are fitted 
to old data” (Sober 2009, p. 243).83 
To get familiar with this framework, we can adapt a toy example from Sober (2009). 
Suppose we want to assess how asbestos exposure and smoking affect the probability of 
developing lung cancer. Simplifying the picture by treating these factors as dichotomous 
variables, and supposing we have frequency information about a sample population’s rate of 
lung cancer, asbestos exposure, and smoking, we can generate five different explanatory 
models: 
• Null, on which neither smoking nor asbestos exposure makes any difference to the 
likelihood of developing lung cancer. The only adjustable parameter in this model is b, 
the baseline probability of developing lung cancer in subjects who are not exposed to 
asbestos and do not smoke. 
                                                
83 In following this thread, we should surely not conflate predicting with explaining, nor should we mistake 
predictive accuracy for explanatory adequacy. Nonetheless, predictive accuracy is one important metric by which 
to judge the overall attractiveness of an explanatory theory, and it looms large in attempts to suss out the 
relevance of parsimony to choice between rival scientific theories.  
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• Only smoking, on which only smoking makes a difference. This model has two 
adjustable parameters: b and s, with the latter standing for the effect of smoking. 
• Only asbestos, on which only asbestos exposure makes a difference. This model also 
has two adjustable parameters: b and a, with the latter standing for the effect of 
asbestos exposure. 
• Two additive causes, on which smoking and asbestos exposure additively make a 
difference. This model has three adjustable parameters: b, s, and a. 
• Two interacting causes, on which smoking and asbestos interact in affecting the 
likelihood of developing lung cancer. This model has four adjustable parameters: b, s, 
a, and i, which latter stands for the interaction effect of smoking and asbestos 
exposure.  
To compare these models, we first fit each one to the observed data by generating an 
instantiation of the model that maximizes the probability of those data. In the case of two 
additive causes, for instance, we set the model’s adjustable parameters (b, s, and a) to values that 
give the best match to our frequency data. We can then compare the fitted models by 
computing their relative scores on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), a metric of a 
model’s predictive accuracy. The fine details of the AIC and its derivation are not germane 
here. What matters is that a model’s score depends on both goodness-of-fit and parsimony, 
and both will be sensitive to the number of adjustable parameters in the model. 
Ranking the relative parsimony of these models is easy: null is the simplest model, two 
interacting causes is the least simple, and so forth. More complex models incur higher 
“complexity penalties,” which means worse AIC scores. On the other hand, more complex 
models will usually be better able to fit the observed data, which means better AIC scores. So 
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weighing a model’s AIC score against those of its rivals will be a tradeoff between quality of 
fit and simplicity. If two models fit the data equally well, then parsimony can act as a 
tiebreaker—the simpler model will have the edge. But in cases where the rival models fit the 
data unequally well, parsimony still matters to the success of the model. Depending on exactly 
what the observed data show, a simpler model may be able to fit the data quite well, in which 
case it may be preferable. On the other hand, if the more complex model enjoys an advantage 
in quality of fit large enough to offset its complexity, it may be preferable to its simpler rival. 
Sober (2009) notes some attractive features of this conception of parsimony: it 
explains the notion that parsimony is not merely pragmatic (or an “aesthetic frill”), but 
actually affects the predictive accuracy of a model. Moreover, it is not just a tiebreaker, but 
can be used to compare models that fit the data unequally well. It further explains why 
scientists even bother testing idealized models, which are known not to be true. On this 
account, there is no mystery about why models known to be false aren’t simply thrown out, 
since a highly idealized model might be more predictively accurate than its less idealized rival. 
Now, applying this conception of parsimony to our test case of the food competition 
results, we want to know whether it can justify the principle of conservatism’s 
recommendation to prefer the behavior-reading model, other things being equal, to its 
mindreading rival. If the deflationist contention that a behavior-reading model is simpler than 
a mindreading model is correct, then the former must have fewer adjustable parameters than 
the latter. But as Sober (2009) shows, this need not be the case.  
Consider the frequency data obtained in the experimental conditions where an 
opaque barrier was and was not present, and where a transparent barrier was and was not 
present. We have our two candidate explanatory models, B (for behavior-reading) and M (for 
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mindreading). M need only have two adjustable parameters: p, the effect of the subordinate’s 
belief that the dominant does not see the food, and q, the effect of the subordinate’s belief that 
the dominant does see the food. B, by contrast, must have four adjustable parameters: r, the 
effect of the subordinate’s belief that there is an opaque barrier between the dominant and 
the food; s, the effect of the subordinate’s belief that there is no opaque barrier between the 
dominant and the food; t, the effect of the subordinate’s belief that there is an transparent 
barrier between the dominant and the food; and u, the effect of the subordinate’s belief that 
there is no transparent barrier between the dominant and the food. B has more adjustable 
parameters than M, making it better able to fit the observed data. And when we compare the 
AIC scores of these models, B might well turn out to fare better than M. But it isn’t simpler 
than M; in fact, it is less so. Therefore, if the principle of conservatism amounts to a 
preference for lower-order models because they are simpler, then the principle is mistaken. 
We should note two potential objections to this argument. First, the deflationist may 
say that by considering frequency data from several different experimental conditions—the 
presence and absence of an opaque barrier, the presence and absence of a transparent barrier, 
to be exact—we have unfairly hobbled model B. After all, this objection says, if we restrict 
our view to conditions in which an opaque barrier was or was not present, M and B have the 
same number of adjustable parameters (namely, two). That point is correct, but it doesn’t 
help the deflationist case. To see why, suppose we were to restrict our focus in this way. For 
one thing, B would no longer be superior to M in its ability to fit the observed frequency data, 
and while M would no longer be the simpler model, neither would it be less simple. The two 
models would merely be equally parsimonious, and equality of parsimony could not 
underwrite the principle of conservatism. More importantly, this response concedes a crucial 
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point: M can account for the results of multiple experimental conditions without increasing 
its number of adjustable parameters, while B has to introduce new adjustable parameters for 
each new experimental condition.84 In other words, M is the more unified model, which would 
seem to be a virtue rather than a drawback. 
The second objection is that we have performed some sleight-of-hand in describing 
M, making some of its adjustable parameters magically disappear. This objection begins by 
noting the widely-agreed-upon assumption that having second-order mental states requires 
having first-order mental states as well. On that basis, model M needs to include the same 
adjustable parameters for the subordinate’s first-order beliefs as B does, with these beliefs 
occurring in the causal chain between the physical features of the environment and the 
subordinate’s second-order beliefs. If this is right, then M has six adjustable parameters to B’s 
four, and is indeed less parsimonious. I think the right response here, which traces to an idea 
from Whiten (1996), is this: from the fact that M is consistent with, or even committed to, 
the claim that all second-order beliefs are caused by first-order beliefs, it does not follow that 
M must include adjustable parameters representing those first-order beliefs. More generally, a 
model can accommodate the claim that x has some causal role in the phenomenon being 
modeled without having to include an adjustable parameter to represent x. So the 
deflationists’ point that M includes an “extra” cognitive element—second-order beliefs in 
addition to first-order beliefs—can be granted without conceding that this “extra” element 
necessarily renders the model less parsimonious (Sober, 2009, p. 254). 
4.3.3.3 Conservatism as Domain-Specific Parsimony 
                                                
84 This point might be more secure put in the following, more modest way:  there are no circumstances in which 
M, but not B, would need to increase its number of adjustable parameters to account for additional experimental 
conditions. 
 
 
165 
 
So, on a domain-general conception of parsimony, the principle of conservatism is 
not justified. If it were, then higher-order models would be eo ipso less parsimonious than 
their lower-order rivals—but, as we have seen, introducing higher-order intentionality into 
models can actually render them simpler than their lower-order rivals. If parsimony can justify 
the principle of conservatism, then, it must be a domain-specific conception of parsimony 
that does the job. On such a conception, the principle holds that lower-order models are 
simpler than higher-order models in the specific sense of parsimony operative in the debate 
over the scientific evidence for nonlinguistic mindreading. The problem with this suggestion 
is that once we give up on a general conception of parsimony, there appear to be a number of 
different types of parsimony to which one could appeal in proposing or critiquing an 
explanatory model. These different types of parsimony are not only dissociable—they can be 
in direct conflict.  
We have already seen one example of this fact prefigured in the last section, so let’s 
again consider the rival models M and B proposed to account for the food competition data. 
The deflationist may claim that B is the simpler model, with simplicity here understood as 
dependent on the number of kinds of mental representations in a model. The thrust of such a claim 
is that what counts in cognitive science, or at least this branch of it, is adequately explaining 
the target phenomenon with as few different kinds of mental representations as possible. And 
since B posits only first-order mental representations, while M posits both first- and second-
order mental representations, B is the simpler model. Score one, it seems, for the 
deflationists.  
However, the inflationists may reply (as in Tomasello & Call, 2006) that what really 
matters for parsimony in this context is theoretical unification. They point out that B needs to 
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introduce a new first-order psychological competence for every data set obtained from a new 
experimental condition, and when all the experimental evidence is in view, B turns out to be a 
massive and ungainly conjunction of thinly-connected first-order competences: “Chimps 
understand the connections between opaque barrier placement and food accessibility AND 
the connections between transparent barrier placement and food accessibility AND the 
connections between…etc.” By contrast, M can cover all the experimental evidence with a 
single second-order competence: “Chimps understand seeing” (Tomasello & Call, 2006, p. 
381). If theoretical unification is what matters for parsimony in cognitive science, then M is 
simpler. Score one, it seems, for the inflationists. 
The point of this discussion is not to claim that inflationists have a clear edge when it 
comes to making appeals to domain-specific parsimony; indeed, the real problem is that we 
have no sense of how either side in the debate could have an edge at all. We don’t know which 
features of a model determine how parsimonious the model is, and we have no clue about 
how to assign importance to different sorts of parsimony, of which there are far more than 
the two we have just rehearsed. Fitzpatrick (2009) runs through a few more prominent 
possibilities, including this intriguing one: “when closely related species such as chimpanzees 
and humans are found to behave in similar ways it is simpler, evolutionarily speaking, to posit 
homologous cognitive mechanisms in order to account for this similarity” (p. 267). This 
evolutionarily-based type of parsimony would seem to favor the mindreading model—but, 
again, we have no sense of how much weight to give it.  
Furthermore, and more basically, we don’t have a sense of why an appeal to a specific 
type of parsimony is justified. Even if it is right to say that one model is simpler in a particular 
sense than another, why does that constitute anything beyond a certain sort of aesthetic 
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advantage? A domain-general framework that connects a model’s parsimony to its predictive 
accuracy has a story to tell about why simplicity really matters, but outside of such a 
framework it’s not clear what can be said about the present case.85 
4.3.3.4 Jettisoning the Principle of Conservatism: Implications 
In the debate over nonlinguistic mindreading, weak deflationists often employ the 
principle of conservatism: an inferential rule of thumb that lower-order, behavior-reading 
models are preferable to higher-order mindreading models. We have used a specific instance 
of this debate, the controversy over the food competition results with chimpanzees, to see 
how this principle functions. I have argued that the principle is best interpreted as an appeal 
to parsimony: other things equal, behavior-reading models are preferable to mindreading 
models because they are simpler. 
For the principle to be legitimate, some justificatory link would have to hold between 
the preference for lower-order models and the preference for simpler models. But no matter 
how one conceives of parsimony, this justificatory link fails to hold. If one opts for a domain-
general conception of parsimony, the principle of conservatism has no purchase, because 
whether a behavior-reading model is superior to a mindreading model will depend on how we 
build those models and especially on how the data turn out. On this conception, parsimony 
gives no antecedent reason to prefer lower-order models to higher-order ones. Nor can the 
principle of conservatism stand on a domain-specific conception of parsimony. At best, it 
may be granted that a lower-order model is simpler in a particular respect than its higher-order 
rival, other things being equal. But this does not tell us why we should care about this sort of 
parsimony at all, much less enough to make it more important than other sorts of parsimony 
in which higher-order models may be superior. I conclude that, barring fresh justification or a 
                                                
85 Though see Fitzpatrick (2009) for some interesting ideas. 
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wholesale reinterpretation, the principle of conservatism should be thrown out as an 
inferential guide. 
In the short term, this conclusion damages the deflationist position by rebutting a 
prominent line of deflationist argument (Povinelli & Vonk, 2004; Burkart & Heschl, 2007). 
And since what is bad for deflationism is good for inflationism, the foregoing should give a 
boost to certain inflationist claims. As regards the specific debate over chimpanzees and 
visual perspective-taking, the evidence for the mindreading hypothesis appears to be quite 
strong. In at least the case of chimpanzees and the ability to know what others can see, there 
do appear to be nonlinguistic mindreaders. And more generally, because the principle of 
conservatism has been used widely and often, rejecting it boosts the prima facie plausibility of 
other forms of nonlinguistic mindreading, of the sorts that have been proposed in animals, 
infants, and persons with linguistic or other cognitive impairments. 
Blocking the principle of conservatism is itself a negative result; nonetheless, it’s a 
result that represents progress on the General Admission Domain Problem. If the problem is 
to be cracked, we need to sort the good guiding principles from the bad ones, and the 
principle of conservatism—as currently articulated—is an impediment to scientific progress. 
And beyond revealing the problems with this particular principle, the foregoing discussion 
shows that any time we wish to compare explanatory psychological models in terms of 
parsimony, we face some complex and fraught choices. If we opt for a domain-general or 
domain-specific conception of parsimony, the Akaike-Sober framework gives us a relatively 
straightforward way of comparing rival explanatory models, even if they fit the data unequally 
well. If we doubt, as we might, the viability of domain-general conceptions of parsimony, we 
may favor a domain-specific conception. That might be the best way forward, but it will 
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require saying much more about what kinds of factors matter for parsimony in this scientific 
domain, how we weigh those factors against one another, and why, in this scientific domain, 
we should care about parsimony in the first place. 
To generalize from this point, I have argued that progress on the Domain Problem(s) 
depends on empirical investigation guided by sound inferential principles. But several of the 
most widely cited methodological rules of thumb in this area—anti-anthropomorphism, 
Morgan’s Canon, the principle of conservatism—have turned out to be unhelpful. Despite 
their popularity, these principles are problematic at best, and downright counterproductive at 
worst.  
 
4.4 CONCLUSION: MOVING FORWARD IN THE WORLD OF OTHERS 
In this chapter and the previous one, many of my conclusions have been couched in 
negative terms; nonetheless, they represent a genuine advance in drawing the boundaries of 
mindreading’s domain. I would now like to conclude this dissertation, first by looking 
backward to summarize its trajectory, and then by venturing some speculative claims about 
how we might move forward from here. 
Questions about folk psychology have animated philosophers and psychologists alike 
for at least the last 50 years—yet in certain fundamental respects the phenomenon has 
remained frustratingly obscure. This dissertation has tried to clear away some of those 
obscurities, beginning with the very meaning of the term “folk psychology.” In the first 
chapter, I delineated two senses of this term, and offered a meaning worth wanting for its 
internal sense, based on my notion of “sub-substantive mindreading:” for any creature X in a 
social interaction, folk psychology is the psychological capacity that underwrites X’s behavior being 
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systematically dependent upon changes in the psychological states of the interactor, in virtue of X’s psychological 
states systematically tracking the interactor’s. 
With a tentative solution to the Meaning Problem in hand, in chapter 2 I took up the 
question of how this capacity works—what I have called the Character Problem. Using the 
debate over the role of mirror neurons in mindreading as a representative test case, I showed 
that the traditional ways of solving the Character Problem are weighed down by basic 
confusions about core concepts such as theory and simulation. By offering the sketch of a new 
approach, based on the unifying, integrative idea of folk psychology as a model, I showed how 
the respective advantages of theory theory and simulationism can be incorporated into a 
single conceptual framework.  
Finally, the last two chapters have addressed the Domain Problem—which, as I 
argue, is really two problems we ought to keep distinct. Setting aside the first of those 
problems—What is the role of mindreading in normally-functioning adult human cognition?, I have 
focused on the second: Who are the mindreaders? Pursuing that question means considering the 
metaphysical and empirical credentials of the notion that the domain of mindreaders might 
include nonlinguistic creatures. This hypothesis, while no longer seen as radical, still faces 
intense resistance within the cognitive-scientific community, particularly among philosophers. 
The upshot of chapter 3 is that nonlinguistic mindreading, despite apparently powerful 
arguments to the contrary, is indeed possible. Chapter 4 tries to identify constructive (and 
obstructive) scientific approaches to this problem, and argues that, in at least some cases, we 
have good reason to think nonlinguistic mindreading is actual. 
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Having briefly reviewed this project’s major arguments and theses, I will now try to 
say something about how it fits into my broader concerns in the philosophy of mind, and 
about its possible long-term implications. 
Philosophers of mind want to understand mind itself, and this goal centrally includes 
the task of determining the extent to which there are continuities between different kinds of 
minds. And that means, quite obviously, that we need to investigate all sorts of minds. It 
won't do to “merely” understand the minds of normal human adults—as if we were 
anywhere close to doing even that! The more we can learn about the points of similarity and 
difference that exist across and between human adults, non-human animals, infants, persons 
with neurological insults or cognitive disabilities, and the like, the more we can reasonably 
hope to learn about the nature of mind itself. 
I have been especially exercised by certain questions in this region of philosophical 
space. To what extent are animal minds like human minds? We know that animals don’t use 
language, or that if any do, they don’t use it in anything like the way we do. How much does 
that matter, cognitively speaking? What does language allow a mind to do? What are the 
limits of what a mind can do in the absence of language? How do we probe, in scientifically 
respectable and fruitful ways, the nature and abilities of nonlinguistic minds? Might the fact 
that we talk in language lead us to overestimate the extent to which we think in language, or 
the extent to which certain cognitive abilities are tied to language? 
These questions are difficult enough on their own, and all the more difficult when we 
approach them with the baggage of conceptual confusion, spurious arguments, and 
unfounded empirical theses. This dissertation seeks to throw off some of that baggage, so 
that we can more fruitfully pursue these urgent philosophical and scientific questions.  
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I have my hunches about where that pursuit is likely to lead, of course. Results from 
cognitive ethology, developmental psychology, and related fields have increasingly pointed 
toward the existence of deep continuities between mammalian minds and brains, and even 
between those of mammals and other non-human animals. The chief upshot of this 
dissertation’s latter half are in line with those findings: the continuities between linguistic and 
nonlinguistic cognition may be deeper and more numerous than philosophers and 
psychologists have tended to suppose. As we develop better experimental methods for 
probing the minds of non-human animals, prelinguistic infants, and adults with linguistic and 
other cognitive disabilities, we may find—indeed, I submit we have already begun to find—
surprisingly robust forms of rationality, metacognition, and intersubjectivity. 
Such results cannot help but have implications outside of cognitive science proper. 
The world of others is, by definition, a shared world; we share it with our fellow human 
beings, and they with us. Whether and to what extent non-human animals share in that 
world—the world of other minds, we might say—remains a mystery. But it’s a mystery we are 
starting to unravel, and as we do so, the world of others may change its shape. Surely our 
beliefs about the minds of nonlinguistic creatures have informed our attitudes and practices 
toward them, and surely the accuracy of those beliefs is relevant to the moral justification of 
our attitudes and practices. If, when we look with clear eyes, we find good reason to expand 
our sense of what nonlinguistic creatures’ minds can do, then we may also come to find ways 
of thinking about and interacting with these creatures that are both more scientifically 
respectable and more compassionate. 
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